Laiho v. Consolidated Rail Corp.
| Decision Date | 11 May 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ. A. 96-30158-MAP.,Civ. A. 96-30158-MAP. |
| Citation | 4 F.Supp.2d 45 |
| Parties | Robert LAIHO, Plaintiff v. CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION, Defendant and Third Party Plaintiff v. SPRINGFIELD INDUSTRIAL CENTER, Third Party Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Marc H. Goldberg, McClung, Peters & Simon, Albany, NY, for Robert Laiho.
Michael B. Flynn, Brister & Zandrow, LLP, Boston, MA, for Consolidated Rail Corp.
Neva K. Rohan, Robinson, Donovan, Madden & Barry, Springfield, MA, for Springfield Industrial Center.
Upon de novo review, the Report and Recommendation is hereby adopted, and the defendant's motion for summary judgment on Count IV of its third party complaint is hereby ALLOWED, as specified by the Magistrate Judge. The clerk will set the case for a status conference. So ordered.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION WITH REGARD TO THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Docket no. 23)
This matter relates to a complaint filed on August 29, 1996, by Plaintiff Robert Laiho ("Laiho") against his employer, Defendant Consolidated Rail Corporation ("Conrail" or the "Railroad"), alleging personal injuries under the Federal Employer's Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.C. § 51. Laiho maintains that his injury was caused by the unsafe condition of a railroad bridge handrail located in the vicinity of a sidetrack leased to Conrail. Springfield Industrial Center ("Industrial"), the third party defendant, owned and was responsible for maintaining the portion of the sidetrack involved in Laiho's accident.
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, Conrail, as third party plaintiff, has moved for summary judgment. Conrail seeks a declaration that, pursuant to the terms of an Agreement for Industry Track ("Agreement") between Conrail and Industrial, Industrial must indemnify Conrail for amounts payable as a result of Laiho's injuries. In essence, Conrail asserts that, under the terms of the Agreement, Industrial is bound to indemnify Conrail regardless of either parties' acts or omissions. Conrail's motion for summary judgment has been referred to the court for a report and recommendation pursuant to Rule 3 of the Rules of United States Magistrates in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).
The Agreement between Industrial and Conrail was entered into on May 10, 1972. The provisions of the Agreement most applicable to the present matter are Section 8(b)(iv), which governs indemnification, and Section 3, which states that the portion of the sidetrack involved in Laiho's accident and owned by Industrial was "to be maintained, repaired and renewed" at its expense. (Def. Ex. A at 2.) The Agreement was in effect at the time of Laiho's accident in September of 1995.
Six to eight months prior to Laiho's accident, Conrail's district safety chairman, Gene Bressette, observed that a railroad bridge, its handrail and some adjacent tracks were in need of repair. (Def. Ex. E at 16-17.) Bressette reported these observations to Conrail. (Id.) He also conveyed his concerns to Industrial's tenant, Sulco Industries ("Sulco"). (Id. at 18.) Three to four months prior to Laiho's accident, Bressette delivered a "safety form" to Sulco indicating the condition of the railroad bridge, its handrails and adjacent sidetrack. (Id.). As a result, the portion of the sidetrack was taken out of service temporarily and repaired. Repairs for the railroad bridge and handrails were not completed at that time. (Third Party Def. Mem.Opp.Summ.J. (Docket No. 26) Ex. C at 20-21.)
Bressette observed that the unsafe railroad bridge and handrail were used by Conrail employees and continued to discuss these concerns with his superiors at Conrail. (Id. at 22.) Industrial acknowledges that it did not specifically include the railroad bridge as part of its routine three-month inspection of the adjacent sidetrack. (Third Party Def. Ex. D at 16.) Laiho's accident occurred on September 8, 1995, when he was walking across the bridge and the faulty handrail gave out. (Complaint ¶ 5 (Docket No. 01).)
Summary judgment is appropriate where the record reveals no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Magee v. United States, 121 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1997). Once the moving party has demonstrated that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden is on the opposing party to challenge this by coming "forward with specific provable facts which establish that there is a triable issue." Matos v. Davila, 135 F.3d 182, 183 (1st Cir. 1998).
