Lamb v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd.

• Decision Date: 19 April 1974
• Citation: 113 Cal.Rptr. 162,520 P.2d 978,11 Cal.3d 274
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 520 P.2d 978 Rose W. LAMB, Petitioner, v. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD and Keystone Engineering Company et al., Respondents. L.A. 30204, 30205.

Page 162

113 Cal.Rptr. 162

11 Cal.3d 274, 520 P.2d 978

Rose W. LAMB, Petitioner, v. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD and Keystone Engineering Company et al., Respondents.

L.A. 30204, 30205.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

April 19, 1974.

Joseph E. Hall, San Clemente, for petitioner.

Franklin O. Grady, Sheldon C. St. Clair, Thomas J. McBirnie, San Francisco, and Norman R. Samuelsen, San Bernardino, for respondents.

SULLIVAN, Justice.

In these proceedings, presented by two separate petitions upon a single record, ¹ petitioner Rose W. Lamb, widow of the decedent John H. Lamb, seeks review of the decision after reconsideration of the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board (Board) holding, contrary to the findings and award of the referee, that Lamb's death did not result from an injury to his heart arising out of and occurring in the course of his employment.

John H. Lamb was employed for approximately 24 years prior to his death by respondent Keystone Engineering. His job involved the operation of machines which made precision gears from steel blanks.

In 1963 it was discovered that Lamb suffered from moderate hypertension. He was given no treatment at that time but continued to work until sometime in 1969 when symptoms of fatigue and shortness of breath caused him to again consult a doctor. It was found that his hypertension had increased to a more dangerous level and he was required to stop work for approximately one month while a program of rest and medication was administered to him. After returning to work Lamb continued to make periodic visits to the doctor for approximately six months or until June of 1970. He continued to take prescribed medication and also continued to have occasional symptoms of fatigue and chest pains.

On July 16, 1970, Lamb arose at 5:30 a.m., as was his habit. He had worked the preceding 10 days without having a day off and had worked overtime on 7 of those 10 days. He complained to his wife that he was tired and she asked him to remain home from work. He declined to do so, stating that there was too much work to be done, and he left for work at 6:15, arriving there at 7. About 10 a.m. Lamb had some difficulty with a gear he was making and called for the assistance of his supervisor. While the two were engaged in making measurements Lamb left momentarily to find a pin that was used for this purpose. After a few minutes another employee came to tell the supervisor that Lamb was lying on the floor under one of the machines. He was dead.

The four doctors who testified before the referee, only one of whom had treated Lamb during his lifetime, unanimously concluded that the immediate cause of death was an 'arrhythmia' or ventricular fibrillation. All agreed in addition that emotional or physical stress could cause or aggravate heart disease, and two of the doctors were of the view that Lamb's demise was contributed to by his work, largely as a result of the emotional stress which he experienced on the job. ² Two other doctors, however, were of the opposite view: they concluded that Lamb's job involved no emotional or physical stress sufficient to merit consideration as a contributing factor. ³ The referee rejected this latter view, accepting instead that of the other two doctors. Her conclusion was that 'The demands of exacting employment, involving customer time schedules, precision work and the risk of loss of expensive materials, coupled with decedent's underlying cardiac pathology, appear to have rendered his cardiac reserve insufficient for the grueling last days of his life, when he worked 10 hours per day (on 7 out of) 10 consecutive days.' The basis of this conclusion was her finding, resting upon lay testimony in the record, that there was indeed 'considerable emotional stress and some physical stress as well.' This testimony was summarized by the referee as follows: 'Emotional stress predominated, due to the exacting nature of the work and decedent's conscientiousness.' The referee therefore concluded that petitioner as Lamb's widow was entitled to the statutory death benefit. (Lab.Code, § 3600.)

On reconsideration the Board rescinded the findings and award of the referee and substituted therefor an award of litigation expenses and nominal attorneys fees. Concluding that, contrary to the referee's conclusion, Lamb's death did not result from an injury to his heart arising out of and occurring in the course of his employment, the Board found that a preponderance of the evidence supported the opinion of the two doctors whose testimony had been rejected by the referee. In its opinion the Board reviewed the lay evidence concerning the Physical strain involved in Lamb's job. ⁴ It then recited the testimony of one of the doctors to the effect that a certain amount of exercise is good for heart patients and that he, the doctor, '(could not) imagine an easier job than decedent's.' No specific mention was made of the evidence of Emotional stress. The opinion of the Board concluded with the following language: 'We recognize that stress and strain like beauty 'is in the eyes of the beholder.' However, the preponderance of both the lay and medical evidence persuades us that decedent's job did not subject him to the type of stress and strain which could cause, aggravate or precipitate his untimely death.'

