Langston v. U.S., CIV. A.2000-CV-1619.

• Decision Date: 27 June 2000
• Docket Number: No. CIV. A.2000-CV-1619.,CIV. A.2000-CV-1619.
• Citation: 105 F.Supp.2d 419
• Parties: Beverly LANGSTON, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

105 F.Supp.2d 419

Beverly LANGSTON, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant.

No. CIV. A.2000-CV-1619.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

June 27, 2000.

Anne Whatley Chain, Asst. U.S. Atty., Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiff.

Steven A. Morley, Bagia and Morley, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

ANITA B. BRODY, District Judge.

Beverly Langston ("Langston") brings this motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct her sentence. For the following reasons, I will deny Langston's motion.

I. Background

On May 28, 1997, Langston was indicted by a federal grand jury on charges of conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and distribution of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. On June 12, 1997, Langston entered a plea of not guilty to the counts in which she was charged. On July 31, 1997, Magistrate Judge Smith ordered that Langston's conditions of bail include drug counseling and/or treatment.

On September 10, 1997, the government filed a motion for a psychiatric examination of Langston. On September 12, 1997, Judge Gawthrop ordered that Langston undergo a prompt psychiatric examination to determine if she was competent to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against her and to assist in her defense. On the same day, Judge Gawthrop severed Langston's case from her co-defendants' cases. On September 25, 1997, pursuant to the Court's order that Langston undergo a competency examination, Russell E. Phillips, M.D., conducted a psychiatric evaluation of Langston. In an October 2, 1997 report, Dr. Phillips opined that "Ms. Langston is competent to stand trial. She understands the charges against her, understands the consequences of conviction on these charges, and is capable of assisting her attorney in her own defense."

On November 5, 1997, Langston was placed at Eagleville Hospital, a residential drug treatment program, and she was discharged on December 12, 1997. After her discharge from Eagleville Hospital, Langston was placed in a halfway house. Despite Judge Gawthrop's order that Langston was to remain at the halfway house for a minimum of ninety days, Langston left the halfway house after one night. On February 6, 1998, Langston's trial counsel, Doloras Troiani, Esq. ("Troiani"), petitioned the court to withdraw as counsel. On the same day, after a conference call, Judge Gawthrop ordered that Troiani's motion to withdraw was denied.¹

On February 10, 1998, the government requested a second psychiatric examination of Langston and on February 11, 1998, Judge Gawthrop ordered a second examination. Pursuant to the Court's order, on February 13, 1998, John S. O'Brien II, M.D., J.D., completed a psychiatric and substance abuse evaluation of Langston. In a February 16, 1998 report, Dr. O'Brien, concluded that Langston "is able to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against her and to participate and assist in her own defense. It is therefore my opinion that she is currently competent to stand trial."

Prior to jury selection, the government's counsel noted on the record that Langston was found competent after a psychiatric evaluation. Additionally, government's counsel confirmed that Troiani believed her client was prepared to proceed, Troiani was able to consult with Langston and Langston was able to assist in her own defense. See Tr. Feb. 18, 1998 at 3.

On February 23, 1998, a jury found Langston guilty on both counts (conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and distribution of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2). On May 21, 1998, Langston was sentenced by Judge Gawthrop to 100 months imprisonment, five years of supervised release, and a special assessment of $200.00. On June 1, 1998, Langston filed a notice of appeal. On January 11, 1999, the Third Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. On March 8, 1999, Langston filed a pro se motion for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33. After the untimely death of Judge Gawthrop, this case was reassigned to my docket. On November 16, 1999, I appointed counsel to represent Langston.

