Landmoore v. Foxcroft

• Decision Date: 18 January 2018
• Docket Number: H042203
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: DAYLE J. LANDMOORE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CLARRE FOXCROFT et al., Defendants and Respondents.

DAYLE J. LANDMOORE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CLARRE FOXCROFT et al., Defendants and Respondents.

H042203

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

January 18, 2018

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 1-13-CV-239616)

In this action for personal injuries, a jury awarded plaintiff Dayle Landmoore damages attributable to an automobile accident caused by defendant Clarre Foxcroft. Plaintiff sought pretrial costs and prejudgment interest. The trial court granted defendant's motion to tax costs in part, and it denied plaintiff's request for prejudgment interest. Plaintiff appeals, contending that the court should have included all of her claimed costs, including expert witness fees, because the judgment she obtained exceeded both her pretrial offer and the amount awarded her in judicial arbitration. She further asserts error in the court's denial of prejudgment interest. We find the rulings to be proper under Code of Civil Procedure section 1141.21 and Civil Code section 3291. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment.

Background

Plaintiff initiated this action on January 16, 2013 with her complaint alleging negligence and negligence per se, after defendant failed to stop her car and collided with plaintiff's car, which in turn struck the car in front of plaintiff. The parties went to judicial arbitration, and on December 27, 2013, the arbitrator awarded plaintiff $30,000 plus "[s]tatutory costs." Plaintiff rejected this nonbinding award and requested a trial de novo. In June of 2014 plaintiff offered to settle the case for $44,999, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 998. Defendant did not respond, however, and the matter proceeded to trial.

On November 19, 2014, the jury reached its verdict in plaintiff's favor, awarding her $19,935 for her past medical expenses and $10,000 for her past noneconomic loss. A "Judgment On Jury Verdict" was entered on December 2, 2014.

Plaintiff submitted a memorandum of costs on December 8, 2014, claiming $38,424.92, including $27,667.50 in witness fees. On December 17, 2014, she moved for a new trial, for prejudgment interest, and for attorney fees. Defendant opposed all three motions and submitted her own motion to tax costs. The trial court denied both the motion for a new trial and the motion for attorney fees. Neither of these rulings is challenged on appeal.¹

On March 4, 2015, the court granted defendant's motion to tax costs and struck $27,872.25 from plaintiff's cost bill,² leaving plaintiff $10,552.67 in costs. On the same day the court denied plaintiff's request for prejudgment interest. By amended judgment on March 24, 2015, plaintiff obtained a total recovery of $40,487.67, composed of the cost allowance plus the jury award of $29,935.00. Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal on April 1, 2015.

On May 1, 2015, counsel for defendant's insurer paid the full amount of the judgment, and on June 25 the court filed an "Acknowledgment of Satisfaction of Judgment" showing payment in full.³

Discussion

1. Costs after an Arbitration Award

Plaintiff first challenges the trial court's limitation on the costs it awarded her. As noted, of her $38,424.92 claim she received only $10,552.67, the court having struck $27,667.50 in fees for medical witnesses along with minor other fees. In moving to tax costs defendant argued that plaintiff was not entitled to any costs, because she failed to achieve a better result than she obtained after arbitration. Defendant cited Code of Civil Procedure section 1141.21,⁴ which addresses the consequences of a party's rejection of an award after judicial arbitration and proceeds to trial. Plaintiff maintained that the final judgment exceeded the arbitration award and therefore she was entitled to all of her costs.

Section 1141.21, subdivision (a)(1), states, in part: "If the judgment upon the trial de novo is not more favorable in either the amount of damages awarded or the type of relief granted for the party electing the trial de novo than the arbitration award, the court shall order that party to pay the following nonrefundable costs and fees, unless the court finds in writing and upon motion that the imposition of these costs and fees would create such a substantial economic hardship as not to be in the interest of justice: (A) To the court, the compensation actually paid to the arbitrator, less any amount paid pursuant to subparagraph (D). [¶] (B) To the other party or parties, all costs specified in Section 1033.5, and the party electing the trial de novo shall not recover his or her costs.[¶] (C) To the other party or parties, the reasonable costs of the services of expert witnesses, who are not regular employees of any party, actually incurred or reasonably necessary in the preparation or trial of the case. [¶] (D) To the other party or parties, the compensation paid by the other party or parties to the arbitrator, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 1141.28." (Italics added.)

