School Committee of Cambridge v. Superintendent of Schools of Cambridge

• Decision Date: 04 December 1946
• Citation: 320 Mass. 516,70 N.E.2d 298
• Parties: SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF CAMBRIDGE v. SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CAMBRIDGE (and a companion case [1]).
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

320 Mass. 516

70 N.E.2d 298

SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF CAMBRIDGE v. SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CAMBRIDGE (and a companion case ^[1]).

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

December 4, 1946

October 10, 1946.

Present: FIELD, C.

J., DOLAN, RONAN WILKINS, & SPALDING, JJ.

Declaratory Judgment. Equity Jurisdiction, Declaratory relief. Words "Actual controversy." A bill in equity seeking a declaratory decree under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c.

231A, inserted by St. 1945, c. 582, Section 1, is sufficient if it sets forth a real dispute caused by the assertion by one party of a legal relation, status or right in which he has a definite interest, and the denial of such assertion by another party also having a definite interest in the subject matter, where the circumstances attending the dispute plainly indicate that unless the matter is adjusted such antagonistic claims will almost immediately and inevitably lead to litigation. Per RONAN J.

Averments in a bill in equity by a school committee against persons, whom the committee had elected respectively as superintendent and as assistant superintendent of schools after they had served for the three previous consecutive school years as assistant superintendent of schools and as a head master, respectively that a controversy existed between the committee and the defendants as to whether upon their election they became employed to serve at discretion under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 71,

Section 41, or whether they must subsequently be elected respectively as superintendent and as assistant superintendent for three consecutive school years before they would be entitled to serve at discretion, disclosed the existence of an "actual controversy" within

Section 1 of c. 231A, inserted by St. 1945, c. 582, Section 1, which should be terminated by a decree declaring the rights of the parties.

TWO BILLS IN EQUITY, filed in the Superior Court on March 4, 1946. Demurrers of the defendants were heard and sustained by Baker, J., who reported the cases.

J. A. Daly, City Solicitor, for the plaintiffs. H. R. Donaghue, for the defendants.

RONAN, J. These are two bills in equity filed by the school committee of Cambridge, who on January 15, 1945, elected Tobin, the defendant in the first suit, and Harrington, the defendant in the second suit, the superintendent and the assistant superintendent, respectively, of the schools of that city. It is alleged that Tobin, prior to his election, had served for more than three previous consecutive school years as assistant superintendent, and that Harrington, at the time of his election, had served for more than three such years as head master of one of the public schools of Cambridge. The bills alleged that doubt and a controversy exist as to whether each defendant upon his election, by virtue of G. L (Ter. Ed.) c. 71, Section 41, became employed to serve at the discretion of the committee or whether he must be subsequently elected for three successive school years to the position to which he was elected on January 15, 1945, before he is entitled to serve at the discretion of the committee. Each defendant, it is alleged, contends that he is now holding his respective position at the discretion of the committee as provided for by said Section 41. The plaintiffs aver that they "do not admit such contention and dispute the interpretation of the law as contended for by the defendant." The plaintiffs seek declaratory judgments under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 231A, as inserted by St. 1945, c. 582, Section 1, adjudging the tenure of office of the defendants. After sustaining the demurrers of the defendants, the judge reported the suits to this court.

The question raised by each of the demurrers is whether the bill discloses the existence of an actual controversy within the meaning of c. 231A, Section 1, of such a nature that it can and should be terminated by a decree declaring the rights of the parties, or whether the allegations contained in the bill go no farther than to disclose a mere difference of opinion between the parties and an attempt on the part of the plaintiffs to secure an advisory opinion which will serve them as a guide to future action.

An "actual controversy," as those words are employed in c. 231A, is not limited to instances where the rights of one party have been impaired or damaged by the act of another. One of the benefits of the declaratory procedure is that it does not require one to incur the risk of violating some term of a contract or of invading some right of the other, even if done in good faith, before he may have relief. Indeed, our act provides that one may seek a declaratory judgment or decree "either before or after a breach or violation thereof has occurred in any case in which an actual controversy has arisen." G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 231A, Section 1. We think a pleading is sufficient if it sets forth a real dispute caused by the assertion by one party of a legal relation, status or right in which he has a definite interest, and the denial of such assertion by another party also having a definite interest in the subject matter, where the circumstances attending the dispute plainly indicate that unless the matter is adjusted such antagonistic claims will almost immediately and inevitably lead to litigation. United States Galvanizing & Plating Equipment Corp. v. Hanson-Van Winckle-Munning Co. 104 F.2d 856. Creamery Package Manuf. Co. v. Cherry-Burrell Corp. 115 F.2d 980. Scott v. Alabama State Bridge Corp. 233 Ala. 12. State v. General American Life Ins. Co. 132 Neb. 520. Union Trust Co. v. Simpson, 160 Misc. (N. Y.) 836. Capital Bank & Trust Company's petition, 336 Penn. St. 108. Acme Finance Co. v. Huse, 192 Wash. 96.

The situation disclosed by the bills is that the two top ranking members of the school system are claiming that they hold their present positions at the discretion of the committee, a claim that is denied by the plaintiffs. While it is true that the plaintiffs do not in terms aver that they contend that subsequent reelections will be necessary before the defendants acquire the status they now claim, their denial would seem to be equivalent to such a contention. In other words, the claims of the defendants are not recognized by the plaintiffs. Although it does not appear that either the plaintiffs or the defendants have taken any steps to enforce their respective claims, yet the pending situation cannot long endure. Its existence is inconsistent with the orderly and proper administration of the public school system. The plaintiffs alone have the duty and obligation to contract with teachers and to fix the terms of their contracts in accordance with G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 71, Section 41. They may elect a teacher upon a yearly basis, Pulvino v. Yarmouth, 286 Mass. 21 , Callahan v. Woburn, 306 Mass. 265; and although they may after one school year of service elect a teacher to serve at the discretion of the committee, they must elect a teacher to serve at their discretion after he has already served for three consecutive full school years. Paquette v. Fall River, 278 Mass. 172 . Frye v. School Committee of Leicester, 300 Mass. 537 . Nester v. School Committee of Fall River, 318 Mass. 538. The committee, in order to get an adjudication of the legal status or the contractual rights of the defendants, ought not to be compelled to take some definite action, such as stopping...