Langworthy v. Pulitzer Pub. Co.

• Decision Date: 13 May 1963
• Docket Number: No. 2,No. 49669,49669,2
• Parties: Joseph H. LANGWORTHY, Appellant, v. The PULITZER PUBLISHING COMPANY, a corporation, Respondent. . Division
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 385

368 S.W.2d 385

Joseph H. LANGWORTHY, Appellant, v. The PULITZER PUBLISHING COMPANY, a corporation, Respondent.

No. 49669.

Supreme Court of Missouri. Division No. 2.

May 13, 1963.

Motion for Rehearing or for Transfer to Court En Banc Denied

June 4, 1963.

Joseph Langworthy, Pacific, pro se.

Robert D. Evans, Robert B. Hoemeke, Green, Hennings, Henry, Evans & Arnold, St. Louis, for respondent.

STOCKARD, Commissioner.

Plaintiff has appealed from a judgment dismissing his petition for libel on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

On May 11, 1956, defendant published the following article in its newspaper of general circulation:

"TOWHEAD PETE'S' GANG OF 5 BOYS, 4 GIRLS SEIZED.

'Towhead Pete' and his gang were rounded up today by county detectives at the personal direction of Superintendent of Police Albert E. DuBois, who found himself on a 'hot spot.'

'Joseph H. Langworthy, an attorney of 512 Ivy Avenue, Times Beach, reported someone had pushed open a window at his home and had taken three pieces of Swiss cheese, a piece of cake, some jello and $20. He wanted something done about it and told police so in emphatic terms.

'The gang of 'Towhead Pete' was rounded up. It consists of five boys--12, 10, 6, 5 and 2 years old--and four girls, 13, 8, 6 and 4 years. They admitted getting into the house, but insisted they found only 28 cents and not $20.

'After a lecture at police head-quarters, they were turned over to juvenile authorities for another lecture, that is, all except the 2-year-old, who was in diapers and police said they 'couldn't pin anything on him, anyway.''

Plaintiff alleged in his petition that 'said matter' was 'false, malicious, and defamatory' to him and that it was published concerning him 'with actual malice' and was an invasion of his right of privacy in that it was unwarranted by the incidents which actually occurred, that the public had no legitimate concern in the matter as published, and that the article was published without his consent or prior knowledge. He then alleged that 'said matter' was false in that (a) there was no person involved either named or known as 'Towhead Pete,' 'Pete' or 'Peter,' (b) no child involved was as young as the age of four years or who was in diapers; and (c) there was no child involved about whom the police made the statements attributed to them. He then alleged that the 'matter published' was a 'false and unfair abridgement of what actually occurred' in that (a) the incidents which actually occurred and were reported by him to the police 'included a long series of crimes' or 'repeated acts of larceny, stealing, burglary, and vandalism,' a number of the children involved were 'delinquent children who needed help,' and while repeated efforts to secure help had been made by him, the juvenile authorities took the position that the detection of one further crime would have to be made before they would proceed against the delinquent children; (b) the published article reported as a single incident a garbled version of two or more incidents but omitted some of the articles which were stolen, and also omitted the fact that the children which were involved broke into and entered the dwelling house of plaintiff by forcibly breaking an outer window with intent to commit a felony therein; and (c) the published article omitted the fact that most of the money stolen was that of plaintiff's 7-year-old daughter which she was proudly saving to buy a bicycle and that the loss was a strong emotional shock to her. Plaintiff then purported to plead innuendoes as follows: 'Said matter' meant, was intended to mean, and was understood by those to whom published that (a) plaintiff had falsely reported that more money was stolen than was actually taken and therefore was untruthful and for that reason not well-suited for his professional duties as an attorney; (b) plaintiff was 'an inordinately selfish and egocentric person who greatly magnified and enlarged the importance of a trivial wrong committed against him by small children and demanded police action against the perpetrators of such wrong to an extent that he was ridiculous;' (c) plaintiff was 'lacking in the good judgment, balance, and regard for others requisite to the proper performance of his professional duties as an attorney;' and (d) plaintiff 'used undue and unwarranted pressure on public officials in a manner not befitting an attorney in the sense that he demanded police action beyond the point of good judgment and to the extent that he was ridiculous.' In conclusion plaintiff alleged that the publication caused him 'great humiliation, mortification, shame, embarrassment, and mental suffering,' and that 'said matter' was a 'malicious defamation' of him in that it tended to provoke him to wrath and expose him to public hatred, contempt and ridicule and deprive him of the benefits of public confidence and social intercourse and intended to injure and did injure him as a member of his profession. He prayed for $10,000 actual and $10,000 punitive damages.

In view of plaintiff's attempt to plead several innuendoes we should set forth certain basic rules pertaining to the law of libel and thereby define and delineate the precise issues for determination.

Words which are defamatory per se, that is, defamatory on their face without the aid of extrinsic proof, are actionable and the allegation in the petition of extrinsic facts in the form of what is referred to as the inducement and innuendo is not required in order to state a cause of action. 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander Secs. 8 and 162; Chambers v. National Battery Co., 34 F.Supp. 834. In such event the law presumes damages which may be alleged generally, 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander Secs. 170b and 262; Eby v. Wilson, 315 Mo. 1214, 289 S.W. 639, 50 A.L.R. 268, and special damages need not be alleged although proof of actual damage may be made to support the presumption of injury and to show its extent. 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander Secs. 264 and 265. A petition based on published words not defamatory per se may state a cause of action for what is referred to as libel per quod. See Nordlund v. Consolidated Electric Co-operative, Mo., 289 S.W.2d 93, 57 A.L.R.2d 832; 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander Sec. 8, pp. 43-44. However, the petition must allege extrinsic facts which show that although the words published were not libel per se they were in fact defamatory, and it is the uniform rule in Missouri and elsewhere that in such situation special damages must be pleaded in order for the petition to state a cause of action. Nordlund v. Consolidated Electric Cooperative, supra; Eby v. Wilson, supra; Furlong v. German-American Press Ass'n, Mo., 189 S.W. 385; Mitchell v. Bradstreet Co., 116 Mo. 226, 22 S.W. 358, 724, 20 L.R.A. 138; Curry v. Collins, 37 Mo. 324; National Refining Co. v. Benzo Gas Motor Fuel Co., 8 Cir., 20 F.2d 763; McBride v. Crowell-Collier Pub. Co., 5 Cir., 196 F.2d 187; Chambers v. National Battery Co., 8 Cir., 34 F.Supp. 834; Cal-Therm Industries, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., D.C., 75 F.Supp. 541; Landstrom v. Thorpe, 189 F.2d 46, 26 A.L.R.2d 1170, certiorari denied, 342 U.S. 819, 72 S.Ct. 37, 96 L.Ed. 620; Muchnick v. Post Publishing Co., 332 Mass. 304, 125 N.E.2d 137, 51 A.L.R.2d 547; 33 Am.Jur., .libel and Slander Sec. 243; 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander Sec. 170a.

Plaintiff has pleaded no special damages in this case. Therefore, for the petition to state a cause of action the published words must constitute libel per se. 'In determining whether language is libelous per se, it must be viewed stripped of any pleaded innuendo. The meaning of...