Landry v. Landry, Docket No. S
| Decision Date | 25 July 1997 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. S |
| Citation | 697 A.2d 843 |
| Parties | Raymond LANDRY, Sr. v. William H. LANDRY, Sr. om-96-622. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Susan K. Lutton, Legal Services for the Elderly, Inc., Augusta, for plaintiff.
John P. Frankenfield, Anthony P. Shusta, II, Madison, for defendant.
Before WATHEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, GLASSMAN, RUDMAN, DANA, and LIPEZ, JJ.
¶1 William H. Landry, Sr. appeals from the judgment entered in the Superior Court (Somerset County, Alexander, J.) after a jury-waived trial. The court ordered William to pay Raymond Landry, Sr. back rent and, on William's counterclaim, ordered Raymond to reimburse him for mortgage payments but denied William recovery for other expenses he had incurred in maintaining and making improvements to Raymond's mobile home. William contends that the court failed to apply the correct legal standard in deciding his counterclaim for the value of improvements made to the residence pursuant to a theory of unjust enrichment, and that it therefore erred by allowing Raymond to retain the benefits of improvements he made without reimbursing him for their value. We agree that the court did not apply the correct standard for determining unjust enrichment. Contrary to William's contentions, however, the court did not miscalculate the back rent he owes Raymond. We therefore vacate the judgment on William's counterclaim and affirm the judgment on Raymond's claim.
¶2 In 1992 Raymond purchased a mobile home with a two-car garage in Skowhegan. In December 1993 William, Raymond's son by his first marriage, underwent back surgery following a work-related injury. Unable to climb the stairs where he had been living, William moved in with Raymond and his second wife Rose. Raymond and Rose were then executing wills, in which they planned to leave the home to each other and, upon their deaths, to William, assuming he paid off the debt secured by mortgages encumbering the property.
¶3 In 1994 Rose died and William received a workers' compensation settlement with which he satisfied the mortgages in the amount of $11,921.83. In August Raymond moved out, in part to help his sister-in-law recuperate from a heart attack. William remained in the home and started a motor-vehicle repair shop in the garage. He made payments on a chipper and riding tractor owned by Raymond; bought and installed items for the home, including new curtains, windows, doors, carpets, and sub-flooring; and allegedly incurred non-routine house-cleaning costs. In April 1995 William asked Raymond to transfer the property to him based on his understanding of their prior agreement. 1 Raymond offered to do so, but only for an additional $10,000. William refused, their discussions became increasingly contentious, and William changed the locks on the mobile home and refused Raymond entry. Raymond responded by altering the terms of his will so as to deny William inheritance of the property, and listed it for sale.
¶4 In September 1995 Raymond filed a complaint seeking a declaration that he was the owner of both the real and personal property, an order that William vacate the premises, an award for the real property's fair rental value, and damages. William counterclaimed requesting specific performance of Raymond's agreement to transfer the property by will, and reimbursement for his nearly $12,000 mortgage payment as well as for the value of his maintenance of and improvements to the property incurred prior to Raymond's alleged breach of the agreement to transfer the property to William by will. By the time a jury-waived trial was held in July 1996, several of the claims and counterclaims had been withdrawn. The court ordered William to pay Raymond back rent of $8,000, ordered Raymond to reimburse William for the $11,921.83 mortgage payment and to turn over to William possession of the chipper and the tractor, but declined to order Raymond to reimburse William for other expenses he had incurred in maintaining and improving the property. This appeal followed.
¶5 We review questions of law de novo. Collins v. Trius, Inc., 663 A.2d 570, 572 (Me.1995). To decide an unjust enrichment claim, a court must ascertain whether a benefit has been conferred, whether the party receiving the benefit has an appreciation or knowledge of it, and whether "the acceptance or retention by the defendant of the benefit [is] under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment of its value." Aladdin Elec. Assoc. v. Town of Old Orchard Beach, 645 A.2d 1142, 1144 (Me.1994). According to the court's order, in deciding William's unjust enrichment claim it considered only whether he had proved by preponderance of the evidence that the improvements were "required as absolutely necessary for the property." The "absolutely necessary" requirement as an element of the unjust enrichment analysis reflects the application of an incorrect legal standard....
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