Lambert v. State
| Decision Date | 08 December 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. F-88-388,F-88-388 |
| Citation | 888 P.2d 494 |
| Parties | Robert Wayne LAMBERT, Appellant, v. STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma |
Appellant, Robert Wayne Lambert, was convicted April 11, 1988 of two counts each of Murder in the First Degree, Kidnapping, Robbery with Firearms, and Larceny of an Automobile and one count of Arson in the Third Degree after a two stage jury trial in the District Court of Creek County, Case No. CRF-87-240. Following the guilty verdicts, Appellant was sentenced in accordance with the jury's recommendations. He received the death penalty on each count of Murder, ten years per count for Kidnapping, one hundred years per count for Robbery with Firearms, twenty years per count for Larceny of an Automobile and fifteen years for the third degree Arson. Appellant has brought this appeal challenging both the guilty verdicts and the sentences imposed for the crimes.
Laura Lee Sanders and Michael Houghton were sitting in Sanders' car outside a Tulsa bar during the early morning hours of October 6, 1987, when they were approached by two men, later determined to be Scott Allen Hain and Robert Wayne Lambert. Hain and Lambert were in the parking lot of the bar considering whether to rob a nearby house. Hain and Lambert forced their way into Sanders' car by threatening Houghton with a knife.
Hain drove the car away from the bar, then stopped and robbed Houghton at gunpoint. When Houghton resisted the robbery, he was tied up and put into the trunk of the car. A short while later, they stopped again and put Sanders in the trunk as well.
After robbing Houghton and getting the keys to his truck, the Appellant and Hain went back to the bar to get Houghton's truck. Appellant drove the truck away from Tulsa toward Sand Springs, eventually driving down a rural Creek County roadway. Hain followed in Sanders' car with Sanders and Houghton still in the trunk.
The two men took some things from Sanders' car and put them in the truck. One of them cut the gas line to the car and set it on fire by putting lighted newspaper and a blanket under the dripping fuel line. Houghton and Sanders were banging on the trunk and yelling. Appellant and Hain left the area, but returned a short time later to see if the fire was burning well.
Prior to leaving the state, the two men stopped at a friend's house in Jennings and left in his garage a bag of things which they had taken from Sanders' car. They traveled to Wichita, Kansas in Houghton's truck. After spending the five hundred and sixty-five ($565.00) dollars taken from Houghton and Sanders, the two returned to Tulsa, where they were apprehended on the evening of October 9, 1987.
Prior to the commencement of the trial on these charges, Appellant requested an evaluation of his competency to stand trial. His request was granted, the proceedings were stayed and Appellant was sent for evaluation to Vinita State Hospital. Following the evaluation, a post-examination competency hearing was conducted to determine whether Appellant could stand trial. At Appellant's request, a jury was impaneled to try the issue.
After the close of the evidentiary portion of the trial, when both sides had rested, the trial court directed a verdict of competency, finding that Appellant had failed to establish a doubt as to his competency. The jury was released without considering the case. We found this action by the trial court to be improper and remanded the case for additional consideration of this issue. Lambert v. State, 808 P.2d 72 (Okl.Cr.1991).
Prior to conducting a new competency hearing, we directed the trial court to determine the feasibility of holding such a hearing retrospectively. If the trial court determined that a new hearing was in fact feasible, as it did, then a new hearing was to be conducted. Once again, Appellant chose to have a jury consider the question of competency.
On appeal, Appellant has challenged the constitutionality of both the competency proceedings in general and as applied to him, retrospectively, in this case. He also claims that the jury was allowed to consider improper evidence, that his request for a change of venue or individual voir dire should have been granted and that the jury was improperly instructed as to the burden of proof and the effect of their decision. We find no merit to these claims.
Appellant's first claim on appeal concerns the constitutional standards under which determinations of competency are made. In its very succinct opinion of Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 403, 80 S.Ct. 788, 789, 4 L.Ed.2d 824, 825 (1960), the Supreme Court defined the level of competency that must be established in order to allow criminal prosecution to continue once a doubt has been raised:
... it is not enough for the district judge to find that 'the defendant [is] oriented to times and place and [has] some recollection of events,' but that the 'test must be whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding--and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.'
