State v. Collins

• Decision Date: 17 December 1975
• Docket Number: No. 57558,57558
• Citation: 236 N.W.2d 376
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Gary James COLLINS, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 376

236 N.W.2d 376

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Gary James COLLINS, Appellant.

No. 57558.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 17, 1975.

Frank M. Krohn, Newton, for appellant.

Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., John G. Mullen, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Kenneth L. Whitehead, County Atty., for appellee.

Considered en banc.

McCORMICK, Justice.

Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence for assault with intent to commit rape in violation of § 698.4, The Code. The questions presented are whether the trial court erred (1) in overruling defendant's motion to dismiss for want of a speedy trial, (2) in overruling his motion for mistrial, (3) in overruling his Miranda objection to testimony of a psychiatrist, and (4) in overruling his motion for directed verdict made at the close of the evidence.

I. The charge in this case was brought by county attorney's information filed January 28, 1974. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on July 8, 1974, alleging he had been denied his right under § 795.2, The Code, to be brought to trial within 60 days of the filing of the county attorney's information. The State contended good cause existed for the delay, and the trial court overruled the motion on that ground. Defendant's trial commenced July 17, 1974.

Since defendant was not tried within 60 days after the charge was brought in district court, he was entitled to have the charge dismissed on his timely motion unless the State demonstrated good cause for the delay beyond that period.

Applicable principles are summarized in several recent cases. See, E.g., State v. Albertsen, 228 N.W.2d 94, 97--98 (Iowa 1975). In this case, we agree with the finding that good cause for delay was shown. The delay was substantially attributable to defendant. The first three months' delay was caused by compliance with an order of the court sustaining defendant's motion for mental evaluation. Defendant was admitted to the medical security facility at Oakdale for mental examination and evaluation in February and was not released until April 30, 1974. He filed a demand for speedy trial seven days later, on May 7, 1974. At his arraignment on May 13, 1974, he entered a plea of not guilty. On June 3, 1974, he filed a notice of his intention to rely upon a defense of insanity. § 777.18, The Code. One of the listed witnesses was Dr. Romullo Lara, a psychiatrist who had examined defendant at Oakdale. Two days later the State filed a notice of additional testimony indicating its intention to call Dr. Lara as a State witness. Additional time was taken by a motion in limine filed by defendant. Further delay was caused by fixing the trial date to accommodate Dr. Lara's schedule.

Under this record, the trial court did not err in overruling defendant's motion to dismiss.

II. Defendant's motion for mistrial resulted from testimony of Dr. Lara as a witness for the State. The witness recited the history taken from defendant. Included in the history was a statement that, 'He says * * * he is charged with assault with intent to commit rape, as well as aiding and abetting a jail break.' Later, out of the presence of the jury, defense counsel moved for mistrial on the ground this testimony improperly referred to an escape charge for which defendant was not then on trial. The trial court overruled the motion but admonished the jury to disregard the challenged testimony.

A trial court has discretion in ruling upon a motion for mistrial. State v. Cage, 218 N.W.2d 582, 586 (Iowa 1974). The limits of that discretion were not exceeded here.

III. A second problem arose during Dr. Lara's testimony. He testified he did not require defendant as part of the psychiatric examination to relate his version of the events upon which the assault with intent to commit rape charge was based. Nevertheless, he said defendant wished to explain his version of the incident and did so. When Dr. Lara was asked to repeat what defendant told him, defense counsel objected on the ground defendant had not been given Miranda warnings. The objection was overruled, and Dr. Lara repeated defendant's alleged statements.

