Meier v. Burnsed
| Decision Date | 28 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 5947,Appellate Case 2019-000518 |
| Parties | Richard Walter Meier and the Estate of William Carl Meier, by and through Conrad Meier, its Personal Representative, Appellants, v. Mary J. Burnsed, Respondent. |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
Heard February 9, 2022
Appeal From Beaufort County Marvin H. Dukes, III, Special Circuit Court Judge
H Fred Kuhn, Jr., of Moss & Kuhn, PA, of Beaufort, for Appellants.
Peggy McMillan Infinger, of Belk Cobb Infinger & Goldstein, PA of Charleston; Paul H. Infinger, of Paul H. Infinger, LLC, of Beaufort; and James B. Richardson, Jr., of Columbia; all for Respondent.
In this dispute over the proceeds of a life insurance policy, Richard Walter Meier and the Estate of William Carl Meier, by and through Conrad Meier, its personal representative (collectively, the Meiers) appeal the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to Mary J. Burnsed. They contend the court erred in finding section 62-2-507 of the South Carolina Code (2022) did not apply to revoke a beneficiary designation made before a divorce when both the beneficiary designation and divorce occurred prior to the effective date of the statute. We reverse.
William Carl Meier (William) and Burnsed married on July 19, 1997. On June 16, 1998, William obtained a $250,000 life insurance policy (the Policy) from Western Reserve Life Assurance Company of Ohio.[1] He designated Burnsed as the primary beneficiary and his brother Richard as the contingent beneficiary.[2] William and Burnsed divorced on November 26, 2002. The family court stated in the divorce decree: William paid the premiums for the Policy and maintained the Policy until his unexpected death on December 26, 2017.
On February 5, 2018, the Meiers filed an action against Burnsed and Transamerica asserting there exists a justiciable controversy over the proper beneficiary of the Policy. They asserted the divorce of William and Burnsed revoked William's designation of Burnsed as beneficiary under section 62-2-507(c) of the South Carolina Code (2022), which codifies the presumption an insured does not intend his or her former spouse to remain a beneficiary of any insurance policies after divorce. S.C. Code Ann. § 62-2-507 reporter's cmt. (2022).
On April 12, 2018, Burnsed filed an answer, counterclaim, and cross-claim, asserting section 62-2-507 did not operate to revoke her as primary beneficiary of the Policy. She counterclaimed for tortious interference with a contract and cross-claimed against Transamerica for breach of contract and unreasonable and bad faith refusal to pay benefits under contract.
On April 20, 2018, the Meiers filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting William and Burnsed's divorce revoked the designation of Burnsed as the beneficiary, pursuant to section 62-2-507(c). They requested the circuit court declare Burnsed was not a beneficiary of the Policy and order Transamerica to pay Richard the proceeds from the Policy as alternate beneficiary.
On April 23, 2018, Transamerica filed an answer, counterclaim in interpleader, and cross-claim in interpleader. It asserted it was "unable to determine the correct recipient of the death benefit payable under the Policy[] and the correct recipient should be determined by" the court. It maintained all issues alleged in the complaint should be resolved through interpleader. Transamerica requested the court order it to pay $250,000 into the registry of the court and discharge it from further liability and dismiss it as a party with prejudice. On May 11, 2018, Transamerica filed an answer to Burnsed's cross-claims, requesting they be dismissed.
On May 30, 2018, Burnsed filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing South Carolina Act Number 100 of 2013 (the Act),[3] codified as section 62-2-507, does not retroactively apply in the case of any divorce entered before January 1, 2014, the effective date of the statute.
Burnsed and the Meiers submitted affidavits with their motions for summary judgment. The Meiers' affidavits asserted William wanted his son to receive the Policy's proceeds whereas Burnsed's affidavits described her continuing close relationship with William after their divorce and stated William "frequently reminded" her that she was the beneficiary of his Policy. Burnsed also submitted emails and text messages she and William exchanged in the years after their divorce.
On June 18, 2018, with the consent of the parties, the circuit court granted Transamerica's motion to deposit the $250,000 payable under the Policy along with any applicable interest into the registry of the court.