The costs provision in section 1141.21 reflects the Legislature's objective to encourage the finality of judicial arbitration awards and discourage trial de novo following such procedures. "Discouraging trial de novo is essential to the proper functioning of the judicial arbitration system. Along with its goal of resolving small claims efficiently and affordably, judicial arbitration is intended to ease court case loads. [Citation.] The success of judicial arbitration in achieving these goals is dependent on a small incidence of trial de novo election." (Flynn v. Gorton (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1550, 1555; accord, Crampton v. Takegoshi (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 308, 319, disapproved on another point in Phelps v. Stostad (1997) 16 Cal.4th 23, 34; see also Smith v. Rae-Venter Law Group (2002) 29 Cal.4th 345, 363 [sections 1141.21 and 998 are both intended to discourage unnecessary trials].)

On appeal, the parties continue to debate the meaning of "judgment" in the predicate scenario that the party requesting a trial de novo fails to achieve a more favorable judgment. Plaintiff insists that when the costs awarded her by the court are added to the damages found by the jury, the final judgment of $40,487.67 was more favorable than the $30,000 arbitration award. Plaintiff's position cannot withstand analysis.

Both parties acknowledge that this court's role on appeal is to determine as a matter of law the meaning of the language section 1141.21. Our obligation is thus to " 'examine the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. We do not examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts ofthe enactment. If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend.' " (Hutcheson v. Eskaton Fountainwood Lodge (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 899 judg. vacated, quoting Coalition of Concerned Communities, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 34 Cal.4th 733, 737; see also Schatz v. Allen Matkins Leck Gamble & Mallory LLP (2009) 45 Cal.4th 557, 571 [most reliable indicator of Legislature's intent is the statutory language itself; hence, "[i]f the words themselves are not ambiguous, we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the statute's plain meaning governs."].)

Here, plaintiff contends that the meaning of "judgment" is undisputed, resorting to the "one final judgment" rule. In her view, because there is only one final determination of the rights of the parties, the figure expressed in that disposition—the one that "determines the last or ultimate rights of the parties" is what the Legislature meant in predicating post-arbitration costs on a "more favorable judgment." In making this argument plaintiff has ignored the context of the disputed language and thus has dispensed entirely with a cardinal principle of statutory construction; indeed, she reads the critical term out of the statute. To avoid losing the right to costs and incurring liability for the other party's costs, the party electing trial de novo must achieve a judgment "more favorable in either the amount of damages awarded or the type of relief granted." (§ 1141.21, subd. (a)(1), italics added.)

Here, the jury's verdict awarding $29,935 in damages was deemed the "Judgment of the Court" on December 2, 2014. That was the judgment to which the statute applies. A contrary determination would make no sense, as it would require the judgment to include the costs the party is seeking in order to determine the party's entitlement to those very costs. It would also be inconsistent with the statutory language: If costs were first included before comparing the judgment with the arbitration award, there would be no purpose for then denying those same costs in subdivision (a)(1)(B) of section 1141.21("the party electing the trial de novo shall not recover his or her costs."). And of course, if costs were first to be added to the damages awarded by the jury to arrive at the applicable "judgment," there would be no point in qualifying "judgment" as "the amount of damages awarded or the type of relief granted." Plaintiff cannot avoid the legislative penalty for rejecting an arbitration award simply by ignoring the statutory language compelling denial of her costs. We have no doubt that the damages awarded by the jury—here, $29,935—must be measured against the $30,000 awarded by the arbitrator in order to meet the conditions set forth in section 1141.21. Plaintiff clearly did not meet the threshold for recovery of her litigation...