Landrum v. State

• Decision Date: 18 April 1988
• Docket Number: 05-87-00278-C,05-87-00279-CR,Nos. 05-87-00277-C,s. 05-87-00277-C
• Citation: 751 S.W.2d 530
• Parties: Rena Joyce LANDRUM, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 530

751 S.W.2d 530

Rena Joyce LANDRUM, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

Nos. 05-87-00277-CR, 05-87-00278-CR, 05-87-00279-CR

Court of Appeals of Texas,

Dallas.

April 18, 1988.

Ronald D. Hinds, Dallas, for appellant.

Sharon Batjer, Dallas, for appellee.

Before WHITHAM, ROWE and THOMAS, JJ.

THOMAS, Justice.

Rena Joyce Landrum appeals two convictions for unlawful delivery of amphetamines, one conviction for possession of amphetamine, and one conviction for possession of cocaine. After accepting appellant's plea of nolo contendere in each case, the trial court sentenced her in each case to four years' confinement, probated for four years. In two points of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in: 1) overruling her motion to suppress evidence obtained by police officers operating outside their geographical jurisdiction; and 2) overruling her motion to dismiss the indictments because of violations of the Speedy Trial Act. We conclude that the police officers were operating within their jurisdiction and that the Speedy Trial Act affords appellant no relief. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

The motion to suppress was decided upon the following stipulated facts. City of DeSoto police officer Paul Pothen left the city limits of DeSoto and ventured several miles within the city limits of Dallas to appellant's house. Officer Pothen was not in hot pursuit of a suspect and was not in the company of either a Dallas police officer or other form of police officer with general or special jurisdiction in the City of Dallas. At appellant's residence, Officer Pothen met appellant for the first time and purchased from her controlled substances.

Officer Pothen left appellant's house and returned with other DeSoto police officers. They were not in hot pursuit and, although "well within" the city limits of the City of Dallas, were not accompanied by peace officers having general or special jurisdiction within the City of Dallas. The DeSoto officers arrested appellant and searched her home. They found substances the possession of which were violative of the Texas Controlled Substances Act. Appellant and the controlled substances were taken to the DeSoto police station. During interrogation at the DeSoto police station, appellant made certain inculpatory statements.

Based upon these stipulated facts, the trial court overruled the motion to suppress the evidence and the inculpatory statements. In her first point of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in overruling the motion because the contraband and incriminating statements were obtained pursuant to an illegal arrest. The arrest was illegal, she argues, because the DeSoto police officers lack the jurisdiction to conduct investigations outside the city limits of DeSoto.

At common law, the city policeman's authority and jurisdiction extended only so far as the city limits. See Love v. State, 687 S.W.2d 469, 471 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, pet. ref'd). The Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized that the legislature has modified that common law rule by statute. See Angel v. State, 740 S.W.2d 727, 733 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). The statutes provide that a city police officer has "the powers, rights, and jurisdiction of a marshall of a Type A general-law municipality." TEX.LOCAL GOV'T CODE ANN. § 341.001(e)(1) (Vernon Pamph.1988) (formerly TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 998). A marshall "has the same power and jurisdiction as the county sheriff to execute warrants, to prevent and suppress crime, and to arrest offenders." TEX.LOCAL GOV'T CODE ANN. § 341.021(e) (Vernon Pamph 1988) (formerly TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 999). A county sheriff's jurisdiction is county-wide. TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 2.17 (Vernon 1977). Thus, as a matter of statute, a city police officer has county-wide jurisdiction. See Angel, 740 S.W.2d at 733.

Appellant concedes that Angel allows a city police officer to make a warrantless arrest outside the city limits. She argues, however, that such an arrest may be made only when by chance a malfeasor is within an officer's view when committing a crime. ¹ She contends that a police officer may not investigate criminal activity outside the city limits. Appellant argues, therefore, that her arrest was tainted by investigation outside the officer's geographical jurisdiction.

We are not called upon to decide the wisdom of mounting a full-blown criminal investigation in a city without the cooperation of that city's police force. That is a matter of police policy not the concern of this court. Our responsibility is to interpret the relevant statutes to determine, without regard to the prudence of such police activity,...