Lambdin v. District Court In and For 18th Judicial Dist. of County of Arapahoe
| Decision Date | 10 October 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 95SA185,95SA185 |
| Citation | 903 P.2d 1126 |
| Parties | , 130 Lab.Cas. P 58,006, 2 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 1647 Ken LAMBDIN, Petitioner, v. DISTRICT COURT In and For the 18TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF the COUNTY OF ARAPAHOE, and the Honorable Thomas C. Levi, One of the Judges Thereof, Respondents. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Elizabeth Lamb Kearney, Brent R. Ruther, Law Offices of Elizabeth Lamb Kearney, Denver, for Petitioner.
Steven J. Merker, Martin J. Katz, Denver, for Respondents.
In this original proceeding pursuant to C.A.R. 21, the petitioner, Ken Lambdin, requests that we direct the Arapahoe County District Court to permit Lambdin to litigate, rather than arbitrate, his compensation claims against Sun Microsystems (Sun). The issue presented is whether sections 8-4-101 to -126, 3B C.R.S. (1986 & 1994 Supp.), of the Colorado Wage Claim Act prohibit employers from requiring employees to submit disputes over compensation to arbitration. We conclude that the Wage Claim Act creates remedies for employees seeking past due compensation, and does not permit waiver of those remedies. Having issued a rule to show cause why the requested relief should not be granted, we now make the rule absolute.
In December of 1986, Sun Microsystems, the defendant in the District Court action, hired Ken Lambdin to work in its Englewood, Colorado office as a sales representative. Lambdin's compensation included a base salary and commissions from sales. Sun calculated and determined eligibility for commissions according to a Sales Representative Incentive Compensation Plan (Compensation Plan) that Sun developed and distributed to its sales force each year. Sun provided Lambdin with a copy of the Compensation Plan after Lambdin accepted employment with the company. 1 The Compensation Plan included an arbitration provision requiring any controversy or claim relating to the plan to be resolved in Palo Alto, California according to the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association and California law. 2 In 1992, a dispute arose between Lambdin and Sun over a commission payment of approximately $60,000. In July of 1993, Lambdin terminated his employment with Sun. After unsuccessfully pursuing his claims for the disputed commission through Sun's internal administrative procedures, Lambdin filed a complaint in Arapahoe County District Court on May 26, 1994. Lambdin's complaint contained claims for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and failure of Sun to pay wages in violation of section 8-4-104, 3B C.R.S. (1986 & 1994 Supp.). 3 Lambdin requested an award of the commission income owed, interest from the date the commission accrued, penalties, attorney fees pursuant to section 8-4-114, 3B C.R.S. (1986), 4 and costs.
Sun filed its motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, to stay proceedings pending arbitration pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) and section 13-22-204, 6A C.R.S. (1987), of the Uniform Arbitration Act of 1975 (UAA). 5 Sun asserted that the arbitration provision of the Compensation Plan governed the dispute, and claimed that because a valid arbitration agreement was in force, the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the dispute.
In response to Sun's motion, Lambdin asserted that the arbitration agreement in the Compensation Plan was invalid. He argued that the Compensation Plan, including the arbitration clause, constituted a contract of adhesion; and that the Compensation Plan was given to him after he had accepted a position at Sun with no opportunity to negotiate its terms. He further argued that the Compensation Plan was not valid because no one from Sun had signed it. For these reasons, Lambdin argued that the Compensation Plan's arbitration provision was unenforceable.
In the alternative, Lambdin claimed that sections 8-4-101 to -126, 3B C.R.S. (1986 & 1994 Supp.), of the Wage Claim Act provided him with a civil remedy for recovery of wages. Section 8-4-125, 3B C.R.S. (1986), of the Wage Claim Act voids any waiver or modification of the employee's rights under the statute. Because the Compensation Plan precluded Lambdin from bringing a civil suit, Lambdin asserted that the provision was an invalid waiver of his rights under the Wage Claim Act and void.
In reply, Sun asserted, in pertinent part, that under section 13-22-204 of the UAA, a valid arbitration agreement overrides any statutory right to pursue a cause of action in court. Thus, Sun argued that the trial court should compel arbitration.
