Lane v. Minn. State Agric. Soc.

• Decision Date: 02 October 1895
• Citation: 64 N.W. 382,62 Minn. 175
• Parties: LANE v. MINNESOTA STATE AGRICULTURAL SOC.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

62 Minn. 175

64 N.W. 382

LANE

v.MINNESOTA STATE AGRICULTURAL SOC.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Oct. 2, 1895.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. Held, that the allegations of the complaint, when read in connection with the general laws of the state relating to the defendant do not show it, the Minnesota State Agricultural Society, to be a public corporation organized for the sole purpose of discharging a governmental function, and therefore exempt from liability to persons injured by its negligence.

2. The complaint alleges that the defendant engaged the plaintiff to ride in a running race for horses, which was promoted and controlled by it; that, knowing a certain horse was dangerous and unsafe to run in any race by reason of a vicious habit of track bolting, of which plaintiff was ignorant, it negligently permitted such horse to run in the race in which she rode, pursuant to her engagement with defendant, without warning her of the unusual danger to which she was thus exposed; that, by reason of such horse bolting the track during such race, she was thrown from her own horse and injured. Held, that complaint states a cause of action.

Appeal from district court, Ramsey county; Charles D. Kerr, Judge.

Action for personal injuries by Mamie Lane against the Minnesota State Agricultural Society. From an order overruling its demurrer to the complaint, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Ira B. Mills, for appellant.

James Schoonmaker, for respondent.

START, C. J.

This is an appeal by the defendant from an order overruling its demurrer to the complaint of the plaintiff, wherein she alleges that she was injured by the negligence of the defendant, September 10, 1891, while riding in a horse race conducted by the defendant on the State Fair Grounds. Two general propositions are urged by counsel in support of the demurrer: First. That the defendant is a public board or corporation, organized for the sole purpose of discharging a governmental function; and therefore, as such public agent, it is not legally liable for the negligence of its officers, agents, and servants, or any of them. Second. That the facts alleged in the complaint do not constitute negligence on the part of the defendant or its agents. If either proposition is correct, the demurrer is well taken; but we are of the opinion that, tested by the allegations of the complaint which are admitted, neither is correct.

1. The state may and must commit the discharge of its sovereign political functions to agencies selected by it for that purpose. Such agencies, while engaged exclusively in the discharge of such public duties, do not act in any private capacity, but stand in the place of the state, and exercise its political authority. Therefore, when the state creates public corporations solely for governmental purposes, such corporations, while engaged in the discharge of the duties imposed upon them, for the sole benefit of the public, and from the performance of which they derive no compensation or benefit in their corporate capacity, are clothed with the immunities and privileges of the state; and no private action, in the absence of an express statute to that effect, can be maintained against them for negligence in the discharge of such duties. The liability of cities and other municipal corporations created by special charters for negligence in the care of their streets is an illogical exception to this rule, but the rule itself is too well settled, by the almost unanimous agreement of all of the authorities, to be now questioned or discussed. Snider v. City of St. Paul, 51 Minn. 466, 53 N. W. 763. The rule, however, has no application to private corporations,-that is, to those which are organized by the voluntary act and agreement of their members for their own benefit,-although the creation of such corporations directly promotes the public interest and welfare. It is also subject to the qualification that public or quasi public corporations are not exempt from liability to which other corporations are subject for negligence in managing or dealing with property or rights voluntarily held by them for their own profit and advantage, although inuring ultimately to the benefit of the public. 2 Dill. Mun. Corp. §§ 980-984; Oliver v. City of Worcester, 102 Mass. 489; Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, 11 H. L. Cas. 687; Glavin v. Hospital, 12 R. I. 411;Moulton v. Inhabitants of Scarborough, 71 Me. 267;Hannon v. St. Louis Co., 62 Mo. 313. The allegations of the complaint, standing alone, make a prima facie case of a private corporation, engaged, for its own benefit, in an undertaking outside of any public duties, viz. promoting, controlling, and conducting a horse race,-a case not within the rule of immunity applicable to public corporations, institutions, and agencies created solely for governmental purposes. The demurrer admits the corporate existence and acts of the defendant as alleged, but its counsel claims (1) that the court must take judicial knowledge of the general statutes of the state relating to the defendant and its organization, and read them as if they were incorporated in the complaint; and (2) that such statutes show that the defendant is a public or quasi public corporation, organized for the sole purpose of discharging governmental functions. We assume, without so deciding, that the first of these claims is correct, but we cannot take judicial notice of the provisions of the defendant's articles of incorporation, adopted and filed pursuant to the statute under which it was organized; nor can we assume that it has no capital or property derived from membership and entrance fees, from fees for admission to its exhibitions, and from the sale of privileges to private parties to conduct, upon the grounds controlled by it, a multitude of independent shows and enterprises. On the contrary, it is a matter of common knowledge that it does derive a large revenue from these sources, over which the state has no control. A consideration of the general laws relating to the defendant does not justify the claim of its counsel that it is not liable for the negligence alleged in this action because it is within the rule of immunity to which we have referred. At the outset of our examination of such laws we are embarrassed by the fact that there is nothing in the record to show when or under what particular law the defendant was incorporated. This necessitates a review of the entire legislation in reference to the defendant.

Pub. St. 1849-1858, c. 17, §§ 334-338, authorized the incorporation of agricultural societies of the character of the defendant, and by implication authorized a division of the property of the corporations upon dissolution. Chapter 17 of the Laws of 1860 made ample provisions for incorporation of county agricultural societies. Section 2 of this act provided that such corporations should have perpetual succession, with the right to adopt a seal, constitution, and by-laws, to purchase, hold, sell, and convey all real and personal property necessary to promote the objects of the corporation and to have police and full control of its grounds. Provision was made by section 3 for filing a copy of the constitution and by-laws of such corporations in the office of the register of deeds, and for the making of annual reports of their receipts and disbursements to the governor of the state. Sections 4, 5, and 6 provided for annual meetings of the societies, for the election of officer, and for two delegates from each county society, who, together with its president as delegate ex officio, were to represent their county in the state agricultural society. These delegates were to meet together, at the city of St. Paul, or such other place as a majority should determine, on the first Wednesday in February in each year, and at the first meeting after the passage of the act file articles or their incorporation in the office of the secretary...