On February 25, 2000, I held oral argument on Langston's motion for a new trial with appointed counsel for Langston and counsel for the government present. At oral argument the parties agreed, on the record, that Langston's pro se motion for a new trial would be considered a § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct her sentence. See Tr. at 3. Langston's counsel argued that Langston's prior counsel was ineffective as she did not request a full competency hearing before trial and Langston was denied due process because of this failure to conduct a pre-trial competency hearing. See Tr. at 4-6. Langston's counsel argued only the issue regarding Langston's competency and left the court to evaluate Langston's additional claims, raised in her pro se motion for a new trial, on the papers filed by Langston and the government. See Tr. at 4. On April 10, 2000, I ordered the parties to submit additional briefing.

II. Standard

Section 2255 allows federal courts to vacate, set aside or correct a sentence of a prisoner:

in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack ...

28 U.S.C. § 2255.

III. Discussion

Langston alleges that she is entitled to relief pursuant to § 2255 because: (A)(1) her substantive due process rights were violated because she was incompetent to stand trial, (2) her procedural due process rights were violated because the district court failed to conduct a full competency hearing, and (3) she had ineffective assistance of counsel because her counsel failed to request a full competency hearing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241; (B) counsel was ineffective for a variety of additional reasons (including failure to: subpoena certain witnesses, obtain discovery, file discovery motions, file pretrial motions, obtain all transcripts of testimony before the grand jury, and file an appeal); and (C) her due process rights were violated because the government withheld evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). I will address each of Langston's grounds for relief.

A. Competency

Langston's first set of claims and the only claims asserted by her counsel involve her competency. Langston states in her pro se motion that during and preceding the trial she was "heavily abus[ing] drugs and alcohol." Langston Mot. at 10-11.

1. Substantive due process

Langston asserts that her substantive due process rights were violated because she was incompetent to stand trial.² The conviction of a legally incompetent defendant violates due process. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966); see also United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 241 (3rd Cir.1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 167, 145 L.Ed.2d 141 (1999). A defendant is competent to stand trial if "(1) the defendant has the present ability to consult with [defense counsel] with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and (2) the defendant has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings." Leggett, 162 F.3d at 242 (internal quotations omitted).

In general, "a person seeking to vacate his conviction bears the burden of proof upon each ground presented for relief." Walden v. United States, 418 F.Supp. 386, 388 (E.D.Pa.1976); see also United States v. Abbott, 975 F.Supp. 703, 705 (E.D.Pa.1997); Cf. United States v. Hollis, 569 F.2d 199, 205 (3rd Cir.1977) (explaining that "in habeas cases the general rule is that the petitioner himself bears the burden of proving that his conviction is illegal."). In cases raising mental incompetency, however, the burden of proof may be on the government. See Hollis, 569 F.2d at 207 (finding an exception to the general rule that the burden is on the petitioner because "of the inconsistency of expecting a defendant like Hollis who asserts that he is incompetent to demonstrate that he does suffer from mental incapacity, and since the issue was raised but was not litigated prior to conviction through no fault of the accused, it would not be appropriate for the burden of proof to be placed upon Hollis." But noting that "[t]he exception adduced here ... is designedly a limited one confined to the facts of this case."); but see Martin v. United States, 463 F.2d 220, 221 (3rd Cir.1972) (reasoning that "[t]he burden rested on the petitioner to establish by evidence his asserted mental incompetence at the time of trial and sentencing."); United States v. Riddick, 15 F.Supp.2d 673, 678 (E.D.Pa. 1998) (Van Antwerpen, J.) (explaining that while petitioner has a substantive due process right not to be tried and convicted while incompetent, "it is up to him to prove by the preponderance of the evidence that he was incompetent at the time of trial.") (citations omitted); Kramm v. United States, No. 95-CV-5280, 1996 WL 705962, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Dec.2, 1996) (Huyett, J.) (holding that a defendant raising actual incompetency in a § 2255 motion is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if he or she alleges facts that, if proved at the hearing, would entitle him or her to relief) (citation omitted). I need not resolve the issue of which party bears the burden of proof because even if the government has the burden, Langston's motion fails. The evidence conclusively shows Langston was competent to stand trial.

Langston has produced no evidence that she...