Lagana v. Stop & Shop, Inc.

• Decision Date: 03 August 1962
• Docket Number: No. CV,CV
• Citation: 186 A.2d 565,24 Conn.Supp. 64
• Court: Circuit Court of Connecticut. Connecticut Circuit Court, Appellate Division
• Parties: , 24 Conn.Supp. 64 Mary LAGANA v. STOP AND SHOP, INC. 14-612-1275.

Page 565

186 A.2d 565

1 Conn.Cir.Ct. 400, 24 Conn.Supp. 64

Mary LAGANA v. STOP AND SHOP, INC.

No. CV 14-612-1275.

Circuit Court of Connecticut, Appellate Division.

Argued May 11, 1962.

Decided Aug. 3, 1962.

George A. Downing, Manchester, for appellant (defendant).

Arthur L. Spada, Hartford, for appellee (plaintiff).

GEORGE, Judge.

The error assigned in this case is the claim that the plaintiff had failed to prove the essential allegations of her complaint, and that as a matter of law the court should have directed a verdict for the defendant or set aside the verdict or rendered a judgment non obstante veredicto. Other error is predicated upon the court's claimed failure to charge the jury as requested.

An appellate court, in reviewing a motion to set aside a verdict, acts primarily upon the decision of the trial court. The trial court has large discretion in acting upon the motion; however, it is a legal discretion, and an appellate court interferes only where the trial court misapplies or mistakes some principle of law, or manifestly abuses a discretion. McKone v. Schott, 82 Conn. 70, 71, 72 A. 570. In the weighing of such a motion, based on the insufficiency of the evidence, great weight is to be given to the decision of the trial court, and every reasonable presumption is to be made in its favor, for the trial court and the jury have had the advantage of hearing the testimony and seeing the witnesses. Caldwell v. Danforth, 124 Conn. 468, 471, 200 A. 577. On appeal, the evidence and the facts are to be taken in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Uncas Paper Co. v. Corbin, 75 Conn. 675, 677, 55 A. 165. 'The concurrence of * * * the jury especially when their conclusion is supported by the presiding judge, all of whom have had the opportunity of seeing and hearing the witnesses, comes to this court with weighty considerations in its favor, and should and will not be disturbed unless it clearly appears that the action of the jury was unreasonable or motivated by improper considerations or that the presiding judge has exceeded his discretionary control over the verdict.' Amellin v. Leone, 114 Conn. 478, 479, 159 A. 293.

It is the right of the jury, as the trier, to accept all or part of the testimony of any witness, though opposed by others; to resolve discrepancies in the testimony of witnesses; or to believe or disbelieve evidence as the jury may see fit. Zullo v. Zullo, 138 Conn. 712, 715, 89 A.2d 216; DeLahunta v. City of Waterbury, 134 Conn. 630, 635, 59 A.2d 800, 7 A.L.R.2d 218; Chase v. Fitzgerald, 132 Conn. 461, 465, 45 A.2d 789, 163 A.L.R. 247; Lockwood v. Helfant, 126 Conn. 584, 586, 13 A.2d 136. The trier may also draw reasonable and logical inferences. Whether the facts proven warrant a particular inference is for the trier to determine, and its conclusions must stand unless no reasonable person could reach them. Bruce v. McElhannon, 141 Conn. 44, 47, 103 A.2d 335.

The jury might have found the following facts: On March 3, 1960, and for some time prior thereto, the defendant owned and operated a supermarket on Albany Avenue in Hartford. The store had one entranceway, with large windows on either side of the front door reaching from the floor to the ceiling. Inside the entranceway, the floor was constructed of terrazzo. The outdoors was clearly visible from inside through the large windows. Immediately inside the front door, on the entrance floor of terrazzo, with no abrasive substance on it, was a rubber mat measuring four and one-half feet long. This mat did not cover the whole entranceway, for in each rainstorm or snowstorm the defendant would lay a large, eighteen-foot rubber mat inside, as an extension from the smaller mat. Had this large mat been down at the time of the plaintiff's fall, it would have covered the entire area of the situs of the accident.

The evidence from the weather reports was conflicting. The plaintiff's exhibit 4 was the report of the Travelers weather service. These observations were made in downtown Hartford and not too far from the site of the accident. Defendant's exhibit A was the report of the United States weather bureau. These observations were made at Bradley Field, some miles from the defendant's supermarket. The jury had a right to choose the plaintiff's weather report as having greater applicability to the problem at hand, as they apparently did. DeLahunta v. City of Waterbury, supra; Zullo v. Zullo, supra. The jury could have found from the weather report and the other physical facts that it had commenced to snow near the premises of the defendant at 11 a. m. on the morning of the accident. At first the snow did not adhere to the ground. By 2 p. m. three-hundredths of an inch of snow had fallen.

At approximately 1:20 p. m. on this day, the plaintiff, a housewife forty-six years old, started to walk from a friend's house to the store of the defendant, arriving there some five or six minutes later. As she walked along, the snow was falling and melting as it struck the ground. She was wearing shoes with leather heels, and the jury could have found, and indeed could hardly escape finding, that the bottoms of her shoes became wet. As the plaintiff entered the store, at approximately 1:26 p. m., she stepped first on the small rubber mat, then on the terrazzo floor where the large rubber mat would ordinarily have been, had it been in place. As she stepped on the terrazzo floor, her left foot slipped from under her and she fell backward, landing upon her back about two feet beyond and inside from the floor mat, sustaining personal injries.

It had snowed in varying amounts from 11 a. m. to 1:26 p. m. The...