LaMasters v. State

• Decision Date: 19 October 2012
• Docket Number: No. 11–0016.,11–0016.
• Citation: 821 N.W.2d 856
• Parties: Lynn G. LAMASTERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

821 N.W.2d 856

Lynn G. LAMASTERS, Appellant,

v.STATE of Iowa, Appellee.

No. 11–0016.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 19, 2012.

Stephanie C. Rattenborg of Rattenborg Law Office, Manchester, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bruce L. Kempkes and Andrew B. Prosser, Assistant Attorneys General, and Allan W. Vander Hart, County Attorney, for appellee.

MANSFIELD, Justice.

Lynn Lamasters was convicted of first-degree murder in 2005. In 2009, he filed an application for postconviction relief alleging his trial counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to raise the defense of temporary insanity or diminished capacity and (2) failing to adequately support the request for bifurcation of his trial. Lamasters also asserted his appellate counsel on direct appeal was ineffective for failing to appeal the trial court's denial of his request for bifurcation. The postconviction court denied his application. The court of appeals affirmed, finding that the postconviction court did not rule on Lamasters's specific claims and Lamasters failed to preserve error by filing a subsequent motion under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904.

We find that the postconviction court did rule on Lamasters's present claims, and they are properly preserved for appeal. However, we also find that these claims lack merit. Therefore, we affirm the denial of Lamasters's application for postconviction relief.

I. Facts and Procedural History.

This case arises out of a brutal homicide. The basic facts are ably set forth in the court of appeals' opinion on direct appeal:

Lamasters was living with Patricia Rapacki in Jesup, Iowa, along with her two daughters from previous relationships. On December 27, 2003, Lamasters and Rapacki took the children to visit their respective fathers for the holidays. Rapacki was not seen alive again.

Lamasters spent the next several days extensively using methamphetamine. He sold the television and some of the furniture from the couple's home. He told friends and acquaintances various stories about Rapacki's whereabouts. He stated at times she was gambling in Minnesota, and at others she was gambling in Dubuque. Rapacki did not appear to pick up her children at the appointed time. Lamasters told one of the fathers that Rapacki had gotten drunk in Waterloo and put her car in the ditch, so she would be unable to pick up her child as scheduled. He told the other father a friend had been injured in Minnesota, so he and Rapacki were going up there and would not be able to pick the child up at the time they had agreed upon.

On January 6, 2004, a deputy sheriff in Raymond, Iowa, noticed a car parked in front of a bank that was not yet open. The deputy drove by, and the car moved to a convenience store. The deputy then started to drive to the convenience store, when the car took off at a high rate of speed. The deputy chased the car until it stopped in a farm field. The driver, Lamasters, took off running. The deputy called for back-up, and a search of the farm field was made. Officers found Lamasters lying in a ditch with self-inflicted stab wounds to his abdomen. He was taken to the hospital.

Officers discovered the car driven by Lamasters was registered to Rapacki, and her purse was in the trunk. Officers questioned Lamasters at the hospital on January 6 and 7 without giving a Miranda warning. At that time officers did not suspect foul play, but wanted to know Rapacki's whereabouts because her car had been used in a high-speed chase. Lamasters stated Rapacki was gambling in Dubuque, and he was taking her purse to her. On January 7, officer Jane Wagner asked Lamasters if he believed Rapacki might have been harmed in some way. Lamasters replied, “They can tell time of death, right? And her time of death will state that I was not—or will show that I was not there.”

Lamasters was questioned more extensively on January 9 and 11, while he was still in the hospital. On these occasions he was read his Miranda rights. Lamasters was released from the hospital on January 12, 2004. Methamphetamine had been found in the vehicle Lamasters was driving, and he was taken to jail for drug-related charges and parole violations.

Later on January 12, special agents with the Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) and local officers executed a search warrant at Rapacki's home. They found a blood stain on the living room carpet, which was found to match the DNA of Rapacki.

In the basement, Rapacki's body was found inside a locked freezer. She had been killed by ligature strangulation with an electrical cord. DNA evidence showed Lamasters' blood was on the collar of Rapacki's sweater. His blood was also on a small piece of electrical cord on the floor outside the freezer. In addition, Lamasters' blood was on the inside of a knot in the electrical cord around Rapacki's neck. Four cigarette butts were found on the floor by the freezer, one matching Lamasters, two matching Rapacki's estranged husband, Jeff Rapacki, and one unknown. The key for the freezer lock was found in the car Lamasters had been driving during the police chase.

