Lane House Constr., Inc. v. Ogrowsky

• Decision Date: 08 April 2014
• Docket Number: No. ED 99897.,ED 99897.
• Parties: LANE HOUSE CONSTRUCTION, INC., Respondent, v. Doris OGROWSKY, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

427 S.W.3d 882

LANE HOUSE CONSTRUCTION, INC., Respondent,
v.
Doris OGROWSKY, Appellant.

No. ED 99897.

Missouri Court of Appeals,
Eastern District,
Division One.

April 8, 2014.

[427 S.W.3d 883]

Martin L. Perron, Maria V. Perron, St. Louis, MO, for Appellant.

Richard J. Keyes, St. Louis, MO, for Respondent.

ROY L. RICHTER, Presiding Judge.

Doris Ogrowsky (“Defendant”) appeals from the circuit court of St. Louis County's entry of summary judgment in favor of Lane House Construction, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) in the amount of $18,032.36. We reverse and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

In December 2010, Defendant retained Plaintiff to repair her leaky roof. The terms of their agreement were contained in a written contract. After Plaintiff repaired Defendant's roof, Plaintiff mailed an invoice to Defendant in the amount of $6,308. However, Defendant refused to pay due to her dissatisfaction with the repairs. Plaintiff filed an initial lawsuit (“Initial Lawsuit”) against Defendant in St. Louis County. After numerous attempts at mediation, the Initial Lawsuit was finally set for trial. On the scheduled date for trial, the parties apparently agreed to a settlement, in which Defendant would pay Plaintiff $2,000. Unfortunately, the settlement never materialized and the trial court eventually dismissed Plaintiff's Petition without prejudice for failure to prosecute on June 4, 2012.

Plaintiff filed a second lawsuit (“Second Lawsuit”) on October 19, 2012. The petition filed in the Second Lawsuit was almost identical to that of the Initial Lawsuit, although it included a fifth count for “enforcement of settlement agreement.” Defendant was personally served on November 9, 2012.

Thereafter, on December 3, 2012, Plaintiff propounded, via mail, its requests for admissions to Defendant. On January 24, 2013, Plaintiff filed its Motion for Summary Judgment and Suggestions in Support Thereof. Defendant filed her responses to Plaintiff's requests for admissions on March 29, 2013.

On April 3, 2013, the trial court granted Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on Count I of the Petition for breach of contract, and dismissed the remaining four counts as moot. In so granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court determined there existed no genuine issues of material fact because Defendant untimely responded to Plaintiff's requests for admissions, and, thus, pursuant to Rule 59.01(a), such requests for admissions were deemed admitted.

This appeal now follows.

II. DISCUSSION

Defendant raises four points on appeal. In Points I and II, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in sustaining Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. Specifically, Defendant claims the trial court erred in: (1) sustaining Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment because genuine issues of material fact existed, in that the trial court inappropriately relied upon Plaintiff's prematurely propounded requests for admissions (Point I); and (2) sustaining Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment in that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the manifestation of a settlement (Point II).

In the last two points on appeal, Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Plaintiff attorney's

[427 S.W.3d 884]

fees (Point III), and awarding Plaintiff prejudgment interest (Point IV).

This Court finds Point I dispositive of the appeal.

Standard of Review

Appellate review of summary judgment is de novo. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid–Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993). The criteria on appeal for testing the propriety of summary judgment are the same as the criteria applied by the trial court to test the propriety of summary judgment. Id. This Court reviews the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment is entered and accords the non-movant “the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the record.” Id. Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party has demonstrated, on the basis of facts as to which there is no genuine dispute, a right to judgment as a matter of law. E. Mo. Coal. of Police, Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 15 v. City of Chesterfield, 386 S.W.3d 755, 759 (Mo. banc 2012); see also Rule 74.04(c)(6). “A ‘genuine issue’ that will prevent summary judgment exists where the record shows two plausible, but contradictory, accounts of the essential facts and the ‘genuine issue’ is real, not merely argumentative, imaginary, or frivolous.” Daugherty v. City of Maryland Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814, 818 (Mo. banc 2007).

Analysis

In a civil case filed in Missouri, Rule 59.01 governs the procedure concerning requests for admissions. See, generally,Rule 59.01. Generally, with respect to the procedures (i.e., the time permitted for filing or responding to requests for admissions) afforded under Rule 59.01, our appellate courts have been called upon to interpret and apply Rule 59.01 in such circumstances when a party to a civil action fails to respond (or timely respond) to requests for admissions, and the consequences of said failure to respond. See, e.g., Lyon Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Harris Cab Co., Inc., 303 S.W.3d 589, 590–91 (Mo.App.E.D.2010) (when neither a denial nor written objection is served to any of the admissions sought, all matters in the requests are deemed admitted); Dynamic Computer Solutions, Inc. v. Midwest Mktg. Ins. Agency, L.L.C., 91 S.W.3d 708, 712–716 (Mo.App.W.D.2002). However, in the case at bar, this Court must take a step back, as the sole dispute centers on the effect of premature requests for admissions.

Pursuant to...