The facts, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from them, must be viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Guzman-Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz, 29 F.3d 3, 4 (1st Cir.1994). A disputed fact is genuinely at issue if a reasonable factfinder could resolve the point in favor of the non-moving party. Id. See Rivera-Muriente v. Agosto-Alicea, 959 F.2d 349, 352 (1st Cir.1992). See also Euromotion, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 136 F.3d 866, 867 (1st Cir.1998). That is to say, "only when a disputed fact ha[ving] the potential to change the outcome of the suit ... [is] found favorably to the nonmovant [is] the materiality hurdle [ ] cleared." Parrilla-Burgos v. Hernandez-Rivera, 108 F.3d 445, 448 (1st Cir.1997) (internal quotations omitted). Absent a genuine dispute of material fact, questions of law are appropriate for resolution at summary judgment. See Jimenez v. Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co., 974 F.2d 221, 223 (1st Cir.1992).
Given the nuances of the issues before the court, it is important to understand exactly what Conrail is seeking through its motion for summary judgment and, in turn, how Industrial is attempting to thwart that effort. Conrail's motion specifically seeks summary judgment on Count IV of its third-party complaint. Count IV sets forth a claim of express contractual indemnity and asserts that Section 8(b)(iv) of the parties' Agreement requires Industrial to indemnify, save harmless, and defend Conrail against all claims arising from Industrial's failure to maintain the sidetrack or any claims under FELA. Accordingly, Conrail "demands judgment against [Industrial] in the full amount of any sums it pays or is ordered to pay to [Laiho], together with interest, attorneys' fees, and costs." (Docket No. 13.)
Conrail's later description of its claim for relief, set forth in its reply brief (Docket No. 30), is, in the court's estimation, more expansive. Specifically, Conrail asks that its "motion for summary judgment should, on all counts, be allowed and [Industrial] be required to undertake Conrail's defense and reimburse Conrail for its past defense costs." (Id. at 13.) Thus, it appears that Conrail wants Industrial to immediately stand in Conrail's shoes, undertake its defense and reimburse it for its defense costs to date.
Resisting any obligation to indemnify, Industrial maintains that summary judgment is not appropriate because, notwithstanding the express terms of the parties' Agreement, issues of fact remain as to whether Industrial's act or omission created the unsafe condition which caused Laiho's accident. Industrial also argues that the doctrine of acquiescence should apply. The doctrine bars indemnification when the indemnitee is found to have known of and acquiesced in the dangerous or unsafe condition at issue.
After hearing arguments and reviewing the parties' briefs, the court finds that the indemnification provision of the Agreement is enforceable as a matter of law and that Conrail's motion for summary judgment should be allowed accordingly. This recommendation is limited to a declaration that Industrial must indemnify and save Conrail harmless from Laiho's claims should it be determined, at trial, that the unsafe condition resulted in whole or in part from any act or omission of Industrial or its tenants. The recommendation does not, however, include the more extensive relief Conrail describes in its reply brief. That relief may well be imposed once the issues of fact are resolved at trial. But for now, and as explained below, the court believes that there are genuine issues of fact which preclude the implementation of the remedy at this time.
The court's recommendation to allow summary judgment, as so limited, also incorporates a rejection of Industrial's claimed defense based on the doctrine of acquiescence. While not explicitly raised by Industrial in its answer to Conrail's third-party complaint, the doctrine of acquiescence appears to be generally incorporated in the defenses raised. As explained in detail below, however, the court believes, as a matter of law, that such a defense ought not be available in this case.
In its motion for summary judgment, Conrail contends that the Agreement between it and Industrial should be interpreted as requiring Industrial to indemnify Conrail for Laiho's FELA claim of personal injury. According to Conrail, Laiho's claim against it is covered by Section 8(b)(iv) of the Agreement, which reads as follows:
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Section 8(b), and irrespective of any joint or concurring negligence of the Railroad, [Industrial] assumes sole responsibility for and agrees to indemnify, save harmless and defend the Railroad from and against all claims, actions or legal proceedings arising, in whole or in part, from (a) the failure of [Industrial] to comply with the requirements set forth in Sections 3 and 7 hereof, or (b) any claims, actions or legal proceedings under [FELA] ... now or hereafter in effect, alleging or claiming, in legal effect, that the Railroad failed to correct or guard against an unsafe condition if the unsafe place to work or the condition...
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