The sole issue raised in defendant's assignment of error is whether statements made by a defendant to a state psychiatrist examining him pursuant to a court order entered upon the defendant's application are admissible against the defendant at trial when the statements were made without prior Miranda warnings to the defendant by the psychiatrist. Defendant cotnends Dr. Lara should have advised him of his privilege against self-incrimination before discussing the charge with him. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

In Miranda, the Supreme Court barred the use of statements 'stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless (the prosecution) demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.' The court added, 'By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.' 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at 706. We have held Miranda prohibits law enforcement officials from eliciting incriminating statements by having a third party ask their questions for them. State v. Flaucher, 223 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1974); State v. Cullison, 215 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1974). However, this case does not present that kind of situation. Defendant was not being subjected to custodial interrogation nor was he being questioned in behalf of law enforcement officers. The Miranda warnings were not required. See Ramer v. United States, 411 F.2d 30, 38 (9 Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 965, 90 S.Ct. 445, 24 L.Ed.2d 431 ('We are unwilling to expand the mandate of Miranda to the extent sought by the appellant.'). See generally, Marcus, Pre-Trial Psychiatric Examination: A Conflict With the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 5 Crim.L.Bull., No. 10, 497.

The trial court did not err in overruling defendant's objection to Dr. Lara's testimony.

IV. In contending the trial court erred in overruling his motion for directed verdict made after both parties rested, defendant asserts the evidence was insufficient for jury consideration on the element of intent. The same argument was made and rejected in State v. Baskin, 220 N.W.2d 882, 887--888 (Iowa 1974). No useful purpose would be served by reciting the evidence in this case. It suffices to say that here, as in Baskin, the evidence was sufficient to support a fair inference by the jury that defendant had in mind the procurement of sexual intercourse by the use of such force as was necessary to accomplish his purpose.

The trial court did not err in overruling his motion for directed verdict.

We find no merit in defendant's assignments of error.

Affirmed.

All Justices concur, except RAWLINGS, J., who concurs specially.

RAWLINGS, Justice (concurring specially).

Confining myself, as does the majority, to the sole 'Miranda warning' issue asserted by defendant in support of a reversal, I too find an affirmance is in order.

On the other hand, the situation instantly involved is to me of such magnitude as to justify if not necessitate some overview regarding self-incriminating statements made by an accused in course of a court-ordered psychiatric examination as to sanity at time of the event.

I. At the outset most, if not all, courts have approached the problem from two separate but interrelated avenues, i.e., court-compelled vs. defense-invited evaluations. It still remains, however, no meaningful evaluation can be achieved in either such instance other than by a thorough, wideranging and intimate discussion between an accused and a psychiatrist, designed to elicit in-depth information from the former regarding past crimes or antisocial conduct, personality-molding experiences and subconscious motivating ideas. See State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3, 210 A.2d 763, 771 (1965); Meyers, 'The Psychiatric Examination', 54 J.Crim.L.C. & P.S. 431 at 435--438 (1963). And any inhibition, direct or indirect, which may be fastened upon such essential dialogue is self-defeating, ¹ at the same time often beset with tangential troublesome problems, illustratively coercion, ² and possible confinement in perpetuity for defendant's noncooperation. ³

II. At this point the matter of self-accusation sation comes into play.

Admittedly, Schmerber v. State of California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) says the Fifth Amendment protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, Or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature. 384 U.S. at 760--761, 86 S.Ct. 1830--1831.

The Schmerber Court also distinguished between admissibility of a blood test on one hand and 'compelling communications or testimony' or 'compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of 'real or physical evidence." 384 U.S. at 764, 86 S.Ct. at 1832.

It therefore follows, blood sampling stands on a different footing than does a psychiatric examination. Further in that regard, any determination as to whether statements made in course of the latter are testimonial in nature depends upon usage of the information thus obtained. When employed as evidence going to the issue of guilt or innocence it can be nothing other than communicative or testimonial. See 5 Crim.L.Bull. 497, 501 (1969).

In this vein, most courts have adopted the view that an accused must cooperate, if possible, in the conduct of a psychiatric examination. And generally any statements made by a defendant in course thereof are deemed admissible in evidence With regard to the matter of legal responsibility. But when those relating to guilt are admitted, several courts have held the jury must be instructed on the limited probative force of any such self-incriminating statements, i.e that they are not to be considered in...