Lapin v. EverQuote Inc.
| Decision Date | 17 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | 4:22-CV-04058-KES |
| Parties | JOSHUA A LAPIN Plaintiff, v. EVERQUOTE INC, a/k/a EverQuote, and JOHN DOE SENDER, d/b/a BuzzBarrelReview.com, d/b/a dzlosurverys.com, d/b/a emailsjobsdelivered.com, d/b/a Entirelybelieve.com, d/b/a JobsDeliver.com, d/b/a expectcarecare.com, d/b/a JobSharkNL.com, d/b/a NationalShopperSurvey.com, d/b/a NationalSurveysOnline.com, d/b/a exigentmediagroup.com, d/b/a enrichedtechnologies.com, d/b/a ConsumerDigitalSurvey.com, d/b/a drivingmarketinggroup.com, d/b/a surveyandgetpaid.com, d/b/a tummyheadmediagroup.com, d/b/a thebestcreditcheck.com, d/b/a thefreetree.co, d/b/a dlzoffers.com, d/b/a nationaldigitalsurvey.com, d/b/a dealzingo.com, d/b/a rumorfox.com, |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Dakota |
ORDER DISMISSING LAPIN'S CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT EVERQUOTE AND DENYING LAPIN'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER
Pending before the court is defendant EverQuote's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Docket 13. EverQuote also argues a federal statute preempts, plaintiff, Joshua A Lapin's state-law claims. Docket 14 at 2-3. Lapin resists these arguments. Docket 19. Lapin also moves the court to reconsider its previous order denying him the ability to file documents electronically. See Docket 11; Docket 18.
Lapin alleges the following:
Lapin is a full-time traveling “digital nomad” who moves from place to place, generally internationally, in 30-day cycles, without a permanent residence in or out of the United States. See Docket 1 ¶ 2. Lapin received 108 commercial emails advertising auto insurance. See id. ¶¶ 5-7. Lapin alleges defendant “John Doe Sender” sent some of these emails to Lapin but does not know the identity of the other senders of the emails. See id. ¶¶ 9, 29. Lapin acknowledges EverQuote did not send these emails, but alleges EverQuote is the advertiser featured in them. Id ¶ 28.
EverQuote has its principal place of business in Massachusetts and is incorporated in Delaware. Id. ¶ 3. EverQuote “is in the business of generating [auto] insurance leads for [auto] insurance companies. Id. It is registered to do business in the State of South Dakota and has a registered agent in South Dakota. See id. ¶ 40, 45. On its website, it advertises South Dakota specific auto insurance, detailing the state's requirements. See id. ¶ 40
Lapin alleges 108 claims against John Doe Sender and EverQuote for various violations of SDCL § 37-24-47. For example Lapin alleges some of the emails have a third-party domain name without the third-party's permission. Docket 1 ¶ 28. Lapin also alleges that some of the emails' header information is misleading or false because some of the emails have untraceable domain names and some of the “to” field in the emails incorrectly indicate Lapin's email. Id. ¶ 29. He further alleges the “from” fields of the emails he received improperly failed to identify EverQuote as the advertiser of the emails and failed to identify the senders of the emails. Id. ¶ 30. Based on these alleged violations, Lapin seeks the statutory liquidated damages amount of $1,000 per email, as well as reasonable costs associated with filing and maintaining this action and for service of process. See Docket 1 ¶ 37; SDCL § 37-24-48.
The court first considers whether it has personal jurisdiction over EverQuote, because without personal jurisdiction, the court lacks authority over the defendant. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 577 (1999)(“[J]urisdiction generally must precede merits in dispositional order[.]”); Kangas v. Kieffer 495 Fed.App'x. 749, 750 (8th Cir. 2012) ().
“To survive a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff must plead ‘sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that the defendant[ ] can be subjected to jurisdiction within the state.' ” Creative Calling Sols., Inc. v. LF Beauty Ltd., 799 F.3d 975, 979 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting K-V Pharm. Co. v. J. Uriach & CIA, S.A., 648 F.3d 588, 591-92 (8th Cir. 2011) (alteration in original)). The plaintiff bears the burden to prove the court has personal jurisdiction. Fastpath, Inc. v. Arbela Techs. Corp., 760 F.3d 816, 820 (8th Cir. 2014). The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve factual conflicts in the plaintiff's favor. Id.
