Lampman v. Bruning

• Decision Date: 11 April 1903
• Parties: KATIE LAMPMAN v. ANTON BRUNING, Appellant
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

94 N.W. 562

120 Iowa 167

KATIE LAMPMAN v. ANTON BRUNING, Appellant

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

April 11, 1903

Appeal from Carroll District Court.--HON. Z. A. CHURCH, Judge.

ACTION for seduction. Verdict against defendant, upon which judgment was entered, and he appeals.

Affirmed.

Salinger & Korte for appellant.

F. M Davenport and W. H. Beach for appellee.

OPINION

LADD, J.

The petition alleges that plaintiff was, "on or about the 20th day of January, A. D. 1898, an unmarried woman of chaste character; * * * that on or about said 20th day of January 1898, the said defendant, with artifice, persuasion, and entreaties, and under promise of marriage, did seduce, debauch, and carnally know the plaintiff, and as a result of sexual intercourse the plaintiff was, on or about the 29th day of September, A. D. 1898, delivered of a female child."

Under these allegations the question of her previous chastity was submitted to the jury, and, upon an affirmative finding, loss of character authorized to be considered as an element of damages. Appellant insists that the allegations were insufficient to raise the issue, for, as he contends, plaintiff might have been both chaste and unchaste within the period described as "on or about January 20, 1898." It may be conceded that, under the statute defining seduction, "previous chastity" means up to and at the very time of seduction (State v. Gunagy, 81 Iowa 177) and also, because of the strictness and accuracy exacted in the averments of an indictment, that the above allegations might be too indefinite to charge the criminal offense. In an early Minnesota case, the court went so far as to say that an averment of chastity previous to the day on which the seduction was definitely alleged to have occurred was insufficient, for, "though chaste at all times previous to the eleventh day of May, she may on that day, and before the alleged seduction, have become unchaste." Whether the possibility of so improbable a situation should be given weight, even in construing an indictment, we shall not stop to determine. Certain it is no such nicety and strictness should be injected into the civil practice, otherwise many evils of the former system would linger to vex, annoy, and impede the administration of justice. The rule that nothing may be taken by intendment in construing an indictment has no application to pleadings in civil actions. The true meaning of the pleader is to be ascertained from a fair construction of the language employed, and this accepted. The rule that when "the construction is doubtful, after giving to the language a reasonable intendment," as laid down in J. Thompson & Sons Mfg. Co. v. Perkins & Sons, 97 Iowa 607, 66 N.W. 874, it should be resolved against the pleader, is not to be applied save when the attack is by motion or demurrer. It is not then adopted because a feature of common-law pleading, but as an aid in securing definiteness and precision in the settlement of issues. "The rules by which their sufficiency are to be determined are those prescribed by the Code." Code, section 3557.

After issue is joined on the merits, notwithstanding section 2951 of the Revision of 1860 is not found in the Code, the pleadings will be liberally construed, with a view to effectuating substantial justice between the parties. Gray v. Coan, 23 Iowa 344; Foster v. Elliott, 33 Iowa 216. Especially is this true after trial, for "an error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the adverse party" is to be disregarded (Code, section 3601) even though such errors are in the pleadings. Coates v. Davenport, 9 Iowa 227; Doniphan v. Street, 17 Iowa 317. While nothing is to be assumed in favor of the pleader unless averred, he is to be accorded the advantage of every reasonable intendment, even to implications necessarily inferred, regardless of technical objections or informalities. Sell v. Miss. R. Logging Co., 88 Wis. 581 (60 N.W. 1065); Moffatt v. Fulton, 132 N.Y. 507 (30 N.E. 992); Kean v. Mitchell, 13 Mich. 207; Jack v. Weiennett, 115 Ill. 105 (3 N.E. 445, 56 Am. Rep. 129); Orman v. Mannix, 17 Colo. 564 (30 P. 1037, 17 L.R.A. 602, 31 Am. St. Rep. 340). See chapter on "Construction of pleadings," 4 Ency. P. & P. 741.

The petition, as we think, fully apprised the defendant that the plaintiff would claim on the trial that she had been chaste at the time of seduction. By answering to the merits, without demanding a more definite statement, and proceeding to trial, he accepted the averment as sufficient, and ought not now be permitted to complain.

II. The court advised the jurors, in estimating the damages to be allowed, to "consider, first, loss of time by plaintiff the expense incurred for medical attendance while sick and the like; second, physical suffering; third, the mental anguish, loss of character and social standing, and sense of shame caused by the seduction." Appellant contends that, though there was proof of loss of time, its value was not shown. The...