1] At this point it was petitioner's turn to seek reconsideration. ⁵ The Board, denying the petition, had recourse to language strongly reminiscent of that used by it in its first opinion (see fn. 4, Ante, and accompanying text): 'Applicant presented lay evidence that Sometimes her husband lifted on his job, Sometimes he had to meet a deadline, Sometime he was reprimanded by his supervisor, Sometimes he chose to work overtime, Sometimes he had to pay attention and concentrate on what he was doing, etc. However, these facts by themselves do not show that decedent's job was inherently stressful much less stressful to him.' (Original italics.) The Board went on to observe that 'applicant presented no evidence that the duties and/or responsibilities of her husband's job produced any symptoms at or near the time he performed them,' and that when last seen by his attending doctor in June of 1970 decedent had complained of no symptoms and had not indicated that he was working beyond his physical capacity. 'On the other hand,' the Board went on to observe, 'the other examiner and/or medical witnesses indicated that with the severe degree of rheumatic heart disease, arteriosclerotic heart disease and hypertension from which decedent suffered, he was likely to drop dead at any time regardless of what activity he happened to be engaged in at that time.'

The Board concluded its second opinion on reconsideration as follows: 'We realize that in cases such as this, most of the medical evidence has to be 'after the fact,' based on assumptions and hypothetical questions, etc. We also realize that medical opinions on cause and effect are always somewhat speculative and/or conjectural. But here the particular opinions that applicant relies upon are just too speculative and weak, for they assume the very facts in issue. Therefore, we are still of the opinion applicant has not met her burden of proving that the job was in fact stressful and this stress did in fact contribute to his death.'

We hold that the decision of the Board in this case must be annulled and the cause remanded for further proceedings in light of the four elementary principles which we now proceed to reiterate.

2] First. 'Although the employee bears the burden of proving that his injury was sustained in the course of his employment, the established legislative policy is that the Workmen's Compensation Act must be liberally construed in the employee's favor (Lab.Code, § 3202), and all reasonable doubts as to whether an injury arose out of employment are to be resolved in favor of the employee. (Lundberg v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 69 Cal.2d 436, 439, 71 Cal.Rptr. 684, 455 P.2d 300) This rule is binding upon the board and this court. (Id. at p. 439, 71 Cal.Rptr. 684, 445 P.2d 300.)' (Garza v. Workman's Comp. App. Bd. (1970), 3 Cal.3d 312, 317, 90 Cal.Rptr. 355, 358, 475 P.2d 451, 454.) (Italics added.)

3] Second. '(A)lthough the board is empowered to resolve conflicts in the evidence (citations), to make its own credibility determinations (citations), and upon reconsideration to reject the findings of the referee and enter its own findings on the basis of its review of the record (citations), nevertheless, any award, order or decision of the Board must be supported by substantial evidence In the light of the entire record (Lab.Code, § 5952; LeVesque v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 1 Cal.3d 627, 635, 83 Cal.Rptr. 208, 463 P.2d 432).' (Garza v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., Supra, 3 Cal.3d 312, 317, 90 Cal.Rptr. 355, 358, 475 P.2d 451, 454.) (Italics added.) The foregoing standard is not met 'by simply isolating evidence which supports the board and ignoring other relevant facts of record which rebut or explain that evidence.' (Id. at p. 317, 90 Cal.Rptr. at p. 359, 475 P.2d at p. 455.)

4] Third. 'As a general rule, the board 'must accept as true the intended meaning of (evidence) both uncontradicted and unimpeached.' (LeVesque v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., Supra, 1 Cal.3d 627, 639, 83 Cal.Rptr. 208, 216, 463 P.2d 432, 440, McAllister v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., Supra, 69 Cal.2d 408, 413, 71 Cal.Rptr. 697, 445 P.2d 313; see Wilhelm v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., Supra, 255 Cal.App.2d 30, 33, 62 Cal.Rptr. 829.)' (Garza v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., Supra, 3 Cal.3d 312, 317--318, 90 Cal.Rptr. 355, 359, 475 P.2d 451, 455.) (Italics added.)

5] Fourth. When a referee's finding of compensable injury is supported by solid, credible evidence, it is to be accorded great weight by the Board and should be rejected only on the basis of contrary evidence of considerable substantiality. (Garza v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., Supra...