Lafleur v. Hugine
| Decision Date | 24 September 2013 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO.: CV-12-J-2315-NE |
| Parties | WENDOLYN LAFLEUR, PLAINTIFF, v. DR. ANDREW HUGINE, JR., et al., DEFENDANTS. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
Pending before the court is the defendants' motion for summary judgment (doc. 26), memorandum (doc. 28), and evidence in support of said motion (doc. 27), to which the plaintiff has submitted a response (doc. 33) and evidence in opposition (doc. 34). The defendant thereafter filed a reply (doc. 39). Having considered the pleadings, evidence and memoranda of the parties, the court finds as follows:
Plaintiff sued her past employer on a variety of counts. By stipulation dated July 29, 2013 (doc. 23), the plaintiff represented to the court that she is only pursuing her claim under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq. (Count VI), and her claim for violation of her due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution (Count VII). Thus, by separate order, the court shall dismiss plaintiff's claims for Declaratory Judgment(Count I), Race Discrimination (Count II), Petition for Writ of Mandamus (Count III), Tortious Interference with Contract (Count IV), and False Claims Act (Count V). The parties have also stipulated that plaintiff is not pursuing any claims against defendants Larry Powers, Chasidy Privett, or Dr. Chris I. Enyinda, and the court shall dismiss all claims against these defendants by separate order.
Pursuant to yearly contracts between Alabama A&M University and the Alabama Department of Education, the plaintiff conducted training on how to incorporate technology into curricula for kindergarten through twelfth grade schools in a twelve county territory of North Alabama. See e.g., plaintiff depo. at 62-63, 116-117, 158; defendant exhs. 2, 7, 8 to plaintiff depo. From 2001 forward, funding for this position was provided to Alabama A&M University by the Alabama Department of Education. Plaintiff depo. at 123. As a Technology in Motion ("TiM") Trainer, the plaintiff was employed through Alabama A&M's Regional Inservice Center. However, she was also supervised by Cheri Hayes, the TiM Administrator for the Alabama Department of Education. Plaintiff depo. at 145-148.
Although plaintiff voiced many complaints during her employment as a TiM Trainer, the facts relevant to the issue before this court concern only her termination from that position. She asserts she was terminated in violation of her due processrights, and in violation of her rights under the FMLA. The plaintiff's issues with her employment began after defendant Dr. Tammy Alexander replaced Dr. Lou Ann Jacobs as the Regional Inservice Center Director. See e.g., plaintiff depo. at 141-142. Dr. Alexander became the Director in August 2007. Alexander depo. at 23. Plaintiff's grievances and other complaints concerning Dr. Alexander's treatment of her began in 2010. See e.g., defendant exhs. 10, 16 and 19 at 5-6 to plaintiff depo. Dr. Alexander testified that beginning in May 2010, she raised concerns she had with plaintiff regarding the consistency of her performance. Alexander depo. at 35-39. Based on a change to the travel policy implemented by Alabama A&M in December 2010, plaintiff's visits to local area schools declined. Alexander depo. at 71-72. Despite meeting with plaintiff and Cheri Hayes to fashion a means by which the new travel policy would not impact the plaintiff's job, the plaintiff traveled very little from January 2011 to May 2011. Alexander depo. at 75-76.
On August 22, 2011, the plaintiff requested medical leave from that date until September 2, 2011, due to job related stress.1 Plaintiff depo. at 211-212, 218-223, 270; defendant exhs. 5 and 6 to plaintiff depo. Alabama A&M granted the leave she requested. Plaintiff depo. at 223-224. Dr. Alexander wrote to Dr. Andrew Hugine,Jr., President of Alabama A&M University, on September 7, 2011, seeking permission to terminate the plaintiff. Plaintiff depo. at 328-329, defendant exh. 11 to plaintiff depo. When plaintiff returned to the officer on September 12, 2011, she was terminated by Alabama A&M.2 Plaintiff depo. at 225; defendant exh 12. Plaintiff testified that this decision was made only by Alabama A&M, and not by the Alabama Board of Education. Plaintiff depo. at 148-149. When Dr. Alexander received approval for plaintiff's termination, she notified Cheri Hayes of the same. Alexander depo. at 90.
