Lane v. Department of Labor and Industries

• Decision Date: 30 August 1944
• Docket Number: 29288-29291.
• Citation: 151 P.2d 440,21 Wn.2d 420
• Parties: LANE v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES et al. (two cases). ROWLEY v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES et al. MOORE v. SAME.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

151 P.2d 440

21 Wn.2d 420

LANE v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES et al. (two cases).

ROWLEY v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES et al.

MOORE v. SAME.

Nos. 29288-29291.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc

August 30, 1944

Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by I. C. Lane employee, against Department of Labor and Industries of the State of Washington and Defiance Lumber Company, a corporation, employer; by I. C. Lane, employee, and by Ralph Rowley, employee, against Department of Labor and Industries of the State of Washington and Grange Lumber Company, a corporation, employer; by John Moore, employee, against Department of Labor and Industries of the State of Washington and Northwest Door Company, employer, for compensation for aggravation of injuries for which claimants had previously received awards. From judgments affirming the orders of the Department of Labor and Industries disallowing the claims of the claimants I. C. Lane and Ralph Rowley, claimants Lane and Rowley appeal. From a judgment reversing an order of the Department of Labor and Industries disallowing the claim of claimant John Moore, Northwest Door Company, employer appeals. The cases were consolidated on appeal.

Judgment in Lane and Rowley case reversed, and judgment in Moore case affirmed.

MILLARD J., and SIMPSON, C.J., dissenting.

Appeal from Superior Court, Pierce County; Ernest F. Freeman and Ernest M. Card, Judges.

Allen & Carey, of Seattle, for claimants.

Smith Troy and L. E. O'Neill, both of Olympia, for Department of Labor and Industries.

T. J. Hanify and Grosscup, Morrow & Ambler, all of Seattle, L. B. Donley, of Aberdeen, and Hulbert, Helsell & Paul, Little, Leader, LeSourd & Palmer, and Laube & Laughlin, all of Seattle, for employers.

GRADY Justice.

This appeal involves the claims of injured workmen for compensation for aggravation of injuries and for which they had previously received awards. In the two cases of I. C. Lane and in that of Ralph Rowley, the court affirmed the orders of the department of labor and industries disallowing the claims on the ground that they had not been made within the time limited by law. In the case of John Moore, the court reversed the order of the department disallowing his claim upon the same ground. On appeal to this court the cases were consolidated. The parties to the appeal will be referred to as the claimants, the employers, and the department.

The questions to be determined are whether the act of 1941 applies to barred claims, and, if so, is it constitutional.

The original act of 1911, chapter 74, p. 345, by § 5(h), p. 360, provided as follows:

'If aggravation, diminution, or termination of disability takes place or be discovered after the rate of compensation shall have been established or compensation terminated in any case the department may, upon the application of the beneficiary or upon its own motion, readjust for future application the rate of compensation in accordance with the rules in this section provided for the same, or in a proper case terminate the payments.'

No limitation of time was fixed within which the workman was required to make application to the department of labor and industries. The law remained in this condition until the enactment of chapter 310, Laws of 1927, p. 813, when § 4(h), p. 844, was amended so as to place a limitation of three years upon the making of a claim for compensation for aggravation of injuries. This amended section was carried forward into chapter 132, Laws of 1929, p. 338, § 2. It was again amended by chapter 209, Laws of 1941 (referendum measure 22), p. 633,§ 1, Rem.Supp.1941, § 7679, and now reads as follows:

'If aggravation, diminution, or termination of disability takes place or be discovered after the rate of compensation shall have been established or compensation terminated, in any case the Director of Labor and Industries, through and by means of the Division of Industrial Insurance, may, upon the application of the beneficiary, made within five years after the establishment or termination of such compensation, or upon his own motion, readjust for further application the rate of compensation in accordance with the rules in this section provided for the same, or in a proper case terminate the payment: Provided, Any such applicant whose compensation has heretofore been established or terminated shall have five (5) years from the taking effect of this act within which to apply for such readjustment.'