“A federal court may assume jurisdiction over a defendant in a diversity action if the forum State's long-arm statute permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction and that exercise is consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Creative Calling, 799 F.3d at 979. South Dakota's long-arm statute confers jurisdiction to the fullest extent allowed by the Due Process Clause, and thus the court need only determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction comports with due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. See SDCL § 15-7-2(14); see also Larson Mfg. Co. of S.D. v. Conn. Greenstar, Inc., 929 F.Supp.2d 924, 926 (D.S.D. 2013) (citing Dakota Indus., Inc. v. Ever Best Ltd., 28 F.3d 910, 915 (8th Cir. 1994)).
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits a state from exercising personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant unless that defendant has “minimum contacts” with the state such that maintaining the lawsuit “does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court must consider five factors to evaluate whether a defendant's actions sufficiently support personal jurisdiction:
(1) the nature and quality of the contacts with the forum state; (2) the quantity of those contacts; (3) the relationship of those contacts with the cause of action; (4) [South Dakota]'s interest in providing a forum for its residents; and (5) the convenience or inconvenience to the parties.
Myers v. Casino Queen, Inc., 689 F.3d 904, 911 (8th Cir. 2012). The third factor distinguishes between specific and general jurisdiction. Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 794 (8th Cir. 2010).
The first three factors carry significant weight, while the final two are less important. See Dever v. Hentzen Coatings, Inc., 380 F.3d 1070, 1074 (8th Cir. 2004). The court should not mechanically apply the test, as this determination “is not readily amenable to rigid rules that can be applied across the entire spectrum of cases.” Viasystems, Inc., v. EBM-Papst St. Georgen GmbH & Co., KG, 646 F.3d 589, 596 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Anderson v. Dassault Aviation, 361 F.3d 449, 452 (8th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted)).
Here, Lapin admits that there is no general personal jurisdiction, so the court need only determine whether the court can exercise specific jurisdiction over EverQuote. See Docket 19 at 2. For a court to exercise specific jurisdiction over the defendant, there must be a relationship between the forum, cause of action, and the defendant. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984). The defendant must purposefully direct its activities towards the forum state. See Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014).
Lapin argues that the court has jurisdiction over EverQuote based on the stream of commerce theory. See Docket 19 at 4-5. The Eighth Circuit has explained that “[p]ersonal jurisdiction may be found where a seller uses a distribution network to deliver its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that the products will be purchased by consumers in the forum state.” Stanton v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 340 F.3d 690, 694 (8th Cir. 2003). The stream of commerce analysis does not replace the five-factor test, but instead is “an overlay through which the five factors, or constitutional due process, may be viewed.” Estate of Moore v. Carroll, 159 F.Supp.3d 1002, 1012-13 (D.S.D. 2016) (collecting Eighth Circuit cases).
Before further discussing the stream of commerce doctrine, the court will address whether this doctrine is applicable to the instant case. Lapin's cause of action is not a products liability case. See Docket 1. Instead, Lapin claims violations of a state law that imposes certain requirements on commercial email advertisements. See SDCL § 37-24-47. Lapin argues that EverQuote is an advertiser under § 37-24-41(1), and that EverQuote placed its e-mail advertisements with various senders (John Doe or “various unknown senders”) who then sent them in violation of § 37-24-47. Docket 1 ¶¶ 29, 35. Essentially, he argues that EverQuote is like a manufacturer who places its product with a distributor, who then distributes the product.
At first glance, the stream of commerce analogy seems inept here, because according to Lapin, the actual advertisement that EverQuote placed in the stream of commerce is not itself the “defective product.” In other words, under Lapin's theory, the bodies of the emails do not themselves violate SDCL § 37-24-47, but rather the way the senders sent the advertisements to him forms the basis for liability. See Docket 1 ¶¶ 29, 35 (). Thus, applying the stream of commerce doctrine to this situation may appear akin to applying it to a case where the plaintiff sues a defendant manufacturer of a product, not because the product was defective per se, but because its seller misled the...
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