Lambries v. Saluda Cnty. Council

• Citation: 760 S.E.2d 785,409 S.C. 1
• Decision Date: 06 August 2014
• Docket Number: No. 27400.,27400.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
• Parties: Dennis N. LAMBRIES, Respondent, v. SALUDA COUNTY COUNCIL; T. Hardee Horne, Chairman; William “Billie” Pugh, Councilman; Steve Teer, Councilman; Jacob Schumpert, Councilman; and James Frank Daniel, Sr., Councilman; Petitioners. Appellate Case No. 2012–212790.

409 S.C. 1

760 S.E.2d 785

Dennis N. LAMBRIES, Respondent,

v. SALUDA COUNTY COUNCIL; T. Hardee Horne, Chairman; William “Billie” Pugh, Councilman; Steve Teer, Councilman; Jacob Schumpert, Councilman; and James Frank Daniel, Sr., Councilman; Petitioners.Appellate Case No. 2012–212790.

No. 27400.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard May 7, 2014.

Decided June 18, 2014.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 6, 2014.

Christian G. Spradley, of Moore, Taylor & Thomas, P.A., of Saluda, and Katherine Carruth Goode, of Winnsboro, for Petitioners.

Richard R. Gleissner, of Gleissner Law Firm, LLC, of Columbia, for Respondent.

Robert E. Lyon, Jr., John K. DeLoache, and Alexander White Smith, all of Columbia, for Amicus Curiae South Carolina Association of Counties.

Danny C. Crowe, of Crowe LaFave, L.L.C., of Columbia, for Amicus Curiae the Municipal Association of South Carolina.

Acting Justice JAMES E. MOORE.

This Court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari to review Lambries v. Saluda County Council, 398 S.C. 501, 728 S.E.2d 488 (Ct.App.2012), in which the Court of Appeals held, in a matter of first impression, that Saluda County Council's practice of amending its agenda during regularly scheduled meetings violated S.C.Code Ann. § 30–4–80 (2007), the notice provision in South Carolina's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). We reverse.

I. FACTS

On December 8, 2008, at a regularly scheduled meeting of the Saluda County Council, a motion was made and seconded to amend the posted agenda to take up a resolution. Both the motion and the resolution were voted upon and passed unanimously during the meeting, which was open to the public. The nonbinding resolution pertained to water and sewer services, although that subject was not originally listed on County Council's agenda.

Dennis N. Lambries (“Lambries”) filed this action in the circuit court against the Saluda County Council and its members (collectively, “County Council”), alleging County Council's amendment of the agenda without notice and in the absence of exigent circumstances and its passage of a resolution that was not on the posted agenda violated FOIA's notice provision in section 30–4–80. Lambries brought the action as a citizen of Saluda County and noted he was also the Chairman of the Saluda County Water and Sewer Authority.

Lambries sought declaratory and/or injunctive relief. Specifically, Lambries asked the circuit court to declare that all resolutions, acts, ordinances, and statements made by County Council in violation of FOIA were null and void, and he sought injunctive relief to prevent future amendments of an agenda in the absence of “truly exigent circumstances,” adopting the language contained in a 1984 South Carolina Attorney General Opinion.¹ Lambries contended the only exception in section 30–4–80 to the requirement that a public notice include an agenda, date, time, and place of meeting was for emergency meetings.

Lambries ultimately dropped his request that certain acts of County Council be declared void and sought only an interpretation of FOIA's notice provision that would prevent County Council from amending its agenda during regularly scheduled meetings. The circuit court denied Lambries's request for injunctive relief and found that under the clear terms of section 30–4–80, which referred to the publication of an “agenda, if any,” an agenda was not even required for regularly scheduled meetings, and FOIA contained no prohibition on the amendment of a published agenda. The circuit court rejected Lambries's argument that a sentence in section 30–4–80 states that an agenda is required, finding it applied only to “called, special, or rescheduled meetings,” not to “regularly scheduled meetings.”

The circuit court noted the purpose of FOIA is for the activities of government “to be in open session and not behind closed doors.” The court found that “the amendment of the agenda was performed in open session and in accordance with Saluda County Council rules of order as codified in their ordinances,” and S.C.Code Ann. § 4–9–110 (1986) authorizes counties to establish their own rules and order of business. The circuit court denied Lambries's motion to alter or amend under Rule 59(e), SCRCP, reiterating that it “d[id] not agree with the plaintiff's fundamental position that a county council cannot amend agendas for regularly scheduled meetings without advance notice or exigent circumstances.”

