Lane v. Town of Grafton
| Decision Date | 03 January 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-453,95-453 |
| Citation | 166 Vt. 148,689 A.2d 455 |
| Parties | Thomas M. LANE v. TOWN OF GRAFTON. |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
Michael J. Hertz, Brattleboro, for plaintiff-appellant.
Janet Murnane of McNeil, Leddy & Sheahan, Burlington, for defendant-appellee.
Before ALLEN, C.J., and GIBSON, DOOLEY, MORSE and JOHNSON, JJ.
Plaintiff Thomas Lane appeals an order of the Windham Superior Court granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Town of Grafton on his negligence claims. Lane contends that the court erred in finding that he failed to meet notice requirements under 19 V.S.A. § 988 and that his claims are therefore barred by governmental immunity. We reverse.
On April 14, 1992, as Lane was driving his truck across a bridge on the Grafton-Townshend Road in the Town of Grafton, a portion of the bridge caved in, resulting in damage to his vehicle and personal injuries. The next day, Lane went to the Grafton Town Offices and told employees and a selectman about the accident, the damage to his truck, and his injuries. On April 23, nine days after the accident, Lane mailed a letter informing the Town:
This is to notify you pursuant to 19 V.S.A. § 987 that Mr. Lane makes a claim against the Town of Grafton for personal injuries and property damage suffered by reason of the insufficiency or want of repair of a bridge in Grafton which caved in as he drove over it on Tuesday, April 14, 1992.
Between June 1992 and October 1994, Lane corresponded with the Town regarding the extent and treatment of his injuries; he submitted medical reports and examination records on several occasions. After two years of correspondence, the property damage claim was settled, but the personal injury claim remained unresolved.
In January 1995, Lane filed a negligence claim in Windham Superior Court to recover for his personal injuries. The Town moved for summary judgment, claiming that Lane's notice was inadequate because it failed to state how the bridge was out of repair or specify his personal injuries, as required under 19 V.S.A. §§ 987 and 988. Thus, the Town claimed protection from Lane's claim under governmental immunity based on a lack of proper statutory notice. The court granted the Town's motion in July 1995, concluding that although Lane's notice concerning the condition of the bridge was adequate, his failure to notify the town of specific injuries or the extent of his injuries was inadequate under § 988. This appeal followed.
When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, we apply the same standard as the trial court: summary judgment is appropriate when the record clearly indicates there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Bacon v. Lascelles, 165 Vt. ----, ----, 678 A.2d 902, 905 (1996); V.R.C.P. 56(c)(3). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, we regard as true all allegations of the nonmoving party supported by admissible evidence, Bacon, 165 Vt. at ----, 678 A.2d at 905, and we give the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable doubts and inferences. Wilcox v. Village of Manchester Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 159 Vt. 193, 196, 616 A.2d 1137, 1138 (1992).
The Town argues, and the trial court agreed, that Lane's notice of injury fails to meet the statutory requirements. The statute states that 19 V.S.A. § 988. The Town's argument of invalid notice is based on our historic decisions holding that general allegations of injury, without more, are insufficient under the statute. See Perry v. Town of Putney, 52 Vt. 533, 536-37 (1880) (); Nourse v. Town of Victory, 51 Vt. 275, 277 (1878) ().
But Lane contends that the court erred in finding his notice failed to meet statutory requirements, arguing that his notice was adequate because it served the underlying purposes of the statute. We agree. When interpreting a statute, the goal of this Court is to give effect to legislative intent. Burlington Elec. Dep't v. Vermont Dep't of Taxes, 154 Vt. 332, 335, 576 A.2d 450, 452 (1990). We do this by examining the purpose behind the statute. Magoon v. Board of Civil Auth., 140 Vt. 612, 614, 442 A.2d 1276, 1277 (1982). We consider the broad subject matter of the law, its effects and consequences, and the reason and spirit of the law to discern legislative purpose. State v. Papazoni, 159 Vt. 578, 581, 622 A.2d 501, 503 (1993). To determine the sufficiency of notice, therefore, we must examine the purpose behind statutory notice requirements. Pratt v. Town of Old Saybrook, 225 Conn. 177, 621 A.2d 1322, 1325 (1993).
Read together, 19 V.S.A. §§ 987 and 988 indicate that notice serves two purposes: (1) to alert towns of bridge conditions endangering public safety so they may be promptly repaired, and (2) to inform towns of impending claims so that there may be timely investigation thereof. Section 987 requires written notice within twenty days to a town selectman "stating the time when and the place where the injury was received, and pointing out in what respect the bridge or culvert was insufficient or out of repair." Where personal injury occurs, the claimant must state so pursuant to § 988. By requiring a description of time and place of the accident, as well as the manner in which the bridge was out of repair, notice allows a town to promptly remedy hazardous road conditions and avoid additional accidents. Notification that the person was injured informs the town of a potential claim, allowing it to investigate and gather evidence. Notice also allows a town to defend against fraudulent claims and may facilitate settlement. But a claimant may not know the full extent of his or her injuries within twenty days of the accident.
We find that Lane's notice was adequate to alert the Town that the bridge was dangerous and inform it of the pending claim, thereby allowing the Town to begin...
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