Langley v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 12 May 1998
• Docket Number: Record No. 1390-97-3.
• Parties: Lawrence W. LANGLEY v. Anne P. JOHNSON.
• Court: Virginia Court of Appeals

499 S.E.2d 15

27 Va. App. 365

Lawrence W. LANGLEY v. Anne P. JOHNSON.

Record No. 1390-97-3.

Court of Appeals of Virginia, Salem.

May 12, 1998.

H. Gregory Campbell, Jr., Blacksburg, for appellant.

Margaret E. Stone (Edwin C. Stone; Stone, Harrison, Turk & Showalter, on brief), Radford, for appellee.

Present: BENTON, COLEMAN and BUMGARDNER, JJ.

BENTON, Judge.

Lawrence W. Langley appeals from the trial judge's ruling that payments made under a settlement agreement to his former wife, Anne P. Johnson, were spousal support payments that survived the wife's remarriage. We hold that the provisions of Code §§ 20-109 and 20-109.1 acted to terminate the husband's spousal support obligation upon the wife's remarriage, and we reverse the trial judge's order.

I.

On August 26, 1991, the parties were divorced by a decree that affirmed, ratified, and incorporated by reference the parties' settlement agreement. Under the heading "Spousal Support and Separate Maintenance," Section 3.02 of the agreement provides that the husband "agrees to pay [the wife] an amount equal to $275.00 cash, per week, until her death." The wife remarried on December 29, 1991. The husband continued his payments for almost four years after the wife's remarriage. When he ceased making his payments in 1995, the wife filed a motion for judgment seeking enforcement of the payment obligation.

The trial judge found that the language in the separation agreement was "plain, simple, clear and unambiguous" and obligated the husband to pay spousal support until the wife's death. Noting that "[r]emarriage can only occur prior to death," the trial judge ruled that "there is no speculation as to the termination of support" and that Code § 20-109.1 "does not apply to the agreement." The husband appeals from the trial judge's ruling that the wife's remarriage did not terminate the husband's spousal support obligation.

II.

We first address the wife's contention that the weekly payments were not spousal support but, rather, were in the nature of a property distribution. The wife argues that although the husband's obligation to make weekly payments is contained under the heading "Spousal Support and Maintenance," the agreement provides that "[p]aragraph titles or headings ... are inserted as a matter of convenience only and for reference and in no way define or describe the scope of this Agreement or any provision thereof." Because no other language in the agreement describes the weekly payments as spousal support, she argues that the payments are not "spousal support." Thus, she argues Code §§ 20-109 and 20-109.1 do not apply.

"Property settlement agreements are contracts; therefore, we must apply the same rules of interpretation applicable to contracts generally." Tiffany v. Tiffany, 1 Va.App. 11, 15, 332 S.E.2d 796, 799 (1985). Where the agreement is plain and unambiguous in its terms, the rights of the parties will be determined from the terms of the agreement. See Harris v. Woodrum, 3 Va.App. 428, 432, 350 S.E.2d 667, 669 (1986). "It is the court's responsibility to determine the intent of the parties from the language they employ." Bender-Miller Co. v. Thomwood Farms, Inc., 211 Va. 585, 588, 179 S.E.2d 636, 639 (1971).

Three distinct obligations are specified under the heading "Spousal Support and Separate Maintenance": the parties agreed to share equally the proceeds of all certificates of deposit; the husband agreed to make weekly payments to the wife; and the husband agreed to maintain a life insurance policy for the wife's benefit. Although the parties' obligation to share equally the proceeds of the certificates of deposit may have characteristics of a property division, the weekly payments do not. The agreement does not relate the weekly payments to any property interest of the parties and contains no indication that the weekly payments were intended to adjust the parties' rights and interest in their property.¹

