Langton v. Secretary of Public Safety

• Decision Date: 11 July 1994
• Docket Number: No. 92-P-1835,92-P-1835
• Citation: 37 Mass.App.Ct. 15,636 N.E.2d 299
• Parties: William LANGTON v. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC SAFETY 1 & others. 2
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

Page 299

636 N.E.2d 299

37 Mass.App.Ct. 15

William LANGTON v. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC SAFETY ¹ & others.²

No. 92-P-1835.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts Suffolk.

Argued Dec. 16, 1993.

Decided July 11, 1994.

Plaintiff, pro se.

Michael Cohen, for defendants.

Before KASS, GREENBERG and GILLERMAN, JJ.

GREENBERG, Justice.

In this complaint, the plaintiff William Langton, an inmate at the North Central Correctional Institution (NCCI) at Gardner, alleges that the Secretary of Public Safety (the Secretary) and other officials of NCCI violated his Federal and State constitutional rights to free speech by forcing him to submit to a psychological examination because he sent a letter to the Secretary criticizing prison conditions. He also contends that his fellow prisoners' free speech and due process rights were violated when prison authorities censored and confiscated certain video films. The plaintiff seeks declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief. Upon the defendants' motion, summary judgment entered in their favor. Because the record, as shown by the documents presented on the motion for summary judgment, reveals disputed material facts on some of the plaintiff's civil rights claims, we vacate part of the judgment, but affirm the judgment with respect to the plaintiff's lack of standing to raise a censorship claim.

The plaintiff's principal claim is that he was coerced, under threat of lock-up, to undergo a psychological examination and that during the examination other threats were made to him, and, therefore, his rights to free speech under the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), the Federal Civil Rights Act, ³ were violated. He further alleges that these actions constituted "force, threats, coercion and intimidation" under G.L. c. 12, §§ 11H and 11I, the State Civil Rights Act.

Among the materials submitted by the plaintiff in opposition to the summary judgment motion is an impassioned letter penned by the plaintiff to the Secretary dated October 1, 1991, in which the plaintiff complains about censorship of video films which had been previously authorized by prison officials for the inmates' entertainment. The full text of the letter is reproduced in the appendix to this opinion. To the Secretary, the "threatening" content of the letter raised the question whether the person writing such things could be in his right mind. As a result, the Secretary determined that a psychological evaluation of the plaintiff was in order.

On October 31, 1991, the defendant Richard Canning, an officer at NCCI, spoke with the plaintiff and ordered him to see an NCCI staff psychologist. After the plaintiff received a reply from the superintendent reiterating approval of the policy allowing the censorship, the plaintiff again wrote to the superintendent informing him of Canning's directive and requesting that his counsel be present at the psychological examination. ⁴ After one failed attempt, the plaintiff was interviewed on November 21, 1991, by the defendant Kahn, a psychologist. Kahn found that the plaintiff did not suffer from any psychological problems.

In dispute are the following facts. The plaintiff asserts that on two occasions he was threatened in order to secure his compliance with the directive to submit to a psychological examination. The plaintiff set forth, with sufficient specificity to raise as factual issues, the details of these threats, both in his verified complaint and in his affidavit supporting his opposition to summary judgment. See Pederson v. Time, Inc., 404 Mass. 14, 16-17, 532 N.E.2d 1211 (1989). First, the plaintiff alleged that on October 10, 1991, at 11:25 A.M., defendant Canning came to the plaintiff's living area and informed him, inter alia, "[t]hat failure to comply with [the] order would result in the [p]laintiff being placed in a strip cell, naked, on suicide watch, until such time as he complied," and "[t]hat in fact, proceedings may well be commenced under the provisions of [G.L. c. 123] because of the letter of [October 10, 1991]." Second, on November 21, 1991, during his psychological exam, defendant Kahn "informed [the p]laintiff that he was not to write any more letters, that to do so would be placing himself in jeopardy of a trip to the 'bug house' "; and that "he did not have to speak with him, but that if he refused he would place himself in danger of lock-up, and could 'kiss any chance of parole good bye.' "

As a return volley, an affidavit was proffered by the Secretary, indicating that the psychological examination of the plaintiff was not taken to punish or to retaliate, but rather to re-evaluate the plaintiff's mental health status; and affidavits were proffered by defendants Canning and Kahn, disclaiming the threats alleged in the plaintiff's complaint.

