Lamar v. Ford Motor Co.

• Decision Date: 12 December 1966
• Docket Number: No. 51878,No. 1,51878,1
• Citation: 409 S.W.2d 100
• Parties: Richard A. LAMAR, Appellant, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY and Harlow O. Coffield, Respondents
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 100

409 S.W.2d 100

Richard A. LAMAR, Appellant, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY and Harlow O. Coffield, Respondents.

No. 51878.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

Dec. 12, 1966.

WELBORN, Commissioner.

Action for $100,000 actual, and $100,000 punitive, damages for assault and battery. Trial court dismissed petition on motions of defendants. Plaintiff appeals.

In his petition plaintiff described himself as chairman of the union bargaining committee at the defendant Ford Motor Company's plant in Claycomo. Defendant Harlow O. Coffield is described as a general foreman of Ford. The petition alleged that plaintiff devoted full time to performing, on behalf of the members of the union, his duties as chairman of the bargaining committee. The petition charges that, on August 31, 1963, defendants, acting through Harlow, assaulted and beat plaintiff, inflicting severe injuries.

Defendant Coffield filed a combined motion to dismiss and general denial. The motion to dismiss charged that the matters upon which the petition was based were 'within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workmen's Compensation Law * * *.'

Defendant Ford filed a separate motion to dismiss, alleging that the cause of action was based upon an incident at Ford's plant; that at the time and place in question both plaintiff and Ford were subject to the Workmen's Compensation Law of the State of Missouri; that the Workmen's Compensation Law provides the sole remedy of plaintiff, and, therefore, the court had no jurisdiction over the alleged cause of action. Ford attached to its motion as an exhibit a copy of a letter from the Division of Workmen's Compensation, showing that, although plaintiff had previously rejected the Workmen's Compensation Law, he had subsequently withdrawn his rejection.

Plaintiff filed 'Opposition to Defendant's, Ford Motor Company's, Separate Motion to Dismiss,' a combination memorandum of argument and authorities and a denial of the allegations of Ford's motion. The document stated that Ford's motion attempted to controvert the allegations of plaintiff's petition, designed to show that he devoted his full time to representation of the union members. It argued that a motion to dismiss on grounds not appearing on the face of plaintiff's petition would lie only when the factual basis of such grounds was not controverted and that Ford's defense of the Workmen's Compensation Law coverage could be raised only by answer, 'thereby making an issue of fact for the jury, * * *.' The document denied the allegations of Ford's motion and prayed that the motion be overruled.

Plaintiff also moved to strike from defendant Coffield's motion and answer the portion thereof relying on the Workmen's Compensation Law, charging that Coffield was not entitled to the protection of that law.

Subsequently Ford filed, in support of its motion, an affidavit of its attorney setting out portions of its collective bargaining agreement. The portions set out include the recitation of the general intent of the agreement of 'attaining peaceful, orderly relations and efficient, uninterrupted operations * * *;' and the general responsibility of Ford in the management of the plant operation, including the right to 'hire, lay off, assign, transfer and promote employees, and to determine the starting and quitting time and the number of hours to be worked; * * *.' Also set out was a provision giving the company 'the sole right to discipline and discharge employees for cause, * * *.' Included were provisions giving the employees 'representatives on Company time * * *.' Representatives are required to be 'in the regular employ of the Company, or on approved leave of absence, for at least one year immediately preceding his designation to such position * * *.' The agreement refers to 'Both Full- and Part-Time Representatives.' Without expressly acknowledging that plaintiff was a full-time representative, the affidavit apparently concedes such to be the case, inasmuch as it sets forth provisions for hours on company time and compensation of full-time representatives. The agreement provides that representatives shall 'be on Company time only for the same number of hours as the employees in such Unit are normally scheduled to work * * *.' A full-time representative is to be paid at the rate he was receiving at the time of assuming his duties. 'He shall be deemed to be an active employee of the Company for the purpose of applying the vacation plan.'