The agreement provides that the weekly payments are to be annually adjusted by the consumer price index. That type of adjustment suggests the payments were made to provide for the wife's necessities and staples of life. Likewise, the stipulation that the weekly payments are to terminate upon the wife's death implies that the payments bear upon the wife's personal circumstances. We conclude, therefore, that these characteristics denote periodic payments in the traditional nature of spousal support and maintenance. See Mosley v. Mosley, 19 Va.App. 192, 196, 450 S.E.2d 161, 164 (1994) (whether a payment is spousal support and maintenance or a property distribution is determined by the function that payment is intended to serve). See also In re Zuccarell, 181 B.R. 42, 44-45 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1995) (recognizing that, typically, a property division is not affected by a change in the personal circumstances of the recipient spouse); In re Ackley, 186 B.R. 1005, 1010 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1994) (noting that the structure of a provision—whether payment is lump sum or periodic, method of payment, terms of payment, amount of payment, whether payment is modifiable, and whether payment is subject to contingencies—is an important element in determining whether the provision is one for support or a property division); In re Edwards, 162 B.R. 83, 85 (D.Conn.1993) (holding that an obligation is in the nature of alimony "when it is intended to provide support for the spouse, rather than an equalization of property rights"); In re Jensen, 17 B.R. 537, 540 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1982) (noting that provisions for payment of expenditures for necessities and staples of life reflect a support function).

From a plain reading of the agreement, we conclude that the parties intended this obligation to be one for spousal support and maintenance. Even if we could conclude that the terms of the agreement are ambiguous, the evidence proves that the parties treated the payments as spousal support. The correspondence between the parties referred to the obligation as "alimony." On his tax returns, the husband also treated the payments as spousal support. Accordingly, we analyze the effect of Code §§ 20-109 and 20-109.1 upon the spousal support obligation contained in the agreement.

III.

Relying upon Miller v. Hawkins, 14 Va.App. 192, 415 S.E.2d 861 (1992); Radford v. Radford, 16 Va.App. 812, 433 S.E.2d 35 (1993); MacNelly v. MacNelly, 17 Va.App. 427, 437 S.E.2d 582 (1993); and Gayler v. Gayler, 20 Va.App. 83, 455 S.E.2d 278 (1995), the husband contends that his support obligation terminated by operation of Code §§ 20-109 and 20-109.1 because of the absence of express language in the agreement stating that the spousal support would survive the wife's remarriage. We agree.

When this case was decided, Code § 20-109 denoted the trial judge's power to award spousal support and to change existing awards, and it further provided, in pertinent part, that "[u]pon the death or remarriage of the spouse receiving support, spousal support shall terminate unless otherwise provided by stipulation or contract." (Emphasis added). Effecting the same policy, Code § 20-109.1 provides, in relevant part, as follows:

Where the court affirms, ratifies and incorporates by reference in its decree such agreement or provision thereof, it shall be deemed for all purposes to be a term of the decree, and enforceable in the same manner as any provision of such decree. The provisions of this section shall apply to any decree hereinbefore or hereinafter entered affirming, ratifying and incorporating an agreement as provided herein. Upon the death or remarriage of the spouse receiving support, spousal support shall terminate unless otherwise provided by stipulation or contract.

(Emphasis added).

In Miller v. Hawkins, 14 Va.App. 192, 415 S.E.2d 861 (1992), we considered the following question: "[i]f spousal support payments are to continue after remarriage of the recipient, must the agreement or decree include specific language disclosing that to be the intent of the parties?" Id. at 196, 415 S.E.2d at 864. The agreement contained the husband's promise to pay the wife spousal support in certain amounts and at designated intervals.² The wife remarried, and the husband discontinued payments. In reversing the trial judge's award of spousal support arrearages in favor of the wife, we noted the following:

While no Virginia appellate court has decided whether or what specifically is required [to avoid the termination provisions of Code §§ 20-109 and 20-109.1], ... [w]e adopt the views expressed in several opinions of appellate courts in sister states and hold that the agreement must contain clear and express language evincing the parties' intent that spousal support will continue after remarriage; otherwise, remarriage terminates the obligation.

The public policy clearly declared by Code §§ 20-109 and 20-109.1 is that spousal support does not survive the recipient's remarriage. To create an exception to that policy, the agreement must be equally clear. If the parties intended that spousal support would continue after remarriage, they could have included such a requirement in the agreement. We do not construe the language contained in the agreement before us to establish an intent that husband was obligated to continue spousal support to wife after her remarriage.

Id. at 195-97, 415 S.E.2d at 863-64 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).

In Radford v. Radford, 16 Va.App. 812, 813, 433 S.E.2d 35, 36 (1993), the agreement provided that "the husband shall pay unto the wife the sum of $200.00 per month for a period of 5 years." Reiterating the public policy discussed in Miller, we held as follows:

[S]pousal support provided for in an agreement terminates upon the remarriage or death of the person to whom the support is payable, unless the agreement expressly provides for its continuation. [The language of Code §§ 20-109 and 20-109.1] contemplates an expressed, not implied, provision that support shall not terminate upon

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