Langan v. St. Vincent's Hosp.

• Decision Date: 10 April 2003
• Citation: 765 N.Y.S.2d 411,196 Misc.2d 440
• Parties: JOHN LANGAN, Individually and as Executor of NEIL C. SPICEHANDLER, Also Known as NEAL SPICEHANDLER, Deceased, Plaintiff,<BR>v.<BR>ST. VINCENT'S HOSPITAL OF N.Y., Defendant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

196 Misc.2d 440

765 N.Y.S.2d 411

JOHN LANGAN, Individually and as Executor of NEIL C. SPICEHANDLER, Also Known as NEAL SPICEHANDLER, Deceased, Plaintiff,

v.ST. VINCENT'S HOSPITAL OF N.Y., Defendant.

April 10, 2003.

David L. Taback, New York City, for plaintiff.

Costello, Shea & Gaffney, New York City, for defendant.

OPINION OF THE COURT

JOHN P. DUNNE, J.

In this action for wrongful death and medical malpractice, the limited issue presented on the motion and cross motion is whether, under principles of full faith and credit or comity, plaintiff John Langan's legal status as a spouse of Neal Spicehandler in a civil union solemnized in the State of Vermont, which union is sanctioned and affords all benefits and obligations of marriage under the laws of Vermont, entitles him to recognition as a "spouse" under New York's wrongful death statute. Plaintiff does not raise any derivative claim for loss of consortium.

As background for analysis, the circumstances of Neal Spicehandler's death, as well as the circumstances of his life are reviewed.

Neal Conrad Spicehandler and John Langan met on November 1, 1986 when Spicehandler was 26 and Langan was 25. They moved in together eight months later and lived together until Spicehandler's death at age 41. They provided each other with health care proxies, each was the sole beneficiary on the other's life insurance policy, they were joint owners on homeowner's insurance, and were the sole legatees under each other's wills.

In the year 2000, Vermont enacted a statute which legally sanctioned homosexual unions in the same manner as a marriage. The civil union required the same solemnization as a marriage and created spouses for all purposes under Vermont state law. Within four months of its passage, Spicehandler and Langan, in a formal ceremony with approximately 40 family members and friends attending, were joined in a union solemnized by a justice of the peace. Their vows included taking each other "to be my spouse." They exchanged wedding bands, they planned to adopt children, and finally purchased a house in Massapequa, Long Island. Within hours of the closing Neal Spicehandler was struck by the automobile driven by Ronald Popadich who ran down and injured 18 people in Manhattan. He was taken to St. Vincent's Hospital with a broken leg, and underwent two surgeries. He died while in the hospital from an embolus of "unknown origin."

Neal Conrad Spicehandler was known as both Neal and Conrad. He is referred to as both by different family members and friends as they describe the nature of his relationship with plaintiff. Their words are telling. First, the parents. Ruth Spicehandler, Neal's mother, knew John Langan as her son's partner for 16 years, and even her grandchildren know John as an uncle. She explains, "John has been Neal's partner in all aspects of life." They participated together "in all family functions" including "birthdays, anniversaries, religious events, holidays, dinners, and vacations." Plaintiff's parents, Daniel and Barbara Langan, worried that their son would face "prejudice, hostility and other difficulties" and initially did not accept his relationship with Spicehandler. But they changed, stating, "John has always loved life, but we believe he loved Conrad even more. It is as if a part of him died when Conrad died."

Jeremy Spicehandler, Neal's brother, says of plaintiff, "I * * * think of him and care for him as a family member * * *." He relates how John had been a source of strength when his father died, and how he and Neal, knowing it would be difficult for his mother, held the holiday Seders at their home in Massapequa, Long Island. "It was a difficult time for everyone, made easier by being in their loving home." Elliot Spicehandler, another brother, states that the civil union was important to Neal because of his "interest in adopting children."

There are additional affidavits from family. A sister-in-law, Laura Spicehandler, stated, "There was never a time in all those 16 years when it was just Neal, or just John. It was always Neal and John, together, spouses * * * as inseparable as any married couple could possibly be." The affidavits of other family members, cousins, aunts, godmother, echo these sentiments. Cousin Kim Marie Merritt sums up their loss, stating that since Neal's loss John "is still working to put one foot in front of the other * * * We are all working to put our lives back together after losing a beloved family member so young, so suddenly."

Friends of Langan and Spicehandler have come forward to provide evidence of their relationship. Alan Matzkin tells of Neal's sacrifice for John in the spring of 1998 when Neal temporarily set aside his legal career ambitions "to help John improve his career prospects and the value of his business." Nancy M. Starznski, one of the many friends and business associates submitting affidavits, and a college friend who often celebrated family events and holidays together with John and Neal, says, "David and I are heartbroken that this affidavit is necessary to quantify the union between these two wonderful people. Their love for each other was so strong * * *."

