Wills v. State

• Decision Date: 01 September 1992
• Docket Number: No. 93,93
• Citation: 329 Md. 370,620 A.2d 295
• Parties: Andrew Nathaniel WILLS v. STATE of Maryland. ,
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 370

329 Md. 370

620 A.2d 295

Andrew Nathaniel WILLS v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 93, Sept. Term, 1992.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

March 5, 1993.

George E. Burns, Jr., Asst. Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, both on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.

Sarah E. Page, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., on brief), Baltimore, for respondent.

Argued before ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE, CHASANOW, KARWACKI, ROBERT M. BELL and CHARLES E. ORTH, Jr., Judge of the Court of Appeals (retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.

CHARLES E. ORTH, Jr. Judge, Specially Assigned.

I

The administration of justice in Maryland recognizes three standards of proof to test the sufficiency of the evidence. The lowest standard requires proof by a "preponderance" of the evidence; the highest standard demands proof "beyond a reasonable doubt;" an intermediate standard calls for proof that is "clear and convincing." ¹

We expect the trier of the facts to distinguish the subtle distinctions and nuances of a standard when called upon to apply it. But the terms "preponderance," "clear and convincing" and "reasonable doubt" are not, at least in their legal sense, street familiar. Therefore, when the trier of facts is a jury, some authoritative explanation of the applicable term is advisable. To that end we adopted what is now Md.Rule 4-325. Section (c) of the rule reads:

The court may, and at the request of any party shall, instruct the jury as to the applicable law and the extent to which the instructions are binding.... The court need not grant a requested instruction if the matter is fairly covered by instructions actually given.

Thus the rule is generally permissive. It becomes mandatory, however, when an instruction on the applicable law is requested by a party. But the mandatory aspect has a proviso--the requested instruction need not be given if the matter has been fairly covered. We are called upon on this appeal to examine the reasonable doubt standard through the eyes of the rule. ²

II

A

We have been taught by the Supreme Court of the United States that the reasonable doubt standard is constitutionally mandated by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and is an indispensable component of every criminal proceeding. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1071-1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). The reasonable doubt standard is firmly fixed today in our system of criminal justice. We declared in Lambert v. State, 193 Md. 551, 558, 69 A.2d 461 (1949):

It is a fundamental rule that the jury in a criminal case, before finding a verdict of guilty, must be satisfied of the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.

So the test for the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal cause is whether the evidence either shows directly or supports a rational inference of the facts to be proved, from which the trier of fact could be convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the defendant's guilt of the offense charged.

See Wilson v. State, 261 Md 551, 564, 276 A.2d 214 (1971); Royal v. State, 236 Md. 443, 448-449, 204 A.2d 500 (1964). We have declared that because the standard is constitutionally mandated, it is within the ambit of Rule 4-325. See Williams v. State, 322 Md. 35, 42, 585 A.2d 209 (1991); Lansdowne v. State, 287 Md. 232, 239, 412 A.2d 88 (1980). Therefore, "a trial judge in a criminal case must give an instruction correctly explaining 'reasonable doubt' if requested by the accused," Lansdowne at 243, 412 A.2d 88.

Its inclusion in the court's charge is so indispensable that the Supreme Court has indicated that failure to instruct the jury of the requirement of the reasonable doubt standard is never harmless error. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320, n. 14, 99 S.Ct. 2781 [2790 n. 14], 61 L.Ed.2d 560, reh. denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979).

Montgomery v. State, 292 Md. 84, 93, 437 A.2d 654 (1981). See Williams, 322 Md. at 42, 585 A.2d 209.

The difficulty with the reasonable doubt standard is its nebulous nature. See Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Evidence, § 14 (14th ed. 1985). Courts, legislatures, scholars, legal literati, and authors of academic literature have wrestled with the problem of defining the standard. None of them has been able to come up with a definition that is generally acceptable. "[S]ome of the courts

have expressed the opinion that the English language is not adequate to give a specific definition of "reasonable doubt" that would simplify its meaning, for the rule requiring that the jury must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt is generally as simple and intelligible as a guide for the jury as any rule that could be formulated.

Lambert, 193 Md. at 559, 69 A.2d 461. "In fact," the Court continued it is recognized that the rule is quite frequently made obscure by attempts at definition, which serve to create doubts instead of removing them. This danger of confusing the minds of the jurors in attempting to define "reasonable doubt" has prompted some of the trial judges to refuse to attempt to give any definition.

