Lamoureux v. Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole

• Decision Date: 10 November 1983
• Citation: 456 N.E.2d 1117,390 Mass. 409
• Parties: Bernard LAMOUREUX 1 v. SUPERINTENDENT, MASSACHUSETTS CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, WALPOLE.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 1117

456 N.E.2d 1117

390 Mass. 409

Bernard LAMOUREUX ¹ v. SUPERINTENDENT, MASSACHUSETTS CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, WALPOLE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Norfolk.

Submitted March 10, 1983.

Decided Nov. 10, 1983.

Bernard Lamoureux, pro se.

John W. Bishop, Jr., Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Herbert C. Hanson, Wayland, for defendant.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and WILKINS, LIACOS, ABRAMS and O'CONNOR, JJ.

LIACOS, Justice.

This case, as with three other cases decided by us today, ² questions the constitutionality of certain State regulations governing the administration of State prisons. The plaintiff, Lamoureux, filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, ³ contending that he was denied the protection of due process of law in a disciplinary hearing in which the disciplinary board (board) of the Department of Correction relied on informant information in finding the plaintiff guilty of the alleged misconduct. ⁴ The plaintiff also contends that administrative segregation involves a State-created liberty interest protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and that the State regulations concerning administrative segregation do not satisfy due process requirements. Lamoureux sought release from administrative segregation and the removal of sanctions imposed by the board.

After a hearing on the merits, a Superior Court judge in Norfolk County found the regulations involving the use of informant information to be inadequate under Federal law. Relying on the due process standard set out in Helms v. Hewitt, 655 F.2d 487 (3d Cir.1981), rev'd in part, 459 U.S. 460, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983), the judge ruled that the statement summarizing the evidence relied on by the board, required by the State regulations, was so lacking as to violate the plaintiff's due process rights. He ordered the sanctions removed, and the plaintiff returned to the general prison population. ⁵

The defendant sought a stay of judgment pending appeal which was denied by the trial judge but which was granted by a Justice of the Appeals Court. We transferred the case here on our own motion.

The defendant maintains that the State regulations pertaining to the use of informant information satisfy the minimal due process requirements set forth in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). In the alternative, the defendant argues that, if the standard adopted by the judge is applicable, the summary of evidence given by the disciplinary board satisfies such a standard. Finally, the defendant contends that the judge erred in releasing the plaintiff from administrative segregation.

We conclude that the judge correctly ordered the return of the plaintiff's good time credits. For reasons discussed further in this opinion, however, we reverse the judgment and remand the case to the trial court for a declaration of the plaintiff's rights.

The facts are as follows. The plaintiff is lawfully in the custody and care of the Massachusetts Department of Correction at M.C.I., Walpole. ⁶ On February 13, 1982, the plaintiff was locked in his cell, pending a disciplinary investigation. ⁷ He was transferred a week later to the Southeastern Correctional Center at Bridgewater.

On March 1, 1982, Correctional Officer Paul Murphy reported the plaintiff for alleged major misconduct at M.C.I., Walpole. The officer alleged that, based on his investigation and "my reliable informant information," inmate Lamoureux had participated in a planned violent takeover of M.C.I., Walpole, by manufacturing weapons at the institution foundry during the early part of February, 1982. ⁸ A copy of the disciplinary report was received by the plaintiff on the same day, and the plaintiff was informed of the pending disciplinary hearing.

The day before the hearing, the plaintiff was transferred, still in administrative segregation, to the Departmental Segregation Unit (D.S.U., also known as Block 10) at M.C.I., Walpole. ⁹ The disciplinary hearing was conducted on March 23, 1982, in accordance with 103 Code Mass.Regs. § 430.01 et seq. (1978). Lamoureux was not represented by counsel. Out of the plaintiff's presence, the board reviewed the informant information. ¹⁰ Determining the informant information to be reliable, the board found the plaintiff guilty of violating § 430.22(14), participating in a hostage taking; § 430.22(15), manufacturing of weapons; and § 430.22(31), attempting to commit the offenses, aiding another to commit the offenses, and making plans to commit the offenses. In accordance with § 430.17, the board provided Lamoureux with a written summary of the evidence relied upon by it in reaching the guilty finding. ¹¹

The board imposed sanctions of fifteen days in isolation and forfeiture of 700 days of good time credit. It further recommended that the plaintiff be reclassified to the D.S.U. The plaintiff appealed his sanctions to the defendant, who reduced the forfeiture to 150 days of good time credit but approved the isolation time and referral to the D.S.U.

