Lane v. Port Terminal R.R. Ass'n, A14-90-00661-CV

• Decision Date: 23 May 1991
• Docket Number: No. A14-90-00661-CV,A14-90-00661-CV
• Citation: 821 S.W.2d 623
• Parties: Paul LANE, Appellant, v. PORT TERMINAL RAILROAD ASSOCIATION, Appellee. (14th Dist.)
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 623

821 S.W.2d 623

Paul LANE, Appellant, v. PORT TERMINAL RAILROAD ASSOCIATION, Appellee.

No. A14-90-00661-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas,

Houston (14th Dist.).

May 23, 1991.

Rehearing Denied June 20, 1991.

George Payne, Tom R. Letbetter, Houston, for appellant.

Kyle M. Rowley, William B. Allison, J. James Cooper, Houston, for appellee.

Before J. CURTISS BROWN, C.J., and MURPHY and CANNON, JJ.

OPINION

MURPHY, Justice.

Appellant sued appellee for wrongful discharge, libel and slander. The trial court rendered a summary judgment in favor of appellee, and this appeal followed. In five points of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in granting the summary judgment. We affirm.

From 1967 to 1987, appellant was employed by appellee as a switchman and yard helper. On November 22, 1985, B.R. Purdy, one of appellant's co-workers, was injured in an accident while working for appellee. In connection with this accident, appellant submitted a formal accident report and gave statements to an assistant claims manager and an assistant trainmaster employed by appellee. Following the accident, Purdy filed a personal injury suit against appellee. In the course of the litigation between Purdy and appellee, appellant's deposition was taken. In his deposition, appellant testified regarding the condition of certain equipment on the day of the accident and gave other details surrounding Purdy's accident.

On January 28, 1987, appellee received a transcript of appellant's deposition in the Purdy case. Upon comparison, appellee discovered significant discrepancies between appellant's deposition testimony and the statements and report which he had given on the day of the accident. On January 29, 1987, appellant was charged pursuant to the Union Bargaining Agreement with violations of rules and regulations pertaining to dishonesty, perjury and withholding evidence. A formal investigation was conducted on February 10, 1987, and appellant was discharged by appellee on February 17, 1987. Appellant appealed his discharge through a formal grievance process, and his claim was ultimately set for adjudication by the National Railroad Labor Board, Special Board of Adjustment. On January 26, 1988, appellant's claim was presented to the board. The board denied the claim on March 23, 1988.

On October 31, 1988, appellant filed this suit against appellee for wrongful discharge, libel and slander. On April 3, 1990, appellee filed its motion for summary judgment. Appellee's motion asserted that appellant's claims were barred by the one-year statute of limitations. In addition, appellee contended that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, because the statements at issue were privileged, and because plaintiff's causes of action were preempted by federal labor statutes. On June 7, 1990, the court below granted appellee's motion for summary judgment, and this appeal followed.

Initially, we note that no issues pertaining to appellant's cause of action for wrongful discharge are raised by this appeal. In its motion for summary judgment, appellee contended that appellant's cause of action for wrongful discharge was federally preempted by the National Railway Labor Act. Appellant did not address this contention in his response to the motion for summary judgment, and he has not raised the issue on appeal. Accordingly, the only issues before us in this appeal are those pertaining to appellant's causes of action for libel and slander.

In his first point of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment, because his causes of action for libel and slander are not preempted by the National Railway Labor Act. In view of our holdings regarding limitations and privilege in our disposition of appellant's other points of error, we need not reach the preemption issue in this case, and it will not be addressed in this opinion.

In his second and third points of error, appellant raises issues regarding appellee's defenses of limitations and privilege. Specifically, appellant contends that his causes of action for libel and slander are not barred by limitations, and that the defamatory statements at issue in this case are not subject to any privilege. We do not agree.

Appellant filed his original petition alleging libel and slander on October 31, 1988. Libel and slander are both subject to a one-year limitations period. See TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 16.002 (Vernon 1986). Accordingly, any publication of defamatory statements made prior to October 31, 1987 is not actionable in this case. Most of appellant's dealings with appellee transpired prior October 1987. However, appellant asserts that there are two publications of defamatory statements occurring after October 31, 1987 that are actionable in this case.

The first group of defamatory statements relied upon by appellant were published at the National Railroad Labor Board, Special Board of Adjustment hearing held on January 26, 1988. Appellee contends that these statements were published subject to an absolute privilege, and that they cannot serve as the basis of appellant's causes of action. We agree.

Texas courts have long recognized that an absolute privilege extends to publications made in the course of judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. See James v. Brown, 637 S.W.2d 914, 916 (Tex.1982); Reagan v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 140 Tex. 105, 166 S.W.2d 909, 912-913 (1942). Quasi-judicial proceedings are those proceedings before executive officers, boards and commissions which have authority to hear and decide matters coming before them or redress grievances of which they take cognizance. McAfee v. Feller, 452 S.W.2d 56, 57-58 (Tex.Civ.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1970, no writ). At least one court has indicated that publications made in the course of proceedings held pursuant to the National Labor Railway Act are subject to an absolute privilege. See Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. v. Wherry, 548 S.W.2d 743, 748 (Tex.Civ.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 962, 98 S.Ct. 497, 54 L.Ed.2d 447 (1977).

In this case, we hold that the National Railroad Labor Board, Special Board of Adjustment hearing at which appellant's claim was adjudicated was a "quasi-judicial proceeding" for purposes of libel and slander law. Accordingly, any publication of defamatory material arising from the proceeding is subject to an absolute privilege. The scope of the absolute privilege extends to all statements made in the course of the proceeding and attaches to all aspects of the proceeding. See James v. Brown, 637 S.W.2d 914, 916-917 (1982). Thus, communications made in the due course of the board hearing cannot serve as the basis of appellant's civil action for libel, regardless of the negligence or malice with...