New York does not compensate a spouse for spiritual or emotional loss, but it may compensate Langan for his pecuniary loss if it is determined that he is a spouse for purposes of the wrongful death statute. There is no infirmity of proof on the factual issues. The evidence offered establishes that John Langan and Neal Conrad Spicehandler lived together as spouses from shortly after they met in 1985 until the year 2000, when they took the first opportunity to secure legal recognition of their union in the State of Vermont, and were joined legally as lawful spouses.

Under New York law as it now stands, if Langan were a registered domestic partner, he would be able to succeed to a rent-controlled apartment as a "family member," would be able to recover had his partner been lost in the September 11 tragedy, would be eligible for the derivative employment benefits of a city- or state-employed partner, including death benefits, would be eligible to adopt his partner's biological child, and would be entitled to be free from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation under the Civil Rights and Executive Laws. He would not, however, be able to recover as a spouse under the wrongful death statute based upon the holding of Raum v Restaurant Assoc. (252 AD2d 369 [1998], appeal dismissed 92 NY2d 946 [1998]).

At the time Raum was decided however, there was no state sanctioned union equivalent to marriage. Passage of the Vermont civil union statute provides a basis to distinguish Raum, and an earlier case, Matter of Cooper (187 AD2d 128 [1993], appeal dismissed 82 NY2d 801 [1993]), which withheld recognition of a right of election under the EPTL for same-sex couples. The laws regarding recognition of sister state marriages, such as a common-law marriage, provide a legal ground to revisit the meaning of the term spouse as used in the EPTL, and to distinguish the holdings in Raum and Cooper.

With respect to marriages entered into in sister states, New York adheres to the general rule that "marriage contracts, valid where made, are valid everywhere, unless * * * contrary to * * * natural laws, or * * * statute[s]" (Shea v Shea, 268 App Div 677, 684 [internal quotation marks omitted], revd 294 NY 909 [1945]). In Shea, a divided Appellate Division reversed the trial court and found that a common-law marriage, although valid in the state where it took place, should not be recognized in New York relying on Domestic Relations Law § 11, which was amended in 1933 to require solemnization for validity (268 App Div 677, 680 [1945]). The Appellate Division found the plaintiff's common-law marriage was prohibited by statute, as the 1933 amendment to section 11 of the Domestic Relations Law had as its main purpose abolition of common-law marriage in New York (see People v Heine, 12 AD2d 36, 38 [1960], affd 9 NY2d 925 [1961]). Dissenting, Justice Johnston relied upon the general rule stated above, that a marriage valid where made is valid in the State of New York, and noted that a refusal of recognition is usually reserved for incestuous or polygamous marriages (268 App Div 677, 684 [1945]). Agreeing, the Court of Appeals reversed on the basis of his dissenting opinion (Shea v Shea, 294 NY 909 [1945], supra). Thus, notwithstanding that in general the validity of a common-law marriage "is always open to suspicion" especially "when one of the parties is dead" (Boyd v Boyd, 252 NY 422, 428 [1930]), it will be recognized in New York if found valid in the state where contracted (Shea v Shea, supra; Cross v Cross, 102 AD2d 638, 639-640 [1984]). This is true for purposes of descent in the Surrogate's Court (Matter of Watts, 31 NY2d 491, 495 [1973]), and for purposes of the wrongful death statute (Black v Moody, 276 AD2d 303 [2000]). Thus, notwithstanding the premise in Raum v Restaurant Assoc. (252 AD2d 369 [1998], appeal dismissed 92 NY2d 946 [1998], supra) that unmarried heterosexual and homosexual couples are treated equally under the wrongful death statutes in New York, a common-law marriage may be established for an unmarried heterosexual couple under the jurisdiction of a sister state and the survivor becomes a "spouse" under the EPTL (Black v Moody, supra). It follows that, if plaintiff has a validly contracted marriage in the State of Vermont, and if the Vermont civil union does not offend public policy as would an incestuous or polygamous union, it will be recognized in the State of New York for purposes of the wrongful death statute (Shea v Shea, 294 NY 909 [1945], supra; Black v Moody, supra; cf. Matter of May, 305 NY 486 [1953] [upheld validity of a 32-year-old marriage between uncle and niece valid pursuant to their faith and lawfully contracted in the State of Rhode Island, notwithstanding the prohibition of Domestic Relations Law § 5 (3)]; see also...