Lagasse v. Lagasse

• Decision Date: 26 June 1985
• Citation: 478 N.E.2d 154,20 Mass.App.Ct. 911
• Parties: Shirley LAGASSE, Administratrix, v. Gary T. LAGASSE (and a companion case 1 ).
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

Page 154

478 N.E.2d 154

20 Mass.App.Ct. 911

Shirley LAGASSE, Administratrix, v. Gary T. LAGASSE (and a companion case ¹).

Appeals Court of Massachusetts,

Middlesex.

Argued April 9, 1985.

Decided May 20, 1985.

Further Appellate Review Denied

June 26, 1985.

Edward Woll, Jr., Boston, for David W. Murray.

Robert P. Sullivan, Lowell, for Shirley Lagasse.

John C. McCullough, Charlestown, for Donald J. Loiselle.

Before ARMSTRONG, KAPLAN and KASS, JJ.

RESCRIPT.

After Shirley Lagasse, as administratrix of the estate of her husband, Richard, received a license to sell a parcel of real estate, a co-owner, Livia Lagasse (Richard's first wife), received an apparent offer to sell the property for more than the upset price in the license. Shirley and Livia both had signed an agreement to sell the property for $650,000 to a David W. Murray, i.e., Livia and the estate would each receive $325,000 in gross proceeds. Uncertain as to her obligations under the agreement, Livia brought a complaint in the Probate Court for declaratory relief.

A judgment was entered in the declaratory judgment action but sounded an uncertain note. In the meantime, Murray had brought an action in the Superior Court to establish his right to conveyance of the property. That action is scheduled for trial in June, 1985. We think the interests of judicial economy and the parties will best be served if questions left over from the Probate Court proceedings are resolved in the pending action in the Superior Court.

A short history of, and commentary upon, the proceedings to date is desirable.

Asserting a need to raise funds to pay debts of the estate and receipt of an advantageous offer, Shirley, the administratrix, petitioned in the Probate Court for a license to sell for $325,000, or for a larger sum, an undivided one-half interest in land owned by the decedent in Chelmsford. The other one-half interest was owned by Livia. Following citation and a hearing, at which Gary T. Lagasse, son of the decedent, noted his objection, a Probate Court judge on May 18, 1984, granted a license to sell the property in question at private sale for $325,000, or for a larger sum, or at public auction, should the administratrix "think best so to do." See generally G.L. c. 202, §§ 1-10, 14, 15, 20, 20A; Onanian v. Leggat, 2 Mass.App. 623, 317 N.E.2d 823 (1974); 1 Newhall, Settlement of Estates §§ 119-129 (4th ed. 1958 & Supp.1984); Massachusetts Probate Manual c.X, at X-3 to X-7 (2d ed. MCLE 1983). The advantageous offer to which the petition referred was made by Murray and memorialized in a purchase and sale agreement signed by the administratrix, by Livia, by Murray, and, for what it was worth, by a daughter of the decedent.

Approximately eight months after the filing of the petition for a license to sell and about two weeks before a hearing on that petition, Livia filed a complaint in the Probate Court seeking, among other things, a declaratory judgment as to whether she, in the face of a better offer, was bound by the agreement with Murray. On a short order of notice, Livia's complaint was consolidated for hearing with the petition for a license to sell. The judge declared (although, as will appear, there is some doubt on this score) that neither Livia nor Shirley was bound and Murray appeals from that judgment. Shirley joins Murray in the appeal.

1. Jurisdiction of the Probate Court over the declaratory judgment proceeding. Although inarticulately stated, the major item of declaratory relief which Livia sought was whether she was obliged to perform specifically the purchase and sale agreement which she had signed. ² That question fits into a traditional equity niche and, accordingly, a Probate Court may entertain it under the equity jurisdiction conferred by G.L. c. 215, § 6. Compare Foster v. Evans, 384 Mass. 687, 690-694, 429 N.E.2d 995 (1981), and Konstantopoulos v. Whately, 384 Mass. 123, 126-129, 424 N.E.2d 210 (1981). We are unpersuaded by Murray's arguments to the contrary. Similarly, we find no merit in Murray's position that Livia's complaint posed no controversy. Whether she might be liable to Murray in specific performance (or damages) should she sell to someone else strikes us as a conventional justiciable question. See School Comm. of Cambridge v. Superintendent of Schs. of Cambridge, 320 Mass. 516, 518-519, 70 N.E.2d 298 (1946); Willcutt v. Prescott, 340 Mass. 532, 535, 165 N.E.2d 104 (1960). In event of doubt, G.L. c. 231A is to be construed broadly as to the existence of a controversy. Pistorino & Co. v. Style Leather Co., 361 Mass. 464, 468, 280 N.E.2d 676 (1972).

2. The license to sell. As a postscript to his allowance of the license to sell, the judge, a month after entry of the decree, issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. None of the findings of fact or conclusions of law vitiates the decree allowing the license to sell; they do not refute the conclusion of the decree that it was expedient for the estate to sell the property and that an advantageous offer had been received. The judge's findings and conclusions may have grown out of the declaratory relief proceeding; insofar as they purport to pertain to the license to sell, they are superfluous. The judge's conclusions of law express his opinion that the purchase and sale agreement is incomplete and, therefore, unenforceable. Those conclusions are, therefore, adverse to Murray who was not--and could not have been--a party to the license to sell proceedings. Against the possibility that the findings of fact and conclusions of law might be given weight in the proceedings about that agreement now pending in Superior Court, we order that they be struck.

3. Resolution of the declaratory judgment action. In his first pass at a resolution of the declaratory judgment, the judge issued a document entitled "Partial Judgment." That paper "continued for trial" all substantive matters raised by the complaint, i.e., the rights of the parties in connection with the Murray purchase and sale agreement and the accounting and contribution issues among the owners of the real estate. Murray moved for entry of final judgment under Mass.R.Civ.P. 54(b), 365 Mass. 821 (1974). In response, the judge revoked the "partial judgment" sua sponte and published findings of fact and conclusions of law. There followed the entry of a final judgment which may be read as a declaration that the Murray purchase and sale agreement does not bind the parties to it and a consequent refusal to get into the accounting and contribution issues.

So much of the judgment as says that the parties are not bound by the Murray agreement cannot be squared with the judge's last conclusion of law, viz., "Any rights David W. Murray may have individually against any or all of the persons interested in said Petition for Leave to Sell Real Estate [the reference, presumably, is to the proceeding in which the administratrix sought a license to sell] or the other parties to this action are subject to determination in any suit or action at law or in equity he may choose to bring or pursue."

In addition to that fundamental inconsistency, on the basis of which we think the judgment had best be vacated, there are errors in the underlying conclusions of law. Those conclusions fail to differentiate between the position of Livia, as owner of an undivided interest in her own right, Shirley, the administratrix, as a fiduciary, and the heirs of Richard C. Lagasse. The refusal of Gary Lagasse and Sandra G. Shipko (who, on the basis of the record, approves the sale to Murray) and Rose Gendron (the life tenant) to...