The Court of Appeals reversed in a split decision, the majority finding (1) an agenda is required for regularly scheduled meetings, and (2) County Council's amendment of an agenda less than twenty-four hours before the meeting violated the “spirit” and “purpose” of FOIA's notice requirement. Lambries v. Saluda County Council, 398 S.C. 501, 728 S.E.2d 488 (Ct.App.2012) (2–1 decision). This Court granted County Council's petition for a writ of certiorari. In addition, the Court has accepted briefs in support of County Council from the amici curiae, the Municipal Association of South Carolina and the South Carolina Association of Counties.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

As an initial matter, County Council contends “the Court of Appeals applied the wrong standard of review” when it found it could decide the issue presented in this case “with no particular deference to the circuit court.” County Council contends the matter should be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, as indicated by the dissent.²

“Actions for injunctive relief are equitable in nature.” Denman v. City of Columbia, 387 S.C. 131, 140, 691 S.E.2d 465, 470 (2010). “An injunction is a drastic remedy issued by the court in its discretion to prevent irreparable harm suffered by the plaintiff.” Id. at 140–41, 691 S.E.2d at 470 (citation omitted).

“An order granting or denying an injunction is reviewed for [an] abuse of discretion.” Strategic Res. Co. v. BCS Life Ins. Co., 367 S.C. 540, 544, 627 S.E.2d 687, 689 (2006). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is based upon an error of law or upon factual findings that are without evidentiary support.” Fields v. J. Haynes Waters Builders, Inc., 376 S.C. 545, 555, 658 S.E.2d 80, 85–86 (2008) (emphasis added).

“Upon review of an action in equity, this Court may make factual findings based on its own view of the preponderance of the evidence.” Scratch Golf Co. v. Dunes W. Residential Golf Props., Inc., 361 S.C. 117, 120–21, 603 S.E.2d 905, 907 (2004). “Determining the proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and this Court reviews questions of law de novo.” Town of Summerville v. City of N. Charleston, 378 S.C. 107, 110, 662 S.E.2d 40, 41 (2008). “In a case raising a novel issue of law regarding the interpretation of a statute, the appellate court is free to decide the question with no particular deference to the lower court.” Sloan v. S.C. Bd. of Physical Therapy Exam'rs, 370 S.C. 452, 466, 636 S.E.2d 598, 605 (2006). “The appellate court is free to decide the question based on its assessment of which interpretation and reasoning would best comport with the law and public policies of this state and the Court's sense of law, justice, and right.” Id. at 467, 636 S.E.2d at 605–06.

We find that, while an injunction is equitable and subject to the trial court's discretion, where the decision turns on statutory interpretation—here, an interpretation of section 30–4–80 in FOIA—this presents a question of law. As a result, this Court need not give deference to the trial court's interpretation. If, based on this Court's assessment, the trial court committed an error of law in its interpretation of FOIA's notice requirement, that would constitute an abuse of discretion by the trial court.

III. LAW/ANALYSIS

On appeal, County Council contends the Court of Appeals erred in interpreting FOIA as prohibiting a public body from amending its agenda at a regularly scheduled meeting. In analyzing this issue, it will be helpful to consider the relevant FOIA provisions, the applicable principles of statutory interpretation, and the reasoning of the Court of Appeals before turning to the propriety of County Council's conduct.

A. Overview of FOIA Provisions

There is no common-law right to attend the meetings of government bodies, so many jurisdictions have legislated public meeting statutes, variously referred to as, inter alia, “open meeting laws” or “Sunshine Acts.” See generally4 Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 13:10 (3d ed. rev.vol.2011); 2 Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law § 84 (2004).

In South Carolina, FOIA governs the public disclosure of the activities of public bodies, and it has provisions pertaining to public meetings as well as documents. S.C.Code Ann. §§ 30–4–10 to –165 (2007 & Supp.2013). The essential purpose of FOIA is to protect the public from secret government activity. Wiedemann v. Town of Hilton Head Island, 330 S.C. 532, 500 S.E.2d 783 (1998).

In declaring FOIA's purpose, the General Assembly has found “that it is vital in a democratic society that public business be performed in an open and public manner so that citizens shall be advised of the performance of public officials and of the decisions that are reached in public activity and in the formulation of public policy.” S.C.Code Ann. § 30–4–15 (2007). “Toward this end, [FOIA's] provisions ... must be construed so as to make it possible for citizens, or their representatives, to learn and report fully the activities of their public officials at a minimum cost or delay to the persons seeking access to public documents or meetings.” Id.

FOIA's open meeting provision, section 30–4–60, provides “[e]very meeting of all public bodies shall be open to the public unless closed pursuant to [section] 30–4–70 of this chapter.” Id. § 30–4–60. Meetings may be closed for certain enumerated reasons, including such matters as the discussion of proposed contractual arrangements and the proposed sale or purchase of property; the receipt of legal advice related to a...