On June 26, 2018, the circuit court[4] held a hearing[5] on the Meiers' motion for summary judgment. On August 10, 2018, the circuit court filed an order denying the Meiers' motion. The court found: "The question presented by this case is whether [section 62-2-507] can apply to [a] life insurance policy when both the policy and the divorce occurred before this statute was enacted, yet the death of the owner of the insurance policy occurred after the enactment of the statute." The court found section "62-2-507 is not retroactive under th[o]se facts." The court looked at several cases from other jurisdictions. One of those cases, Stillman v. Teachers Insurance & Annuity Ass'n College Retirement Equities Fund, 343 F.3d 1311 (10th Cir. 2003), from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which examined a Utah statute. The circuit court found that unlike the Utah statute, which explicitly stated that amendments to the statute applied to "governing instruments executed before" the amendments, "the South Carolina probate code has no equivalent provision in the language of the code itself." The court noted however, that the "language [referenced by the Tenth Circuit] does appear in the Reporter's Comment of some acts that were later codified into the probate code, but it does not appear in [the Act] [section] 1, which was codified as . . . [section] 62-2-507, the statute in dispute here." The circuit court determined "the [Utah] statutory language upon which the Tenth Circuit relied does not exist in the South Carolina code." The court also looked at the United States Supreme Court case of Sveen v. Melin, 138 S.Ct. 1815 (2018), which examined the constitutionality of retroactively applying a revocation-upon-divorce statute. The court distinguished Sveen, noting that "while the retroactive application of the revocability statute might not have been unconstitutional in [Sveen], there are reasons to believe that, under the circumstances currently before the court, . . . [section] 62-2-507 does change [William's] contractual relationship with the insurance company."
On March 11, 2019, the circuit court[6] held a hearing on Burnsed's motion for summary judgment. On March 21, 2019, the circuit court filed an order granting Burnsed's motion. The court found section 62-2-507(c) "was not intended by the General Assembly to apply retroactively in the case of a divorce entered before the effective date of the statute." This appeal followed.
The purpose of summary judgment is to expedite the disposition of cases not requiring the services of a fact finder. George v. Fabri, 345 S.C. 440, 452, 548 S.E.2d 868, 874 (2001). When reviewing the grant of a summary judgment motion, this court applies the same standard that governs the trial court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP. Fleming v. Rose, 350 S.C 488, 493, 567 S.E.2d 857, 860 (2002). "When the parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, the issue becomes a question of law for the [c]ourt to decide de novo." S.C. Pub. Int. Found. v. Calhoun Cnty. Council, 432 S.C. 492, 495, 854 S.E.2d 836, 837 (2021); see also Quicken Loans, Inc. v. Wilson, 425 S.C. 574, 579, 823 S.E.2d 697, 700 (Ct. App. 2019) .
"[T]he interpretation of a statute is a question of law for the [c]ourt to review de novo." Calhoun Cnty. Council, 432 S.C. at 495, 854 S.E.2d at 837. "Determining the proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and this [c]ourt reviews questions of law de novo." Buchanan v. S.C. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 417 S.C. 562, 566, 790 S.E.2d 783, 785 (Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Lambries v. Saluda Cnty. Council, 409 S.C. 1, 7, 760 S.E.2d 785, 788 (2014)), aff'd as modified, 424 S.C. 542, 819 S.E.2d 124 (2018). "Questions of law may be decided with no particular deference to the trial court." Wilson, 425 S.C. at 579, 823 S.E.2d at 700 (quoting Wiegand, 391 S.C. at 163, 705 S.E.2d at 434). "In a case raising a novel issue of law regarding the interpretation of a statute, the appellate court is free to decide the question with no particular deference to the lower court." Buchanan, 417 S.C. at 566, 790 S.E.2d at 785 (quoting Lambries, 409 S.C. at 7-8, 760 S.E.2d at 788). "The appellate court is free to decide the question based on its assessment of which interpretation and reasoning would best comport with the law and public policies of this state and the [c]ourt's sense of law, justice, and right." Id. at 567, 790 S.E.2d at 785 (quoting Lambries, 409 S.C. at 8, 760 S.E.2d at 788).
"Generally an action on a life insurance policy is a legal action involving a question of contract law." Est. of Revis ex rel....
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