These same principals, contrary to Appellant's assertions otherwise, are part of Oklahoma law. In Middaugh v. State, 767 P.2d 432, 434 (Okl.Cr.1988), we held:
This Court has developed a two prong test to determine whether a person is competent to stand trial. First, the accused must have sufficient ability to consult with his attorney. Second, the accused must have a rational and actual understanding of the proceedings against him.
This interpretation of 22 O.S.1981, § 1175.1 parrots the Supreme Court's standards. Appellant suggests that because Section 1175.1 indicates that the accused must understand the nature of both the charges and the proceedings, it somehow creates a different standard than that discussed above. We disagree.
Competency is defined in 22 O.S.1991, § 1175.1(1) as "the present ability of a person arrested for or charged with a crime to understand the nature or the charges and proceedings brought against him, and is able to effectively and rationally assist in his defense." In our view, there is little or no difference between the effective meaning of the statute and the terms used by the Supreme Court. In both cases, the accused is required to understand the charges against him, the implications of the charges against him and be able to effectively assist his attorney in defense of the charges against him. Appellant's assault on the word "nature" finds little practical effect when measured against the term "rational understanding."
Appellant offers a definition of the term "nature" with which we find no fault; "the essential quality of the thing, essence." The definition is from Webster's New World Dictionary and in our view could easily serve as the definition for "rational understanding." If an accused has some level of awareness of the essence of the charges and the proceedings related to those charges, it is fair to say not only that he comprehends the nature of the proceedings, but also that he has a rational understanding of the events occurring around him. See Ake v. State, 778 P.2d 460, 464 (Okl.Cr.1989).
In short, we find no merit to Appellant's argument that the Oklahoma statutes fall short of a constitutionally acceptable means of measurement when competency to stand trial is at issue. We are, therefore, unable to conclude that Appellant was subjected to an unfair determination of competency or that the jury, which was properly instructed in Oklahoma law, applied any unconstitutional factors when making that determination.
We reach the same conclusion with respect to Appellant's claim that the remand of his case for a subsequent, retrospective post-examination competency hearing was unconstitutional. We have addressed this issue on a number of occasions in the past. In Boltz v. State, 806 P.2d 1117 (Okl.Cr.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 846, 112 S.Ct. 143, 116 L.Ed.2d 109 (1991), we rejected an identical claim. We are not presented with any reason here which compels us to change or reconsider our position on this issue. See also, Clayton v. State, 840 P.2d 18, 25 (Okl.Cr.1992); Thomas v. State, 777 P.2d 399 (Okl.Cr.1989).
Boltz is also determinative of Appellant's argument that his video-taped confession was improperly admitted as evidence of competency. In Boltz we held that consideration of the defendant's trial testimony in a retrospective competency trial was not only proper, but that it " 'provided a solid starting point for reliable reconstruction of the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Hatch v. State of Okl.
...ability to consult with his attorney" and "a rational and actual understanding of the proceedings against him." Lambert v. Oklahoma, 888 P.2d 494, 498 (Okla.Crim.App.1994) (quoting Middaugh v. Oklahoma, 767 P.2d 432, 434 (Okla.Crim.App.1988)); see also Bryson v. Oklahoma, 876 P.2d 240, 249 ......
-
Van White v. State
...him. We have previously considered and rejected this argument in Tate v. State, 1995 OK CR 24, ¶ 17, 896 P.2d 1182, 1188, and Lambert v. State, 1994 OK CR 79, ¶ 11, 888 P.2d 494, 497-498 and decline to reconsider our holding. This supplemental claim is denied. Having denied all of Appellant......
-
Maynard v. Boone
...Valdez v. State, 900 P.2d 363 (Okla.Crim.App.1995); Perry v. State, 893 P.2d 521 (Okla.Crim.App.1995); Lambert v. State, 888 P.2d 494, 498 (Okla.Crim. App.1994). Accordingly, we agree with the district court that Maynard is not entitled to relief on this 2. Sufficiency of Evidence Maynard a......
-
Hain v. Gibson
...relied on by the jury in reaching its verdicts. On direct appeal, the OCCA reversed Lambert's murder convictions. Lambert v. State, 888 P.2d 494, 504 (Okla.Crim.App.1994). In doing so, the OCCA concluded that Lambert was prejudiced by the failure to charge felony murder in the information b......