Lamasters was charged with first-degree murder in connection with Rapacki's death. SeeIowa Code §§ 707.1, .2 (2003). His attorneys in the jury trial were James Metcalf and David Dunakey. In November 2004, Lamasters filed a “Request to Bifurcate the Guilt Phase from the Issues of Insanity/Diminished Responsibility/Intoxication.” In that motion, he argued that if he was required to argue “I didn't do it ... but if I did I was insane” it would “undermine the defense to the charge to such an extent the Defendant will be denied a fair trial by a fair and impartial jury.” The district court overruled Lamasters's motion, stating:

Defendant has not yet even alleged an insanity defense. The court has no information to support defendant's apparent contention that his insanity defense may be substantial. Only if the court were presented with the situation in which an insanity defense and an evidentiary defense were substantial and prejudicially incongruent would the court consider bifurcation.

Lamasters filed a second motion to bifurcate in January 2005. This motion was filed contemporaneously with his “Notice of Defenses: Insanity/Diminished Responsibility,” which was “conditioned on [Lamasters's] right to withdraw it in the event that the Court refuse[d] to allow the bifurcation of the trial.” The second motion to bifurcate made reference to a preliminary psychiatric evaluation conducted by forensic psychiatrist, Dr. Thomas Gratzer. The motion also offered, for in camera review, correspondence from Dr. Gratzer to attorney Metcalf indicating Gratzer's opinion that “there was substantial evidence and/or substantial likelihood that Mr. L[am]asters['s] psychotic symptoms had risen to the level of an insane act with respect to the first degree murder charge.” The State resisted the motion to bifurcate, while also seeking a psychiatric evaluation of Lamasters and production of Dr. Gratzer's preliminary report. Lamasters opposed these requests. The trial court overruled Lamasters's second motion to bifurcate, finding it unnecessary to address the State's additional requests. In denying Lamasters's second motion to bifurcate, the district court explained:

The court agrees that the Iowa courts have in the past suggested that a bifurcated trial may be appropriate under certain circumstances. State v. Jenkins, 412 N.W.2d 174 (Iowa 1987); State v. Collins, 236 N.W.2d 376 (Iowa 1975). The factors necessary for bifurcation have not been demonstrated in this case. The defendant should not be compelled to choose between exercising his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself and his due process right to present a defense on the merits. However, the defendant has not demonstrated that a violation of his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself is necessarily involved in the event he pursues his insanity defense. The defense has not demonstrated that the psychiatric examination and presentation of defendant's psychiatric defense necessarily involves inculpatory testimony which cannot be excised without diminishing the force of the insanity defense. State v. Jenkins, 412 N.W.2d 174 (Iowa 1987).

The court added that it had “evaluated the substantiality of the proffered [insanity] defense both on the merits and on the issue of insanity, and conclude[d] that based upon the information proffered to the court, it [wa]s appropriate to deny bifurcation.” Finally, the court commented:

It appears that the defendant in this case is not prepared to allege that his psychiatric examination will necessarily be inculpatory. Rather, the defendant makes the blanket assertion that “an insanity defense will create an unfair mindset in jurors, essentially negating any other defense the defendant may assert.” ... This assertion is really no different than a problem any litigant—civil or criminal, plaintiff or defendant—encounters when presenting alternative theories.

Lamasters went to trial without raising either an insanity or a diminished capacity defense. On April 5, 2005, the jury found Lamasters guilty of first-degree murder. As required by Iowa law, he was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. SeeIowa Code § 902.1. The court of appeals affirmed Lamasters's conviction, rejecting arguments that the district court erred in permitting the State to introduce evidence of Lamasters's flight and in denying Lamasters's motion to suppress statements he made on January 6 and 7, 2004. See State v. Lamasters, No. 05–0927, 2006 WL 3018129, 725 N.W.2d 659 (Iowa Ct.App. Oct. 25, 2006).

On February 14, 2007, Lamasters filed a pro se application for postconviction relief. After obtaining appointed counsel, Lamasters filed an amended application, which alleged, among other things, (1) “[i]neffective assistance of Appellate Counsel on failing to raise on Appeal the Trial Court denial of bifurcation on the issues of...