The affidavit alleged that plaintiff had a job classification entitling him to be paid at the rate of $2.79 per hour while working as a union committeeman; that he was paid at that rate for the period of time which included the date of the occurrence mentioned in plaintiff's petition. The affidavit set out that plaintiff had filed two workmen's compensation claims for injuries received while employed by defendant Ford and before the became a union committeeman.

The affidavit alleged that plaintiff 'was subject to the discipline of the Ford Motor Company and bound to abide by its rules and regulations and under such aspects of control of (Ford) as its employee as are shown by the above set out provisions of said Union Agreement and to the extent to which (Ford) reserved and set out its management rights as employer under the terms and provisions of said Trade Union Agreement.'

Subsequently, on March 4, 1965, plaintiff filed an application for disqualification of Judge Rooney and a counteraffidavit to the affidavit in support of Ford's motion to dismiss.

The counteraffidavit, by plaintiff's attorney, recited that plaintiff was a full-time representative of the union and was not under direction or control of defendant Ford; that plaintiff was the sole judge of the hours he would be present on Ford's premises, acted solely for members of the union, took no orders from Ford; that plaintiff had the right to be present in the plant at any time of day or night when any member of the union was working; that Ford had no right to compel plaintiff to perform any work of any kind for it; that plaintiff was the sole judge of his hours of work and was accountable only to the union; that Ford did not have authority to discharge plaintiff while chairman of the union bargaining committee and that plaintiff could be removed from that office only by vote of the membership of the union; that his duties while on defendant Ford's premises consisted of going from department to department conferring with other union representatives enforcing the terms of the contract on behalf of the union and its members; that plaintiff was subject to removal from office by the union should he be or become subject to the influence of Ford; that, while the union agreement required that he be paid by Ford, he was considered an employee under the agreement only for vacation plan purposes; that the provision for payment of union representatives by Ford had been obtained as the result of an extended strike and extended negotiations; that Ford had no right of control, supervision, appointment, designation or selection of the chairman of the bargaining committee; that the injuries received by plaintiff did not arise out of Ford's business of manufacturing automobiles, but resulted from an assault committed upon plaintiff, while plaintiff was acting on behalf of the union.

On March 4, 1965, Judge Rooney entered an order sustaining defendants' motions to dismiss. On March 12, plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the order of dismissal and for reconsideration of the motions to dismiss. Among the grounds stated was that Judge Rooney had no jurisdiction to enter the order of dismissal in view of the pending motion for his disqualification.

On April 2, 1965, the parties filed a stipulation for a change of venue to the Platte County Circuit Court. The stipulation was approved and the cause ordered transferred.

On June 18, 1965, the judge of the Platte County Circuit Court heard arguments on plaintiff's motion to set aside the dismissal. On June 25, the affidavit of plaintiff was filed in the Platte County Circuit Court in support of his motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal.

Plaintiff's affidavit set forth that he was sole Chairman of the Unit Committee for the entire union membership at the Ford plant; that as such he had the right to enter and leave the Ford premises twenty-four hours per day; that he devoted full time to union affairs and was not required to perform any duties for Ford while serving as chairman; that he had no obligation to report and did not report his activities or his presence on, or his leaving, the Ford premises to anyone connected with Ford. It stated that plaintiff would leave the Ford plant and the Kansas City area on union business for extended periods of time; that during such absences he designated an acting Chairman of the Unit Committee and merely notified Ford of his choice. It further stated that, pursuant to an umpire's ruling, he was required only to 'ring in' on any day he came on the Ford premises in order to be entitled to compensation from Ford. The affidavit set forth the circumstances of the incident out of which his claim arose, alleging that at the time he was on the Ford premises he was acting as full-time Chairman of the Unit Committee and that the assault by Coffield arose out of a discussion between plaintiff and Coffield of a union member's grievance.

Subsequently, a supplemental affidavit by Ford's attorney was filed, setting forth the terms of the collective bargaining agreement concerning the first stage grievance procedure. The procedure authorized the aggrieved employee either to take up the matter directly with his foreman or with the district committeeman who shall discuss the matter with the foreman. Plaintiff's affidavit alleged that in the discussion with Coffield which produced the assault, he was, as authorized, acting in lieu of an absent district committeeman.

Ultimately, the...