Lamon v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.

• Decision Date: 04 January 1979
• Docket Number: No. 45619,45619
• Citation: 91 Wn.2d 345,588 P.2d 1346
• Parties: Vicki L. LAMON, a single woman, Respondent, v. McDONNELL DOUGLAS CORPORATION, a Foreign Corporation, Appellant.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 345

91 Wn.2d 345

588 P.2d 1346

Vicki L. LAMON, a single woman, Respondent, v. McDONNELL DOUGLAS CORPORATION, a Foreign Corporation, Appellant.

No. 45619.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Jan. 4, 1979.

Lane, Powell, Moss & Miller, G. Val Tollefson, Seattle, for appellant.

Bonjorni, Harpold & Fiori, Duncan Bonjorni, Auburn, Jerry Schumm, Whitefish, Mont., for respondent.

HAMILTON, Justice.

This is a products liability case in which Vicki L. Lamon, plaintiff (respondent), sought to recover for injuries received when she fell through an open escape hatch while in the course of her preflight duties as an airline stewardess. Plaintiff alleged in her complaint against McDonnell Douglas Corporation, defendant (appellant), that the subject airplane was defectively designed and manufactured and that defendant negligently failed to properly warn of a dangerous condition. Defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted by the trial court based on the files and affidavits before it. The Court of Appeals reversed by a less than unanimous decision. Lamon v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 19 Wash.App. 515, 576 P.2d 426 (1978). The matter was then appealed to this court pursuant to RCW 2.06.030(e).

As we view it, the pivotal question posited by the appeal is whether the record before us reveals a genuine issue of material fact. If so, dismissal by way of summary judgment is inappropriate.

We answer the question in the affirmative. Accordingly, we affirm the conclusion of the Court of Appeals and reverse the trial court.

An agreed statement of facts can be summarized as follows:

On September 3, 1973, plaintiff was working as a stewardess for United Air Lines. Prior to a scheduled flight, plaintiff was among several stewardesses preparing the airplane, a DC-10, for flight. Two stewardesses were assigned work in the galley located beneath the first-class cabin. Those stewardesses proceeded to enter that area by way of the personnel elevator located aft of the first-class section. Subsequently, there was a power failure in the galley. Under these circumstances, stewardesses are instructed to use the emergency exit from the galley. One of the stewardesses in the galley did so use the emergency exit. She opened the hatch cover, which lifts up and is not hinged or attached to the aircraft. The hatch opens onto the aisle of the first-class section. The galley stewardess came partially through the hatch, announced the power failure, and went back into the galley. Contrary to instructions which she received during training, she left the hatch uncovered and unattended.

At the time the stewardess came through the hatch, plaintiff was visiting with other stewardesses in an area aft of the first-class section. Plaintiff saw the upper half of the stewardess' body emerge, and she heard her announce the power failure. ¹

A short time later, plaintiff resumed her preflight duties. In order to distribute menus and earphones, she proceeded to the aisle where the hatch is located and backed down the aisle from the aft to the forward end of the first-class section. When she reached the open hatch, she fell into it and suffered injuries.

Defendant's attorney filed a motion for summary judgment and supported it with a memorandum, his own affidavit, and the affidavit of the Chief Interiors Engineer Commercial for defendant. The substance of the latter affidavit was that the hatch was designed to afford a rapid and easy egress from the galley in the event normal means of egress were unavailable, and that it was necessary to locate it in an unobstructed area such as an aisle. No explanation relating to the hinging or nonhinging of the hatch cover was tendered.

