Lanz v. M'Laughlin

• Decision Date: 01 January 1869
• Citation: Lanz v. M'Laughlin, 14 Minn. 55 (Minn. 1869)
• Parties: GEORGE LANZ v. GEORGE H. McLAUGHLIN and Wife.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 55

14 Minn. 55

GEORGE LANZ

v.GEORGE H. McLAUGHLIN and Wife.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Appeal by defendants from a judgment of the district court, Nicollet county.

The action was to enforce performance of an alleged agreement to convey real estate. Plaintiff had judgment below.

Sumner Ladd, for appellant.

Hanscome & Wallin, for respondent.

BERRY, J.

We think that there is no evidence in this case reasonably tending to show that there was any written contract, or note or memorandum of a contract, to sell the land in question to the respondent, such as is required by the statute of frauds.To entitle a party to the specific performance of an alleged contract to convey real property "the contract must be clearly proved, and its terms should be so specific and distinct as to leave no reasonable doubt of their meaning."3 Parsons, Cont. 354, and cases cited in note o;Id. 17.

In his letter of July 16th, dated at Louisville, Kentucky, where he resided, McLaughlin informs Lanz that he can have the land for $1,500, cash, adding, "if this suits you, and you can make it convenient to call here on your route to Chicago, I will turn over everything to your entire satisfaction."In his reply of July 30th Lanz writes: "It will be impracticable for me to go to Louisville, but I shall be in Chicago on the twelfth of August next.At that time I shall have the $1,500, and shall be ready to pay it over upon receipt of the deed.* * * I think there is no difficulty in your sending the deed to some one in Chicago who will receive the money and deliver the deed.If you have any acquaintance in Chicago, send the deed to him, and I will call on him and receive it.If you know no one there, I would recommend either of my employers.* * * If you are satisfied with this proposition, write to care of C. C. Wallin & Son, 245 Lake street, and I will receive your letter there on the twelfth of August."In answer, McLanghlin writes from Louisville, August 5th, to Lanz, at Chicago, as follows: "In reply to your communication of the thirtieth ult., I am ready to proceed to business.I cannot go, nor can I send the documents, to Chicago, for the reasons that you allege.If you can make it convenient to come here, it will not take an hour to make out the transfer deeds."

It is quite manifest that up to this point no agreement was concluded between the parties by this correspondence.McLaughlin's letters of July 16th and August 5th contained a mere offer, or proposal, of which the answers by Lanz do not show an unqualified acceptance; or, as it has been expressed in Thomas v. Blackman,1 Hill. (28 Eng. Ch.) 312, "no clear accession on both sides to one and the same set of terms."This was necessary to be shown.1 Hill.Vendors, 14; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. (9th Ed.) § 736c;Palmer v. Scott, 1 Russell &M. 394;Huddleston v. Briscoe,11 Ves. 583;Eliason v. Henshaw,4 Wheat. 225;Carr v. Duval,14 Pet. 83;Tayloev. Merch. Ins. Co. 9 How.(U. S.) 390.

After the letters above referred to had been put in evidence, the respondent was permitted to testify (defendant objecting) to facts tending to show that the proposition contained in the appellant's letters of July 16th and August 5th were accepted by the respondent verbally, in person, at Louisville.We are of opinion that this testimony was improperly received.The letters of July 16th and August 5th containing mere proposals, it was necessary that the proposals should be accepted by the respondent before a contract could be concluded.An oral acceptance would not satisfy the statute of frauds.The contract which could be perfected only by an acceptance of the proposal or offer would not be a contract in writing, unless the acceptance was in writing.Palmer v. Scott, supra;1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 736, b and c;Coles v. Trecothick,9 Ves. 234, note 9;Holland v. Eyre,2 Sim. & Stu. 194.

As to the letters written by McLaughlin subsequently to the fifth of August, certainly they do not constitute a contract, and we are of opinion that they do not amount to a note or memorandum or acknowledgment of a contract to convey the...