O'Malley v. Sheriff of Worcester County

• Decision Date: 04 May 1993
• Citation: 415 Mass. 132,612 N.E.2d 641
• Parties: Timothy O'MALLEY & another 1 v. SHERIFF OF WORCESTER COUNTY & others. 2
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 641

612 N.E.2d 641

415 Mass. 132

Timothy O'MALLEY & another ¹ v. SHERIFF OF WORCESTER COUNTY & others. ²

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Suffolk.

Argued March 4, 1993.

Decided May 4, 1993.

Michael A. Gray, Worcester, for Sheriff of Worcester County & others.

Michael H. Cohen, Boston, for Michael Fair.

Peter Costanza, Boston, for plaintiffs.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and NOLAN, LYNCH, O'CONNOR and GREANEY, JJ.

NOLAN, Justice.

While serving their sentences in the Worcester County jail and house of correction (jail), the plaintiff inmates filed a complaint in Superior Court on August 2, 1985, against the County of Worcester, several county officials and Michael Fair. The complaint alleged that during several disciplinary actions county officials violated the plaintiffs' constitutional right to due process of law. ³ The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. On November 4, 1991, a judge in the Superior Court issued a memorandum and order granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the issue of liability but denying declaratory relief. ⁴ The judge also ruled that the then Commissioner of Correction (Commissioner), Michael Fair, was liable individually for damages. The defendants' motions for summary judgment were denied. With the amount of damages yet to be resolved, partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs was entered on November 25, 1991. The defendants petitioned a single justice of the Appeals Court for leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal from judgment of the Superior Court. G.L. c. 231, § 118 (1990 ed.). On December 11, 1991, the single justice granted the defendants' petition. We transferred the case to this court on our own motion. We now affirm summary judgment for the plaintiffs as to liability for violations of due process, but reverse the judgment against Michael Fair individually.

The material facts of this case are undisputed. Between July, 1983, and July, 1985, the inmates were subjected to a total of ten disciplinary proceedings at the jail, which they claim were conducted in violation of their due process rights. The inmates did not receive advance written notice of the hearings. In none of the proceedings was the inmate given a copy of the decision of the disciplinary board (board). Instead, the inmates were allowed to read it, but not to take a copy. ⁵ In all ten proceedings, the board imposed disciplinary isolation, but in only one case was an inmate (Moore) actually confined to an "isolation cell." Under the regulations, when the board imposed isolation as a disciplinary sanction, the inmate could be locked up in his own cell, placed in a special isolation unit within the jail known as the "county lockup," or sent to an isolation cell known as the "Hole." ⁶ The plaintiffs assert that they spent twenty-three hours a day in isolation as a result of disciplinary sanctions. As to qualitative differences between an isolation cell and lockup, in an isolation cell the inmate is left with only his underwear and a Bible whereas in the lockup situations only the inmate's television is removed.

During the period at issue, the jail's written regulations failed to provide an inmate with either twenty-four hours advance notice of a disciplinary proceeding or a written copy of the board's findings and decision. The regulations of the Department of Correction (department), issued by the Commissioner, provided, inter alia, that an inmate "be informed of the violation he is charged with by copy of the [incident] report," and "be advised in writing of the decision" which shall include "a description of the evidence relied upon by the board ... and a statement of the reasons for the sanction(s) imposed." 103 Code Mass.Regs. § 943.03(1) and (6) (1979).

During this same period, the department conducted inspections of the jail twice each year as required by G.L. c. 127, § 1B (1990 ed.). In each report, the inspection team certified that Worcester County's disciplinary procedures were in compliance with the Commissioner's regulations.

Addressing the defendants' appeal, we note first that "[a]n order granting or denying summary judgment will be upheld if the trial judge ruled on undisputed material facts and his ruling was correct as a matter of law." Commonwealth v. One 1987 Mercury Cougar Auto., 413 Mass 534, 536, 600 N.E.2d 571 (1992). Because the parties to this case do not contest any material facts, we review the trial judge's decision to determine whether the plaintiffs were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(c), 365 Mass. 824 (1974). One 1987 Mercury Cougar Auto., supra.