Id. We opined, however, in Lansdowne, 287 Md. at 242, 412 A.2d 88:

In our view, the term "reasonable doubt" is not so commonplace, simple, and clear that its meaning is self-evident to a jury. Even judges, who have "professional expertise" and "experience," and who, by their "legal training, traditional approach to problems, and the very state of the art of [their] profession ... learn to perceive, distinguish and interpret the nuances of the law which are its 'warp and woof,' " State v. Hutchinson, 260 Md. 227, 233, 271 A.2d 641, 644 (1970), have difficulty construing the meaning of "reasonable doubt." Indeed, in myriads of cases, trial judges have committed error by incorrectly explaining "reasonable doubt." Some unskilled and untutored lay jurors are at least as likely as some judges to misconstrue the meaning of "reasonable doubt."

(Footnote omitted). "Consequently," we concluded, "a correct explanation may well serve the useful function of enlightening rather than confusing a jury." Id. ³ But we have made clear that

there is not just one "satisfactory explanation of reasonable doubt and we decline to prescribe an instruction that will apply in every case."

Poole v. State, 295 Md. 167, 186, 453 A.2d 1218 (1983), quoting Montgomery, 292 Md. at 95, 437 A.2d 654.

B

Our predecessors have struggled to express a suitable explanation of the reasonable doubt standard. In Lambert, 193 Md. at 560-561, 69 A.2d 461, the Court held:

[I]t is not erroneous to instruct the jury that evidence is sufficient to remove a reasonable doubt when it convinces the judgment of an ordinarily prudent man of the truth of a proposition with such force that he would act upon that conviction without hesitation in his own most important affairs.

Lansdowne, 287 Md. at 241-242, 412 A.2d 88, affirmed that an instruction similar to that given in Lambert "was a correct statement of the law which did not constitute error." The Court explained, "It did not confuse the jury and was not prejudicial to the accused." Id. at 242, 412 A.2d 88.

Montgomery, 292 Md. at 95, 437 A.2d 654, reaffirmed the sufficiency of the Lambert instruction. It observed, however, that

in our opinion instructing a jury [as the judge did in that case] that reasonable doubt is a doubt which is founded upon reason without focusing their attention on the grave importance of their decision based on the evidence and their commitment to be bound by the result is a circular attempt at explanation which does nothing more than define the term by using the term.

Id. Such an explanation was not a proper instruction. Id.

In Poole, 295 Md. 167, 453 A.2d 1218, the Court commented on the trial court's instruction even though the point was not preserved for appeal. The Court noted:

In defining reasonable doubt, the [trial] court stated, in pertinent part, "It is such a doubt that would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act in the graver or more important transactions of life." (Emphasis supplied).

Id. at 186 n. 4, 453 A.2d 1218. The Court said:

[Poole] seems to argue that the concept of the "without hesitation" requirement, as explicated in Lansdowne v. State, 287 Md. 232, 241, 412 A.2d 88, 92-93 (1980), and Montgomery v. State, 292 Md. 84, 95, 437 A.2d 654, 659 (1981), was left out of the instructions here.

Id. at 186, 453 A.2d 1218. "However," the Court found it clear from its review of the records "that the factor of hesitation was given by the trial judge." Id. "Moreover," the Court observed, "as the State has aptly pointed out," this Court recently held that there is not just one "satisfactory explanation of reasonable doubt and we decline to prescribe an instruction that will apply in every case."

295 Md. at 186, 453 A.2d 1218, quoting Montgomery, 292 Md. at 95, 437 A.2d 654.

In Bowers v. State, 298 Md. 115, 468 A.2d 101 (1983), the trial court defined reasonable doubt as

"such doubt as would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act in the graver or more important transactions of his life."

Id. at 157, 468 A.2d 101. The trial court continued:

"Thus, if the evidence is of a character as to persuade you of the truth of the charges against the Defendant, with the same force that would be sufficient to persuade you to act in the more important transactions in your life then you would conclude the State has proven aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.

"If, on the other hand, you could not act based on that evidence in the more important transactions in your life, then you would conclude that the State had not met the burden of proof and therefore had not proven the aggravating circumstances."

Id. Defense counsel objected:

Your Honor, you said that if they find evidence sufficient to act in the more important, on which they would act in the more important transactions of their life to find...