On October 11, 1994, the trial court granted Sun's motion and ordered a stay of Lambdin's civil action pending the conclusion of arbitration proceedings. Lambdin filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court's order, reiterating the arguments set out above. See supra p. 1128. Alternatively, Lambdin requested that the court order the dispute to be arbitrated in Colorado under Colorado law, including the Wage Claim Act. 6
Sun countered that the court lacked jurisdiction to determine matters relating to forum and choice of law. 7 After a hearing, the trial court held that the determination of the appropriate venue and applicable law was governed by the specific provisions of the arbitration clause. Thus, the court denied Lambdin's Motion for Reconsideration and directed that the case proceed to binding arbitration under the specific provisions of the Compensation Plan's arbitration clause.
Pursuant to C.A.R. 21, Lambdin filed a Petition for Relief in the Nature of Mandamus and Prohibition in this court. On June 15, 1995, we issued a rule to show cause directing that the trial court order mandating arbitration be stayed. We now make the rule absolute.
As an initial matter, Sun filed a Motion to Dismiss the order to show cause as being improvidently granted. An original proceeding under C.A.R. 21 is an appropriate remedy "where the trial court has abused its discretion and where an appellate remedy would not be adequate." People v. District Court, 869 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Colo.1994) (quoting People v. District Court, 868 P.2d 400, 403 (Colo.1994)); Halaby, McCrea & Cross v. Hoffman, 831 P.2d 902, 905 (Colo.1992). It is not a substitute for an appeal. Hamon Contractors, Inc. v. District Court, 877 P.2d 884, 887 (Colo.1994). However, exercise of our original jurisdiction is discretionary and is necessarily governed by the circumstances of each case. Id.
In the present case, absent our intervention, Lambdin would be required to submit to arbitration (in California and be governed by California law) under the terms of the arbitration clause. Appellate review of the arbiter's final decision regarding Lambdin's claim would not be an adequate remedy, because it would not resolve the underlying issue of whether Lambdin has a right to pursue his compensation claim through the Colorado court system. In the past, pursuant to C.A.R. 21, we have reviewed cases in which the trial court has issued a stay pending arbitration between the parties. See, e.g., Firelock Inc. v. District Court, 776 P.2d 1090 (Colo.1989); Sager v. District Court, 698 P.2d 250 (Colo.1985); Sandefer v. District Court, 635 P.2d 547 (Colo.1981). Because in this case the damage caused cannot be remedied on appeal, exercise of original jurisdiction is warranted. Therefore, Sun's motion to dismiss the order to show cause as being improvidently granted is denied.
The Wage Claim Act provides a clear, comprehensive statutory scheme designed to require employers to pay wages earned by their employees in a timely manner. Section 8-4-104(1), 3B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.), of the Wage Claim Act mandates that when an employee quits or resigns his or her employment, wages or compensation become due and payable on the next regular payday. If an employer refuses to pay wages or compensation in accordance with section 8-4-104(1) without a good faith justification, the employer is liable to the employee for the compensation that is due plus a penalty as defined by the statute. § 8-4-104(3), 3B C.R.S. (1986). To pursue these claims, an employee is entitled to commence a civil action in court. § 8-4-123, 3B C.R.S. (1986). An employee who prevails in such civil action is entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees. § 8-4-114, 3B C.R.S. (1986). Section 8-4-125, 3B C.R.S. (1986), of the Wage Claim Act is entitled "Nonwaiver of Rights." It states:
Any agreement, written or oral, by any employee purporting to waive or to modify his rights in violation of this article shall be void.
This section, by its plain language, voids any agreement that constitutes a waiver or modification of an employee's rights under the Wage Claim Act.
Lambdin contends that enforcement of the arbitration agreement effects a waiver of the right set out in section 8-4-123 of the Wage Claim Act to institute a civil suit to recover wages. Hence, he claims the agreement is void under section 8-4-125. 8 We agree.
Our primary task in construing statutes is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Bertrand v. Board of County Comm'rs, 872 P.2d 223, 228 (Colo.1994); General Elec. Co. v. Niemet, 866 P.2d 1361, 1364 (Colo.1994). To ascertain legislative intent, we interpret statutory terms in accordance with their commonly accepted meanings. Whimbush v. People, 869 P.2d 1245, 1249 (Colo.1994). Moreover, a statute should be read as a whole in order to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts. City of Lakewood v. Mavromatis, 817 P.2d 90, 96 (Colo.1991).
The plain meaning of section 8-4-125 is that an agreement to arbitrate that conflicts with the rights established by the Wage Claim Act cannot be enforced against the employee. The General Assembly has developed a comprehensive statutory scheme through which employees may obtain wages that are owed. The plain language of the statute establishes that the General Assembly intended Colorado employees to be able to recover past due...
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