1. Due process. The judge concluded that Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), and its progeny require certain procedural safeguards when disciplinary isolation is imposed. Because these safeguards were not followed in the ten disciplinary proceedings involving O'Malley and Moore, the judge found a violation of their constitutional right to due process. This conclusion, we hold, was correct as a matter of law.

In Massachusetts, as in every other State, prison inmates are protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Wolff, supra, 418 U.S. at 556, 94 S.Ct. at 2974, and cases cited. "There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country." Id. at 555-556, 94 S.Ct. at 2974. Prisoners, therefore, "may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." Id. The procedural protections of due process apply, however, only if there is an existing liberty or property interest at stake. Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2706, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). The plaintiffs argue that they have a valid liberty interest in avoiding disciplinary isolation. To determine if this constitutes a protected entitlement, we look first to Federal due process and then to State law. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466, 103 S.Ct. 864, 868, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983).

The United States Supreme Court has held that "[a]s long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate's treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight." Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 2547, 49 L.Ed.2d 466 (1976). Thus, the Montanye Court found that the transfer of inmates between State prisons did not implicate a liberty interest inherent in the due process clause. Id. See also Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 226-227, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 2539, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976). Similarly, we have recognized that administrative segregation does not involve a federally protected liberty interest because it "is the sort of confinement that inmates should reasonably anticipate receiving at some point in their incarceration." Real v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., Walpole, 390 Mass. 399, 407, 456 N.E.2d 1111 (1983), vacated sub nom. Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 105 S.Ct. 2192, 85 L.Ed.2d 553, S.C., 396 Mass. 1001, 482 N.E.2d 1188 (1985), quoting Hewitt, supra, 459 U.S. at 468, 103 S.Ct. at 869. The United States Supreme Court has also rejected "the notion that any grievous loss visited upon a person by the State is sufficient to invoke the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause," because that "would subject to judicial review a wide spectrum of discretionary actions that traditionally have been the business of prison administrators rather than of the federal courts" (emphasis in original). Parenti v. Ponte, 727 F.2d 21, 23 (1st Cir.1984), quoting Meachum, supra, 427 U.S. at 224-225, 96 S.Ct. at 2538. Given these precedents, we discern no Federal liberty interest regarding disciplinary isolation. ⁷

A State may also create a protected liberty interest by placing "substantive limitations on official discretion." Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249, 103 S.Ct. 1741, 1747, 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983). ⁸ To find these substantive limitations we look to the language of the statute that governs the conduct at issue. Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 461, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 1909, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989). We have acknowledged that Massachusetts regulations containing "explicitly mandatory language in connection with requiring specific substantive predicates" can create protected liberty interests. Lamoureux v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., Walpole, 390 Mass. 409, 417, 456 N.E.2d 1117 (1983), quoting Hewitt, supra, 459 U.S. at 472, 103 S.Ct. at 871. The regulations of the department state explicitly that "[a]n inmate may be placed in isolation only pursuant to a sanction imposed by a disciplinary board" and only after the inmate's appeal has been decided or waived. 103 Code Mass.Regs. § 430.20 (1978). Additionally, those sections of the regulations pertaining to county correctional facilities provide that "[n]o inmate shall be placed in disciplinary isolation to [sic ] compliance with the procedures set forth in 103 CMR 943.03." 103 Code Mass.Regs. § 943.05(1) (1979). The procedures in § 943.03 require, inter alia, that prison authorities provide inmates with notice of charges, an opportunity to be heard at a hearing before a disciplinary board, a conditional opportunity to present evidence, and review of a written decision including reasons for any sanctions imposed, as well as a right of appeal. The language is mandatory, not permissive. Thus, these regulations make clear that isolation may not be imposed arbitrarily or at the unbridled discretion of prison officials. ⁹ We hold, therefore, that these regulations bestow on inmates a protected liberty interest in avoiding disciplinary isolation.

Once a liberty interest has been established, a court must next determine what procedural safeguards are necessary to satisfy the requirements...