The plaintiff remained in administrative segregation in the D.S.U. from March 22 to June 29, 1982, when he was formally reclassified by the D.S.U. board for the D.S.U. in accordance with the disciplinary board's recommendation. The plaintiff presently remains in the D.S.U.

We have held in cases decided today that loss of statutory good time credits involves a State-created liberty interest that is protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See Nelson v. Commissioner of Correction, 390 Mass. 379, 456 N.E.2d 1100 (1983). Cf. Cassesso v. Commissioner of Correction, 390 Mass. 419, 456 N.E.2d 1123 (1983). We have decided also that the State regulations governing the use of informant information in disciplinary proceedings do not provide adequate precautions to protect the accused's Federal due process rights against potential abuse of informant information. See Nelson v. Commissioner of Correction, supra 390 Mass. at 393-94, 456 N.E.2d at 1109. It is not necessary to repeat our discussion. The judge properly relied on the standard set forth in Helms v. Hewitt, 655 F.2d 487 (3d Cir.1981), and Gomes v. Travisono, 510 F.2d 537 (1st Cir.1974). See Nelson v. Commissioner of Correction, supra 390 Mass. at 395-96, 456 N.E.2d at 1110. When a disciplinary board's determination is derived from informant information, "(1) the record must contain some underlying factual information from which the [board] can reasonably conclude that the informant was credible or his information reliable; (2) the record must contain the informant's statement [written or as reported] in language that is factual rather than conclusionary and must establish by its specificity that the informant spoke with personal knowledge of the matters contained in such statement." Helms, supra at 502, quoting Gomes v. Travisono, supra at 540; Nelson, supra 390 Mass. at 394, 456 N.E.2d at 1109.

The defendant argues that the summary of evidence in the instant case satisfies the Helms criteria because the statement of evidence relied upon specifically stated that the informant or informants (hereinafter, "informants") had been used in the past, that the informants' information in the past had proved reliable, and that the informants had no motives or inducements. ¹² Furthermore, the defendant argues that the recovery of the manufactured weapons was evidence supporting the determination of reliability.

We disagree, and we conclude that the board's summary of evidence was inadequate to protect the plaintiff's Federal due process rights. It is true that, unlike the statement presented in Nelson, the statement in the instant case satisfies the first criterion of Helms by indicating why the board found the informants credible. The summary of evidence does not, however, indicate what the information was and whether the information was personally known. ¹³ Where cross-examination and confrontation are not available to sift out the truth, such guidelines are important to ensure that the hearing by the board was a genuine fact-finding procedure verifying the truth of wrongdoing. See Nelson, supra 390 Mass. at 393, 456 N.E.2d at 1108. The second and third requirements go to the question of weight to be given reliable informant information. They ensure that the board's decision is based on fact and not on speculation. Gomes v. Travisono, supra.

Even where informant information has been found to be reliable, the weight to be given such information may be reduced, however, by other considerations. "For example, a weapon might be found where an informant indicates it will be, but if the area where the weapon is found is a public place, the importance of the corroboration would be diminished since the weapon could have been planted." Kyle v. Hanberry, 677 F.2d 1386, 1391 (11th Cir.1982). If the location of the weapon was the single piece of information offered by a hypothetical reliable informant, then, clearly, the informant's information would be insufficient to support a guilty finding. If the information offered by a hypothetical informant is hearsay, it might have no more weight than rumor and would be an inadequate basis for decision. In a disciplinary hearing involving the use of informant information, a written record adequately specifying the basis of the board's findings will help to ensure that administrators, faced with public scrutiny, will act fairly. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 565, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2979, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); Gomes v. Travisono, supra.

We do not require that a full statement by the informants be set forth in the record of the proceeding, and available to the inmate, nor do we require an in camera examination of the informants. See Kyle v. Hanberry, supra at 1390. The administrators of State prisons have a legitimate concern with the inherent risk of providing...