Laidlaw v. the Krystal Co.

• Decision Date: 28 January 2011
• Docket Number: No. 1D10–2538.,1D10–2538.
• Citation: 53 So.3d 1128
• Parties: Laura LAIDLAW, Appellant,v.The KRYSTAL COMPANY, a Foreign Corporation, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

53 So.3d 1128

Laura LAIDLAW, Appellant,

v.The KRYSTAL COMPANY, a Foreign Corporation, Appellee.

No. 1D10–2538.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Jan. 28, 2011.

Christopher W. Hewett, of Law Office of Nooney & Roberts, Jacksonville, for Appellant.T. Daniel Webb, of Vernis & Bowling of North Florida, P.A., for Appellee.CLARK, J.

The appellant challenges a final summary judgment entered for the appellee in the appellant's negligence action, where the appellant alleged that she slipped and fell on a wet floor in the appellee's restaurant. The appellant's action was based on the assertion that the appellee had not properly maintained the area, and did not sufficiently warn of the danger. Because the parties' filings provided factual support for the appellant's claims, the trial court should not have entered the summary judgment.

The appellee acknowledged that the appellant fell on a wet floor when she was a customer at the appellee's restaurant. In seeking summary judgment the appellee filed the affidavits of two employees, who indicated that it had been raining and that water was tracked into the restaurant, and that the floor had recently been mopped in the area where the appellant fell. Those employees further indicated that “wet floor” signs were put out before the appellant entered the restaurant. However, the appellant's deposition indicated that she did not see any “wet floor” signs in the restaurant, until after she fell and mentioned to one of the employees that they needed to put out some signs. That assertion is consistent with the appellant's interrogatory answers, which likewise indicated that when she fell the floor was slippery and there was no warning that the floor was wet.

A summary judgment should be entered only when there is no genuine issue of any material fact, and even the slightest doubt as to the existence of such a question precludes summary judgment. Falco v. Copeland, 919 So.2d 650 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); Jackson v. H.L. Bouton Co., 630 So.2d 1173 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); see also Cassoutt v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 660 So.2d 277 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), rev. denied, 668 So.2d 602 (Fla.1996). The trial court should not resolve factual questions upon motion for summary judgment and instead must view the evidence and draw all inferences in favor of the opposing party. Id. Furthermore, to obtain a summary judgment the appellee was required to demonstrate the absence of any question of material fact. See Falco; Jackson. The appellee did not satisfy this burden and the court should not have resolved the case by summary judgment.

In entering the summary judgment the trial court suggested that “wet floor” signs had been put out before the appellant fell, and that the appellant did not see them. However, viewing the evidentiary filings...