Lalli's Estate, Matter of

• Decision Date: 25 November 1975
• Citation: 378 N.Y.S.2d 351,38 N.Y.2d 77,340 N.E.2d 721
• Parties: , 340 N.E.2d 721 In the Matter of the ESTATE of Mario LALLI, Deceased. Robert M. LALLI, Appellant, v. Rosamond LALLI, as Administratrix of the Estate of Mario Lalli, Deceased, Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 351

378 N.Y.S.2d 351

38 N.Y.2d 77, 340 N.E.2d 721

In the Matter of the ESTATE of Mario LALLI, Deceased.

Robert M. LALLI, Appellant, v. Rosamond LALLI, as Administratrix of the Estate of Mario

Lalli, Deceased, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 25, 1975.

Leonard M. Henkin, Morris R. Henkin, Mount Vernon, and David C. Quinn, Buffalo, for appellant.

Leonard A. Weiss and Muriel Lawrence, Mount Vernon, for respondent.

JONES, Judge.

We hold that EPTL 4--1.2 (subd. (a), par. (2)) is not unconstitutional to the extent that it prescribes the entry during the father's lifetime of an order of filiation declaring paternity as a condition precedent for inheritance by an illegitimate child from his or her father.

In this case an illegitimate son, over 25 years of age at the time of his father's death, sought an order in Surrogate's Court for a compulsory accounting by the administratrix of his deceased father's estate. The administratrix, the decedent's widow, moved to dismiss the son's application on the ground that he was not a distributee and hence had no standing to compel an accounting.

The facts are undisputed. Appellant and his sister were the natural son and daughter of the decedent, having been born on August 24, 1948 and March 19, 1950, respectively. Respondent administratrix had been married to the decedent for some 34 years prior to the decedent's death on January 7, 1973, during which time the decedent and she had resided together as husband and wife. The natural mother of appellant and his sister had died on October 11, 1968. It was not contested that during his lifetime the decedent had provided financial support for both appellant and his sister. Additionally it appeared that when appellant wished to be married in April, 1969 parental consent was required because he was then under age 21. Incident to the granting of such consent the decedent had acknowledged that appellant was his son in a writing sworn to before a notary public. It is agreed, however, that there was never any order of filiation.

The Surrogate granted respondent's motion to dismiss the application for a compulsory accounting on the ground that appellant was not a distributee under EPTL 4--1.2 (subd. (a), par. (2)). In so doing the Surrogate rejected appellant's contention that EPTL 4--1.2 (subd. (a), par. (2)) is unconstitutional. On direct appeal pursuant to CPLR 5601 (subd. (b), par. (2)) we affirm.

EPTL 4--1.2, bearing the heading, 'Inheritance by or from illegitimate persons', provides in pertinent part:

'(a) For the purposes of this article:

'(1) An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his mother so that he and his issue inherit from his mother and from his maternal kindred.

'(2) An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his father so that he and his issue inherit from his father if a court of competent jurisdiction has, during the lifetime of the father, made an order of filiation declaring paternity in a proceeding instituted during the pregnancy of the mother or within two years from the birth of the child.

'(3) The existence of an agreement obligating the father to support the illegitimate child does not qualify such child or his issue to inherit from the father in the absence of an order of filiation made as prescribed by subparagraph (2).

'(4) A motion for relief from an order of filiation may be made only by the father, and such motion must be made within one year from the entry of such order.'

Appellant's assault on EPTL 4--1.2 (subd. (a), par. (2)) is grounded in contentions that its provisions deny him the equal protection of the law assured him under State and Federal Constitutions and the due process of law to which he is entitled under the Federal Constitution. In disposing of his challenge we address three aspects of asserted constitutional infirmity: first, the difference in proof of parenthood necessary to establish the right of inheritance from a natural father as contrasted with the proof required to establish the right of inheritance from a natural mother; second, the insistence that there be an order of filiation; and third, insistence that the order of filiation be made during the lifetime of the natural father. ^*

At the threshold we recognize a material distinction between benefits and rights to which an illegitimate child is entitled in consequence of the fact that he or she is the child of his or her parent on the one hand, and, on the other, expectations only to which such a child may look forward in consequence of a child-parent relationship. The former category includes entitlement to the proceeds of a wrongful death action (Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 88 S.Ct. 1509, 20 L.Ed.2d 436; cf. Glona v. American Guar. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 88 S.Ct. 1515, 20 L.Ed.2d 441); to workmen's compensation benefits (Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 92 S.Ct. 1400, 31 L.Ed.2d 768); to financial support from a father (Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 93 S.Ct. 872, 35 L.Ed.2d 56); to social security benefits (Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 94 S.Ct. 2496, 41 L.Ed.2d 363). In such cases the applicable standard for review as to constitutionality is that sometimes labeled strict scrutiny (a compelling State interest in the objective sought and the least restrictive means for achieving that objective (cf. Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1, 340 N.E.2d 444)).

As appellant concedes, however, the test in the present instance (involving only an inchoate expectancy at best) is whether there is a rational basis for the means chosen by the Legislature for the accomplishment of a permissible State objective. (Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 91 S.Ct. 1017, 28 L.Ed.2d 288; cf. Montgomery v. Daniels, supra, 38 N.Y.2d p. 61, 378 N.Y.S.2d p. 17, 340 N.E.2d p. 456.) We have no...