At the time this act became effective, all of the claims now under consideration were barred by the three-year limitation period.

It is a general rule that a statute fixing a time limitation upon the assertion of a right or the enforcement of an obligation will not be held by construction to operate retroactively, and it will be deemed so to operate only when, by its plain terms or by necessary implication, such intention is apparent. It is not necessary, however, that the statute expressly state in words that it shall so operate, or that rights or obligations already barred shall be revived, but it is sufficient if the plain words of the statute carry such meaning and leave no room for doubt.

We have in many cases applied the rule that, where the language of a statute is plain and clear and capable of but one meaning, there is no room for construction and none is needed. State ex rel. George v. Seattle, 184 Wash. 560, 52 P.2d 360; Carkonen v. Alberts, 196 Wash. 575, 83 P.2d 899, 135 A.L.R. 209; Shelton Hotel Co., Inc., v. Bates, 4 Wash.2d 498, 104 P.2d 478; Smith v. Department of Labor and Industries, 8 Wash.2d 587, 113 P.2d 57 A very clear and comprehensive statement of the rule is found in 50 Am.Jur. (Statutes) 204, § 225, as follows:

'A statute is not open to construction as a matter of course. It is open to construction only where the language used in the statute requires interpretation, that is, where the statute is ambiguous, or will bear two or more constructions, or is of such doubtful or obscure meaning that reasonable minds might be uncertain or disagree as to its meaning. Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation, and the court has no right to look for or impose another meaning. In the case of such unambiguity, it is the established policy of the courts to regard the statute as meaning what it says, and to avoid giving it any other construction than that which its words demand. The plain and obvious meaning of the language used is not only the safest guide to follow in construing it, but it has been presumed conclusively that the clear and explicit terms of a statute expresses the legislative intention, so that such plain and obvious provisions must control. A plain and unambiguous statute is to be applied, and not interpreted, since such a statute speaks for itself, and any attempt to make it clearer is a vain labor and tends only to obscurity.'

The legislature has used the language quoted above three different times: In 1927, 1929 and 1941. Each time it spoke on the subject matter involved in the Workmen's Compensation Act it was carrying out a social objective, namely, to give further relief to injured workmen than had been given by previous legislation in view of recognized changed economic conditions. In doing so there could be no reason for any discrimination between injured workmen.

The one whose compensation has once been established or terminated but who has not made claim for aggravation of his injuries within the three-year period prescribed, is just as much in need of aid as is one who has done so, or as one who might later make such a claim; and as the legislature did not affirmatively exclude such injured workmen, it is very clear that the plain language of this statute is all inclusive. If the statute stopped at the proviso, then all that this court has said about applying statutes of limitation prospectively and that the law in force at the time the claim of an injured workman accrued must govern, would be applicable. It would seem as though the lawmakers sensed this and, to avoid such effect, added the proviso: ' Any such applicant whose compensation has heretofore been established or terminated shall have five (5) years from the taking effect of this act within which to apply for such readjustment.' (Italics ours.)

We, therefore, hold that the act applies to the claims of the claimants, and that they were timely made.

On the constitutional question raised by the employers, we must take into consideration the type of statute that is now Before us and bear in mind that it is a part of the legislation enacted pursuant to the police power of the state.

The employers assert that after a claim of the kind Before us is once barred, it cannot be revived by subsequent legislation because a right of immunity in favor of the employer arises which constitutes a vested right and its impairment is protected by constitutional inhibitions. The claimants and the attorney general contend that the act relates only to the remedy of the workman and does not affect any vested right of the employer. Many authorities are cited by the respective counsel. There is a conflict of authority on the general subject, but must of it disappears when the nature and scope of the different statutes are considered.

There are two types of statutes which the courts had to apply. One of them is the statute which either by its plain terms or by the construction given it by the court makes the limitation of time inhere in the right or obligation rather than the remedy. It is sometimes referred to as a statute of nonclaim and, strictly speaking, is not a statute of...