Plaintiff's attorney submitted a memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment and supported it by the affidavit of an engineer. The affidavit stated the affiant's business association, educational background, and his specialization in reconstruction and analysis of industrial and traffic accidents. The affiant then averred:

On April 5, 1975, I examined the galley escape hatches on a DC-10 and a Boeing 747 airplane. The examination was made at the Seattle-Tacoma airport and the airplanes were part of the United Airlines fleet. Based on this examination it is my opinion that the design of the escape hatch cover on the DC-10 created an unreasonably dangerous condition for the cabin attendants. The condition was created because the hatch cover on the DC-10 consists of a loose panel, and in order to close the hatch after use the loose hatch cover has to be manually fitted into the hatch opening. If after using the hatch the user were to forget to replace the hatch cover the open hatch would constitute a serious hazard to cabin attendants who often have to walk backward in the performance of their duties. If when replaced the hatch cover were not properly fitted into the hatch opening it could act as a trap door and endanger the person stepping on it. The dangerous features of the DC-10 hatch cover are not present in the design of the Boeing 747 galley hatch cover. While quite similar in other respects, the Boeing 747 hatch cover is hinged to the floor and is equipped with a spring device which automatically closes and keeps the hatch cover closed when the hatch is not in use.

Based on the agreed statement of facts, the affidavits and the record of the case, the trial court dismissed the case.

In Balise v. Underwood, 62 Wash.2d 195, 199, 381 P.2d 966, 968 (1963), we observed:

(1) The object and function of the summary judgment procedure is to avoid a useless trial; however, a trial is not useless, but is absolutely necessary where there is a genuine issue as to any material fact. Preston v. Duncan, 55 Wash.2d 678, 349 P.2d 605.

Pursuant to CR 56(c), a summary judgment is available only where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."

In Morris v. McNicol, 83 Wash.2d 491, 494-95, 519 P.2d 7, 10 (1974), we considered the criteria for granting summary judgment, and determined that

(a) "material fact" is a fact upon which the outcome of the litigation depends, in whole or in part. CR 56; Balise v. Underwood, 62 Wash.2d 195, 381 P.2d 966 (1963); Zedrick v. Kosenski, 62 Wash.2d 50, 380 P.2d 870 (1963).

Moreover, the burden is on the party moving for summary judgment to demonstrate that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and all reasonable inferences from the evidence must be resolved against him. Barber v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 81 Wash.2d 140, 500 P.2d 88 (1972); Welling v. Mount Si Bowl, Inc., 79 Wash.2d 485, 487 P.2d 620 (1971). Thus, where a motion for summary judgment is made, it is the duty of the trial court to consider all evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the nonmovant. Maki v. Aluminum Bldg. Prods., 73 Wash.2d 23, 436 P.2d 186 (1968).

The motion should be granted only if, from all the evidence, reasonable men could reach but one conclusion. CR 56(c); Meissner v. Simpson Timber Co., 69 Wash.2d 949, 421 P.2d 674 (1966). Only when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits considered by the trial court do not create a genuine issue of material fact between the parties is the moving party entitled to a summary judgment. Ferrin v. Donnellefeld, 74 Wash.2d 283, 444 P.2d 701 (1968).

For the purposes of a summary judgment procedure, an appellate court is required, as was the trial court, to review material submitted for and against a motion for summary judgment in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made. Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Co. v. Central Heating & Plumbing Co., 81 Wash.2d 528, 503 P.2d 108 (1972); Robert Wise Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Alpine Dev. Co., 72 Wash.2d 172, 432 P.2d 547 (1967).

Pursuant to the standard for summary judgment set out by CR 56(c) and decisions of this court, a reviewing court must consider not only whether the affidavits, facts, and record of a case have created an issue of fact, but also whether any such issue of fact is material to a cause of action.

One of plaintiff's theories of liability was that of strict liability, a theory first applied by this court in Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wash.2d 522, 452 P.2d 729 (1969), a case of alleged defective manufacture. In that case, this court adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965). ² in Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash.2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975), we held that section 402A applied to design defects as well as manufacturing defects. We went on to state, at page 154, 542 P.2d page 779:

Thus, we hold that liability is imposed under section 402A if a product is Not reasonably safe. This means that it must be unsafe to an extent beyond that which would be reasonably contemplated by the ordinary consumer. This evaluation of the product in terms of the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer allows the trier of the fact to take...