Lally v. Holland

• Decision Date: 30 April 1852
• Parties: LALLY et al. v. HOLLAND et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

31 Tenn. 396

LALLY et al.

v.HOLLAND et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

April Term, 1852.

This was a bill filed in the common law and chancery court of the city of Memphis. At the May term, 1850, Turley, judge, presiding, a decree was rendered in favor of the complainants, to the extent of the fund remaining of the proceeds of the sale of the slave after the payment of the debt secured by the mortgage. From this decree respondent McKinney appealed.

Hickersham, for complainants. A mistake in a deed, in the description of property conveyed, will be corrected in chancery when the proof is clear. 1 Sugden on Vend. 180, note; 2 Johns. Ch. 585;8 Humph. 230-236;6 Id. 287; 4 Blackf. 432; 1 Meigs' Dig. 203, 204; Oct. No., 1851, Law Rep. 327. And such mistake may be corrected against a subsequent mortgagee or attaching creditor. 2 Johns.; 2 U. S. Law Magazine, 47; 1 Desau. 437.

Wright & Turley, for McKinney. A court of equity will correct mistakes, but never against an innocent purchaser. 10 Yerg. 429;7 Humph. 242-244;5 Yerg. 208, 209; 1 Sudgen on Ven. 170; 2 Dev. L. 508;1 Munf. 303;5 Humph. 480. McKinney was not bound to look beyond the deed as registered. Baldwin v. Marshall, 2 Humph. 216; 1 Johns. 299;5 Humph. 480.

Thornton & Massey, with Wright and Turley, for McKinney.

McKinney, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

This bill was brought to recover a slave named Hampton, in the possession of, and claimed by, the defendant McKinney. The complainants found their right to said slave upon a deed of trust, alleged to have been executed on the 20th of October, 1846, by the defendant Jackson C. Holland to the complainant William Lally, for the indemnity of the complainant Martin Lally against liability on account of certain outstanding debts remaining due from the partnership which had previously existed between the defendant Holland and said Martin Lally.

The deed of trust was executed at Holly Springs, in the state of Mississippi, where all the parties to the same at that time resided, and was there recorded, pursuant to the law of Mississippi, on the day after its date. Said deed of trust, in the body thereof, purports to have been made by John C. Holland, and is signed “J. C. Holland.” It purports to convey to said trustee, among other things, “one negro man, named Hamilton.” The bill alleges that, by a mistake of the draftsman of said deed, Holland's Christian name was written John, instead of Jackson; and that by a like mistake the name of the slave was written Hamilton instead of Hampton, and avers that the defendant Jackson C. Holland was the party who executed said deed, and that Hampton was the slave intended to be conveyed; and the truth of this averment is sufficiently made out in the evidence. The bill charges that Holland failed to discharge the outstanding liabilities of said firm; that debts to the amount of $716.43 remain due to the firm creditors; and that all the effects of the partnership, and also all the property of defendant Holland, conveyed in the deed of trust, except the slave Hampton, has been exhausted, leaving the foregoing amount unpaid. And the object of the bill is to subject said slave to the satisfaction of the claims of the creditors of the firm who are joined as parties complainant in this cause; and to this end it is sought to have the mistakes in the deed of trust rectified.

It appears that some considerable length of time prior to the execution of said deed of trust the slave Hampton had been brought to Memphis, in this state, by the defendant Holland, and there placed in the possession of McKinney, under a contract of bailment for hire; and that on the 17th of February, 1847, Holland mortgaged said slave to McKinney, to secure the sum of $700, money advanced on that day by the latter to the former, which was to be repaid in one year thereafter. It further appears that, the money not having been repaid, McKinney filed a bill in the chancery court at Memphis, to foreclose said mortgage; and by a decree of said court the slave Hampton was sold, and purchased by McKinney, on the 17th of November, 1849, at the price of $885, out of which sum the balance of the mortgage debt, being $318.79, was satisfied, together with costs of suit, leaving a surplus of $533.53, which surplus was afterwards attached upon a bill filed by McKinney, for the satisfaction of other debts which he held against the defendant Holland, and the money was applied accordingly by the decree of the court.

The defendant McKinney rests his defence chiefly upon the ground that he is a bona-fide purchaser of the slave Hampton, for a valuable consideration, without notice of the prior deed of trust; and there is nothing in the record to show actual notice to him of its existence.

By the statute of Mississippi, deeds of trust and mortgages of personal as well as of real property are required to be recorded, and take effect and are valid, “as to all subsequent purchasers for valuable consideration without notice, and as to all creditors,” only from the time they are proved or acknowledged, and delivered to the clerk of the proper court to be recorded.

We understand it to have been conceded in argument here that the deed of trust upon which the complainants found their right to recover the slave in controversy is to have precisely the same legal effect and operation in the courts of this state to which it would be entitled in Mississippi. And this upon the principal of general jurisprudence, that personal property is to be governed by the law of the owner's domicile. And, subject to very few exceptions, a transfer of personal property, wherever situated, if valid according to the rule of the law of that country, will be held valid everywhere. Story on Confl., secs. 380, 383, 384. It is no ground of objection to the validity or operation of the deed of trust that the slave was not locally within the state of Mississippi at the time of its execution. An actual delivery of the slave was not necessary to complete the contract of sale, or to vest the right of property in the trustee. As observed by Judge Story (2 Sumn. 211), there is no principle of law which establishes that a sale of personal goods is invalid because they are not in the possession of the rightful owner at the time. The sale will not be invalidated, even by an adverse possession, much less by a possession subordinate to the title of the owner. The sale is not, under such circumstances, the sale of a mere right of action, but a sale of the thing itself, and good to pass the title against every person not holding the same under a bona-fide title, for a valuable consideration without notice. Id.

We proceed, then, to consider the general question presented for our determination--whether, upon the facts of this...