The question raised by the opposing affidavits is whether the statements attributed to the officials by the plaintiff were made. Cf. Sheehy v. Lipton Indus., Inc., 24 Mass.App.Ct. 188, 507 N.E.2d 781 (1987). A disputed issue of material fact is to be resolved at trial by the trier of fact, not determined on a summary judgment motion. Good v. Commissioner of Correction, 417 Mass. 329, 332-333, 629 N.E.2d 1321 (1994); Flesner v. Technical Communications Corp., 410 Mass. 805, 808-809, 575 N.E.2d 1107 (1991). ⁵ What remains is the question whether the factual dispute was material. See Beatty v. NP Corp., 31 Mass.App.Ct. 606, 607-608, 581 N.E.2d 1311 (1991).

1. Langton's individual claims.

(a) Federal civil rights claim. It is premature to decide the defendants' claim that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff's First Amendment rights were not interfered with by virtue of the defendants' actions in response to the plaintiff's letter. If the psychological examination was a reprisal for making complaints about prison conditions, there may be a "clearly established" constitutional right that was violated. Compare Ross v. Reed, 719 F.2d 689, 695-696 (4th Cir.1983). By addressing specific grievances to the appropriate officials, the defendants' actions could have been an attempt to forestall and punish a legitimate effort by the plaintiff to trigger official action.

"[I]n any § 1983 action the initial inquiry must focus on whether the two essential elements to a § 1983 action are present: (1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; ⁶ and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1913, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981). Section 1983 should be "liberally and beneficently construed ... [and] be broadly construed against all forms of official violation of federally protected rights." Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 684, 700-701, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2032, 2040-41, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), quoted in Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 111 S.Ct. 865, 112 L.Ed.2d 969 (1991).

(b) State civil rights claim. The State Civil Rights Act, G.L. c. 12, §§ 11H-11I, affords a private right of action for violations interfering "by threats, intimidation or coercion ... with the exercise or enjoyment by any other person or persons or rights secured by the constitution or laws of the United States, or of rights secured by the constitution or laws of the commonwealth." G.L. c. 12, § 11H. For a claim to lie under the Act, the plaintiff must prove interference with some underlying right by the use of threats, intimidation or coercion. See Appleton v. Hudson, 397 Mass. 812, 817, 494 N.E.2d 10 (1986).

"[P]risoners have a right, subject to reasonable limitations of time and place, to petition prison authorities" for the redress of grievances. Stovall v. Bennett, 471 F.Supp. 1286, 1290 (M.D.Ala.1979). See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 1081, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972) ("persons in prison ... have the right to petition the Government for redress of grievances"). The right emanates from the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution; Part I, art. XI of the State Constitution, and State law (see, e.g., G.L. c. 30A, §§ 1-8; G.L. c. 124, § 1[i] ). Accordingly, it is a "secured" right, as required by the State Civil Rights Act. See Bell v. Mazza, 394 Mass. 176, 182-183, 474 N.E.2d 1111 (1985), and cases cited.

Behind prison walls the right to petition is limited because "a prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system." Lovell v. Superintendent, 26 Mass.App.Ct. 35, 37, 523 N.E.2d 268 (1988), quoting from Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 2804, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974).

Even a limited right to petition for redress of grievances is elusive, however, if the petitioner must undergo, as a consequence of such an exercise, compulsory psychological examinations, solitary confinement, threatened procedures under G.L. c. 123, or the potential loss of parole. Here, the plaintiff's claim is that the defendants, in their official capacities, retaliated against him with threats of retribution, described above, to compel his silence. If proved, that conduct would satisfy the coercive conduct element of the plaintiff's claim under the State Civil Rights Act. See O'Connell v. Chasdi, 400 Mass. 686, 692-694, 511 N.E.2d 349 (1987). See and compare Batchelder v. Allied Stores Corp., 393 Mass. 819, 823, 473 N.E.2d 1128 (1985); Bally v. Northeastern University, 403 Mass. 713, 718-720, 532 N.E.2d 49 (1989); Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 399 Mass. 93, 98-101, 502 N.E.2d 1375 (1987); Layne v. Superintendent, 406 Mass. 156, 158, 546 N.E.2d 166 (1989). If the allegations in the plaintiff's affidavit are true, they are sufficient to constitute threats, coercion and intimidation under the Act.

2. Prisoners' claims.

(a) Federal claims. In...