Lampe v. Magoulakis

• Citation: 111 N.E.2d 7,159 Ohio St. 72
• Decision Date: 04 March 1953
• Docket Number: No. 33108,33108
• Parties: , 50 O.O. 61 LAMPE v. MAGOULAKIS et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Ohio

Page 72

159 Ohio St. 72

111 N.E.2d 7, 50 O.O. 61

LAMPE v. MAGOULAKIS et al.

No. 33108.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

March 4, 1953.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Ordinarily, one is not liable for injuries resulting from the defective condition of a chattel, which is loaned to another and which is not an inherently dangerous instrumentality, where the one loaning such chattel did not in fact know of the defective condition, whether he ought to have known of it or not, and such one is under no duty to examine the condition of such chattel before lending it.

2. A stepladder is not such 'an inherently dangerous instrumentality.'

3. Where one is under no legal obligation to loan or furnish a chattel to another, the 'interest or advantage' of the one so loaning or furnishing such chattel, which will justify imposing upon such one the duty to use ordinary care either to have such chattel in a reasonably safe condition or to warn if it is not, must be at least an interest or advantage to which the lender was not already legally entitled. (Paragraph five of the syllabus in Drexler, an Infant, v. Labay, 155 Ohio St. 244, 98 N.E.2d 410, distinguished.)

This action was instituted by plaintiff to recover from defendants, who as partners operated a meat market, for personal injuries suffered by the plaintiff.

A party named Kendall had, to use the words of plaintiff's petition, 'entered into an agreement with the defendants herein to clean and paint the storeroom in which the defendants operated their business' and 'plaintiff was employed by * * * Kendall to assist in the work.'

Plaintiff was standing on a plank, supported by two stepladders. One of the stepladders broke. As a result plaintiff was thrown to the floor and received the injuries involved.

A verdict was rendered for plaintiff for $6,000. Thereafter, defendants filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which was overruled.

The judgment of the Common Pleas Court was affirmed by the Court of Appeals without opinion.

The cause is now before this court on appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeals, pursuant to an allowance of a motion to certify the record.

William E. Pfau and William E. Pfau, Jr., Youngstown, for appellants.

Harrington, Huxley & Smith, Youngstown, for appellee.

TAFT, Judge.

There is evidence in the record tending to prove that the ladder which broke was a ladder of the defendants.

The written and signed agreement between Kendall and the defendants read in full:

'Scrape and whitewash for $160. for back.'

Construing the evidence most favorably for the plaintiff, there is evidence which tends to prove that, before or at the time the agreement was signed, nothing was said about who was to furnish ladders, that Kendall did not then know whether defendants had any ladders, that Kendall understood that he was to and he did furnish the lime and the brushes required for the job, that when the work was being done Kendall asked for a plank, ladders, and a tub to mix the lime, that defendants provided a tub and two ladders but not the plank, and that Kendall then provided the plank.

The only intelligible evidence in the record as to how defendants came to furnish the ladders is the testimony of plaintiff as follows 'We had to have ladders in order to go to work so I had a ladder on this job I was on and we were going to bring that down and then he [representative of defendants] said, no, you don't need to bother, there is two ladders up there on the balcony.'

Bearing in mind that defendants were operators of a meat market, we are of the opinion that reasonable minds could not conclude that there was any agreement by defendants to furnish any stepladder for this work, which was admittedly to be done at a fixed price. It follows that, in furnishing one or more stepladders, defendants did so gratuitously.

Plaintiff relies upon Section 12593, General Code, Hilleary v. Bromley, 146 Ohio St. 212, 64 N.E.2d 832, and Drexler, an Infant, v. Labay, 155 Ohio St. 244, 98 N.E.2d 410.

As to Section 12593, General Code, it is sufficient to state that plaintiff was not employed by defendants and was not directed by defendants to do anything. Plaintiff was in the employ of Kendall and what he did was under the direction of Kendall.

Hilleary v. Bromley, supra, involved a situation where both the one who furnished the ladder and the one to whom it was furnished were 'benefited by the transaction' involving the furnishing of the ladder. In that case, it appeared that there was a contract under which one party was obligated to furnish the ladder. See, also, Witherspoon v. Haft, 157 Ohio St. 474, 106 N.E.2d 296. Cf. Thrash, a Minor, v. U-Drive-It Co., 158 Ohio St. 465, 110 N.E.2d 419. There was no such contract in the instant case, where the most that can be said for plaintiff is that the ladder was merely furnished by defendants gratuitously. While the defendants in the instant case might well have been 'benefited' in a broad sense by the prompt completion of Kendall's contract, that was a benefit to which they were legally entitled. In other words, they received no legal consideration for furnishing the ladder.

With respect to Drexler v. Labay, supra, plaintiff relies upon paragraph five of the syllabus. However, that paragraph imposes a duty only where there is an 'interest or advantage' to the party furnishing the item causing the plaintiff's injury. Where there is no...