Land v. State
| Citation | 156 So.2d 8 |
| Decision Date | 31 July 1963 |
| Docket Number | No. 31949,31949 |
| Parties | James Matthew LAND, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Florida |
J. Donald Bruce, Jacksonville, for appellant.
Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., and A. G. Spicola, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
James Matthew Land, defendant below, was found guilty of murder in the first degree, without recommendation of mercy. The motion for a new trial, timely filed by the defendant's court appointed attorney, was denied, the defendant was adjudged guilty of murder in the first degree and sentenced to death. The defendant, for the purposes of appeal, was found to be insolvent. His lower court counsel was allowed to withdraw and other counsel was appointed to prosecute this appeal.
The transcript shows that the defendant attacked the victim, Mrs. Mattie A. Groom, a person 80 years of age and weighing approximately 100 pounds, in her home in Jacksonville on December 11, 1961, in which attack she suffered facial and neck bruises, broken ribs and lacerations of her arms. The victim was hospitalized the day of the attack and remained under hospital care until about 2:45 o'clock P.M. on January 14, 1962, when she was taken by ambulance to her daughter's home for convalescence. Upon arrival she was placed in bed but quickly developed a high temperature. At 7:00 o'clock P.M. of the same day she was returned by ambulance to the hospital where she remained until her death on January 25, 1962. The cause of her death was assigned as bronchial pneumonia and adrenal insufficiency. In the course of the trial the doctors testified the death of the victim resulted from the wounds administered by the defendant.
The defendant contends that the trial court erred in permitting leading questions by the State Attorney to the treating physicians and erred in allowing the physicians to express opinions as to the cause of death. The record discloses no error on these points.
The defendant, 39 years of age, upon arraignment pleaded not guilty to the indictment and gave notice of his intention to rely upon insanity as one of his defenses. The court thereupon directed two psychiatrists to make examination of the defendant and report their conclusions to the court, with copies to counsel for the defendant and the State Attorney.
Doctor Ekwall, one of the experts appointed, a licensed physician and surgeon with practice limited to neurology and psychiatry, testified that the defendant was, on the date of the examination, competent, knew right from wrong and was sane. Doctor Moore, a licensed medical doctor specializing in psychiatry, another of the experts, testified the defendant was not insane, was capable of making a proper decision and that he could properly confer with his counsel and defend himself.
Doctor Ingram a doctor of medicine specializing in neuropsychiatry, appointed by the court at the request of the defendant, upon being called to the stand by the defense, testified that at the time of his examination the defendant was well oriented and in possession of his faculties; that there was no evidence of hallucinations or delusions; that he had a partial amnesia for the events in question but that he did not think the defendant was psychotic or insance at the time of the examination. Doctor Ingram testified the defendant's past history revealed social deprivation; that he left school at the age of 12, began drinking at an early age and, he thought, was a chronic alcoholic; that he saw no evidence of any tumor or infectious process but that the electroencephalographic tracing confirmed the history the defendant gave of 'blackouts,' probably a result of long abuse of the brain by use of alcohol; that the defendant was of dull normal intelligence; that he had reached the conclusion the defendant, on the day of the alleged offense, did know the difference between right and wrong and was probably not psychotic, although perhaps under the influence of alcohol.
Upon being asked whether his examination indicated the defendant had a 'blackout' on the date of the offense, the doctor testified: Upon being asked whether he would say the defendant was so full of alcohol that he was incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong, the witness answered, 'No, sir.'
On cross examination by the State Attorney, Dr. Ingram testified that after he had examined the defendant and talked with defendant's counsel he had talked with an assistant State Attorney. He did not say what if any information he secured from that source nor whether he considered it in reaching his conclusions. The State Attorney asked the witness: 'So everything you know about this man, about his past history and about all this mental condition you talk about is what he told you?' And the witness answered, 'Yes, sir.' The doctor upon inquiry as to whether in his opinion the defendant knew the difference between right and wrong, stated, 'I believe he did know the difference.' Upon further inquiry as to whether he believed the defendant was legally sane responded, 'Yes, sir.'
The defendant, relying upon McCullers v. State, 1 contends that because his witness, Dr. Ingram, in the course of his study of the defendant and his background, talked with the assistant State Attorney, he should not have been permitted to express an opinion as to the defendant's sanity, when that opinion was 'based in part on conversations with parties who were not before the court.'
The point is without merit for several reasons, the first being that nothing in the record indicates that the doctor's opinion was in anywise based upon his conversation with the State Attorney but, on the contrary, shows affirmatively his opinion was based upon his...
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