Langlitz v. American Nat. Ins. Co.

• Citation: 146 S.W.2d 484
• Decision Date: 20 December 1940
• Docket Number: No. 2070.,2070.
• Parties: LANGLITZ v. AMERICAN NAT. INS. CO.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 484

146 S.W.2d 484

LANGLITZ v. AMERICAN NAT. INS. CO.

No. 2070.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Eastland.

December 20, 1940.

Rehearing Denied January 10, 1941.

Appeal from District Court, Eastland County, Ninety-First Judicial District; Geo. L. Davenport, Judge.

Suit by Tee Clyde Langlitz against the American National Insurance Company on a life policy to recover double indemnity on ground that insured's death from gunshot wounds was by accidental means. From a judgment in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff appeals.

Judgment affirmed.

R. L. Rust, of Eastland, and Sayles & Sayles, of Abilene, for appellant.

Conner & Conner, of Eastland, for appellee.

FUNDERBURK, Justice.

Mrs. Tee Clyde Langlitz, surviving wife of Leonard O. Langlitz, brought this suit against American National Insurance Company to recover, as beneficiary, upon a policy of insurance issued to her said husband. The Insured was alleged to have died from gunshot wounds by reason whereof his death was by accidental means, and the Beneficiary entitled to recover double indemnity, according to a provision of the policy.

The defense was urged that the Insured's death was suicide, occurring within two years from the issuance of the policy, by reason whereof, as provided in the policy, the liability of the Insurer was limited to payment to the Beneficiary of the amount of the premiums which had been paid by the Insured to the Insurer, which premiums had been duly tendered.

In a jury trial it was found by the verdict that Insured "did shoot himself intentionally"; that "he did commit suicide"; that "the wound on the body of the deceased, Leonard O. Langlitz, was" not "received by accidental means."

From the judgment for the Insurer, the Beneficiary has appealed. For brevity, we shall continue to designate the plaintiff (appellant) as "Beneficiary"; the defendant (appellee) as the "Insurer", and the deceased Leonard O. Langlitz as the "Insured."

The Beneficiary has briefed four assignments of error. The first, while alleging that the "court erred in rendering judgment in favor of the appellee", which alone because of its generality presents nothing sufficiently specific for review, further alleges that "the verdict of the jury was contrary to the law and evidence", subject to the same objection, but upon the whole the assignment is perhaps rendered sufficient by reason of further particular allegation as follows: "There was no evidence of probative force showing any motive on the part of the Insured to commit suicide", and "there was no evidence to overcome the presumption of law aiding the theory of accidental death."

We have no difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that evidence of motive for committing suicide is not indispensable to the sufficiency of evidence to show suicide. In the absence of any such evidence of motive there may, nevertheless, be other evidence sufficient to support a finding that death was suicide.

The allegation that "there was no evidence to overcome the presumption of law aiding the theory of accidental death" presents a question of a little more difficulty. The difficulty, however, is in properly understanding the nature and effect of the presumption thus referred to.

The Beneficiary, in addition to setting out the policy as an exhibit to her pleadings, alleged one of the obligations of the Insurer to be to pay the Beneficiary, under the provisions of the policy, the sum of $500. Another was to pay $500 additional as a "Double Accidental Death Benefit." As to the $500 double accidental death benefit, a number of exceptions from the liability to pay the same as provided by the policy were alleged, including the exception of death "as a result of self-destruction, or an attempt thereat, whether sane or insane." Regarding these exceptions the Beneficiary alleged that "she has stated the above exceptions as to liability in said policy only because the rules of pleading so requires and she now negatives all said exceptions and says that Leonard O. Langlitz died on or about April 4, 1939 from a gun shot wound inflicted on said date, which was an accidental discharge of said gun and that his death resulted directly and independently of all other causes from bodily injury effected solely through external and accidental means, of which there was a visible contusion and wound on the exterior of the body, to-wit, on his head and * * * he did not commit suicide and his death was not due to intentional self-destruction, but was due solely from accidental means."

There is either a material omission, or if not, at least a want of clearness in the Beneficiary's petition in this: While there is alleged and negatived certain exceptions from the coverage of the policy as regards the "Double Accidental Death Benefit", there are no such allegations as to exceptions from the other obligation of the policy to pay $500 regular life insurance. Referable to this general provision, the policy provides under the heading, "Limitations", as follows: "If the Insured, whether sane or insane, shall commit suicide within two years from the date hereof the liability of the company shall be limited to the amount of cash premiums actually paid on the policy." The date of the policy was February 16, 1938. The alleged date of the death of the Insured, being April 4, 1939, was, therefore, within the suicide time limitation of two years. It, therefore, appears that only by appropriating the negation of exceptions to the double indemnity provision as being also the negation of exceptions to the general obligation can the pleadings be considered sufficient to state a cause of action under the authority of International Travelers Ass'n v. Marshall, 131 Tex. 258, 114 S.W.2d 851, 852, and authorities therein cited.

The rule re-affirmed and applied in the Marshall case was stated as follows: "It has long been held that in a case of this kind the burden rests upon the plaintiff to allege and prove that the death of the insured was by accident, and did not come within the exceptions named in the policy. In order to sustain a judgment based on such policy, plaintiff must negative, by allegation and proof, the exceptions which under the terms of the policy specifically exempt the company from liability." As to the record in that case, the court further said: "* * * that plaintiff, having failed to make such allegations, by showing that the death of William Wright Marshall came within the general liability assumed by the insurer, and that it did not come within the excepted causes stated in the policy, did not meet the burden placed upon her." (Italics ours.)

Does the rule thus declared apply to a case where one of the exceptions from the coverage of the policy is suicidal death? We think so. The attempt to recognize in such a case a distinction would, it seems to us, have no reason to support it. In International Travelers' Ass'n v. Bettis, 120 Tex. 67, 35 S.W.2d 1040, which we may refer to as the Bettis case and one of the cases followed in International Travelers Ass'n v. Marshall, supra, the court said [120 Tex. 67, 35 S.W. 1044]: "It is further contended, and was so held by the Court of Civil Appeals in its opinion , that, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, the law aids the deceased with the presumption that he did not intentionally or voluntarily inflict such injury upon himself, and that the rule should apply in this case." The rule thus referred to was stated in the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals as a quotation from 1 C.J. 495, as follows: "`Where, however, it is apparent that the injury to or death of the insured was the result of external and violent means, and the issue is as to whether it was due to an accident, within the meaning of the policy, or to some cause excepted by the policy, the presumption is in favor of accident and against the existence...