According to Dr. Alexander, her decision to terminate plaintiff arose from considerations such as that plaintiff was not "out in the field" enough to "move the program forward" and that plaintiff was "inflexible" concerning new procedures being implemented both by Dr. Alexander and by Alabama A&M. Alexander depo. at 42-44, 47-48, 61-62, 68-69. She testified that the decision to terminate plaintiff was actually made in April 2011 and unrelated to plaintiff's FMLA leave.3 Id., at 64,101; Johnson depo., at 116-117, 179-180; defendant exh. 2 to Johnson depo. Dr. Alexander raised her concerns with plaintiff's productivity in plaintiff's May 2011 performance review. Alexander depo. at 52-56. In response, plaintiff alleged the evaluation was evidence of additional harassment, hostility and retaliation by Dr. Alexander.4 Plaintiff exhs. 10 and 11 to Alexander depo. Plaintiff asserted her reduced productivity was a direct result of Dr. Alexander's policies. See plaintiff exh. 11 at 312, 333, 335
The plaintiff agrees she was a staff employee, as opposed to a faculty member, of Alabama A&M, and thus an "at-will" employee and subject to termination without cause with three weeks notice. Plaintiff depo. at 247-248, 252, 278, 335. See also Johnson depo. at 42, 52, 63, 113. The letter she received September 12, 2011, informed plaintiff she would be paid through September 30, 2011, which she was. Plaintiff depo. at 327-328; plaintiff exh. 1 to Alexander depo. Pursuant to the staff handbook, which plaintiff acknowledged receiving, the plaintiff received the noticeshe was due prior to a termination without cause.5 See e.g., defendant exhs. 3 and 4 to plaintiff depo.
Upon her termination, the plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC. Defendant exh. 20 to plaintiff depo. Although plaintiff lists many bases for her belief her termination was discriminatory, she did not mention violation of her FMLA rights in that Charge. Id. She also submitted an employee grievance on September 15, 2011, contesting her termination. Plaintiff exh. 11 to Johnson depo.
A moving party is entitled to summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact, leaving final judgment to be decided as a matter of law. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-56 (1986). An issue is "material" if it is a legal element of the claim under the applicable substantive law which might affect the outcome of the case. It is "genuine" if the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir.1997).
The facts, and any reasonable inferences therefrom, are to be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, with any doubt resolved in the nonmovant's favor. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1609 (1970). Once met by the moving party, however, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to come forward with evidence to establish each element essential to that party's case sufficient to sustain a jury verdict. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986); Earley v. Champion Int'l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir.1990).
A party opposing a properly submitted motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Eberhardt v. Waters, 901 F.2d 1578, 1580 (11th Cir.1990). In addition, the non-moving party's evidence on rebuttal must be significantly probative and not based on mere assertion or be merely colorable. See Rule 56(e); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986). Speculation does not create a genuine issue of fact. Cordoba v. Dillard's, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir.2005).
The court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and may not make credibility determinations nor weigh the parties' evidence.Frederick v. Sprint/United Management Co. 246 F.3d 1305, 1311 (11th Cir.2001); Stewart v. Booker T. Washington Ins., 232 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir.2000). With these standards in mind, the court considers the plaintiff's claims.
A. FMLA Claim
The FMLA entitles a covered employee to take up to twelve weeks of leave in a twelve month period for a "serious health condition" of the employee. Smith v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 273 F.3d 1303, 1305 (11th Cir.2001). The FMLA prohibits an employer from interfering with this right. 29 U.S.C. § 2615.
Unrelated to the merits of this claim, the defendants argue that the plaintiff's FMLA claim against them in their individual capacities is due to be dismissed. Defendants' brief, at 21-22. Plaintiff's response in opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment clarifies that her claim under the FMLA is brought solely against the defendants in their official capacities.6 See plaintiff's memorandum (doc. 34) at 1, 11. In their official capacities, the defendants are "state officials" forpurposes of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. The plaintiff concedes that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits for monetary damages against state officials in their official capacities. Plaintiff's memorandum, at 14. The court considers this claim only to the extent that the...
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