Laprocina v. Lourie

• Decision Date: 26 May 2021
• Docket Number: PC 13-6459,No. 2019-191-Appeal.,2019-191-Appeal.
• Citation: 250 A.3d 1281
• Parties: Jean LAPROCINA, as Administratrix of the Estate of George N. Laprocina v. Nicole C. LOURIE et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

250 A.3d 1281

Jean LAPROCINA, as Administratrix of the Estate of George N. Laprocina

v.Nicole C. LOURIE et al.

No. 2019-191-Appeal.

PC 13-6459

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

May 26, 2021

Mark A. Fay, Esq., for Plaintiff.

Mark P. Dolan, Esq., Mark P. Dolan, Jr., Esq., for Defendants.

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, and Lynch Prata, JJ.

Justice Goldberg, for the Court.

This case came before the Supreme Court on April 6, 2021, on appeal by the plaintiff, Jean Laprocina, as Administratrix of the Estate of George N. Laprocina,¹ from a Superior Court judgment in favor of the defendant, The Narragansett Electric Company (Narragansett), following the grant of Narragansett's motion for summary judgment.² On appeal, the plaintiff asserts that (1) the trial justice abused her discretion by granting Narragansett's motion for summary judgment after, according to the plaintiff, another justice of the Superior Court had denied essentially the same motion; (2) Narragansett had a duty to maintain and repair streetlights; and (3) questions of fact remained as to whether Narragansett was negligent and whether it had actual or constructive knowledge of the malfunctioning streetlight. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

Facts and Travel

The facts before us are tragic. On December 30, 2010, George Laprocina was walking across Allens Avenue at the intersection of Toronto Avenue in Providence, Rhode Island, when he was struck by a motor vehicle operated by defendant Nicole Lourie and owned by defendant Christine Lourie. The front passenger side of the vehicle impacted George, causing his head to strike the passenger side windshield. George suffered multiple bodily fractures, severe head trauma, and permanent brain damage.

In 2013, plaintiff commenced a negligence action in the Superior Court, and later filed an amended complaint alleging, inter alia , that the area where the collision occurred was not properly illuminated at the time of the incident because Narragansett allowed a "rolling blackout" to occur or failed to repair, replace, and maintain the streetlights in the area, which created a dangerous condition to pedestrians.

On October 22, 2014, Narragansett filed its initial motion for summary judgment, arguing that it owed no duty of care to George because its duty to maintain the streetlights in the area of the incident is governed by a tariff approved by the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission (the PUC streetlight tariff), which, Narragansett maintained, limits any duty owed by Narragansett regarding its rendered services solely to its customer—the City of Providence (the city). See R.I.P.U.C. No. 2031-A. The PUC streetlight tariff contains a disclaimer of liability, which states that Narragansett's "duties and obligations under this tariff extend only to the [city], and not to any third parties. [Narragansett] * * * specifically disclaims any liability to third parties arising out of [Narragansett]'s obligations to [the city] under this section." Id. at Sheet 6.

A hearing on the motion for summary judgment was held on February 9, 2016. The trial justice denied Narragansett's motion, finding that the liability disclaimer contained in the PUC streetlight tariff was overly broad in absolving Narragansett of liabilities in all situations—to wit, even in cases of willful or wanton misconduct—and was therefore contrary to public policy and not enforceable.

More than two years later, Narragansett filed a second motion for summary judgment based on new grounds and a purportedly expanded record. Narragansett argued that, under principles of common law negligence and contract law, it had no duty to George to maintain the streetlight in question. A hearing on Narragansett's second motion for summary judgment was held before a different trial justice. The second trial justice determined that the issue before her turned on a common law duty analysis and, after analyzing the factors outlined in the seminal case of Banks v. Bowen's Landing Corp. , 522 A.2d 1222 (R.I. 1987),³ she concluded that Narragansett did not owe a duty of care to George. The second trial justice entered an order granting Narragansett's motion for summary judgment on February 20, 2019, and defendant sought and received a judgment in accordance with Rule 54(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure; final judgment entered in favor of Narragansett on March 18, 2019. The plaintiff timely appealed from that judgment.

Standard of Review

This Court reviews a trial justice's grant of summary judgment de novo. Ballard v. SVF Foundation , 181 A.3d 27, 34 (R.I. 2018). "Although summary judgment is recognized as an extreme remedy, to avoid summary judgment the burden is on the nonmoving party to produce competent evidence that proves the existence of a disputed issue of material fact." Id. (brackets and deletion omitted) (quoting Sullo v. Greenberg , 68 A.3d 404, 407 (R.I. 2013) ). We, like the trial justice, "view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and if we conclude that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we will affirm the judgment." Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Sullo , 68 A.3d at 406-07 ).

Law of the Case Doctrine

We first address plaintiff's argument that, under the law of the case doctrine, the second trial justice abused her discretion in granting summary judgment after the first summary-judgment motion had been denied. We reject this contention.

"The law of the case doctrine provides that, ‘after a judge has decided an interlocutory matter in a pending suit, a second judge, confronted at a later stage of the suit with the same question in the identical manner, should refrain from disturbing the first ruling.’ " Lynch v. Spirit Rent-A-Car, Inc. , 965 A.2d 417, 424 (R.I. 2009) (quoting Chavers v. Fleet Bank (RI), N.A. , 844 A.2d 666, 677 (R.I. 2004) ). However, the law of the case doctrine "is a flexible rule" and "may be disregarded when a subsequent ruling can be based on an expanded record." Id. (quoting Chavers , 844 A.2d at 677 ). "When presented with an expanded record, it is within the trial justice's sound discretion whether to consider the issue." Felkner v. Rhode Island College , 203 A.3d 433, 445 (R.I. 2019) (quoting Ferguson v. Marshall Contractors, Inc. , 745 A.2d 147, 152 (R.I. 2000) ).

In 2014, Narragansett moved for summary judgment on the basis that it was immune from liability pursuant to the liability disclaimer contained in the PUC streetlight tariff. The trial justice denied that motion based on a determination that the liability disclaimer was void as against public policy because it absolved Narragansett of all liability with respect to third parties. Nearly four years after the filing of its first motion for summary judgment, Narragansett filed a second motion, on different grounds from the first, claiming it had no common law duty or contractual duty to repair the streetlight. As such, the second trial justice was confronted with what could be characterized as a different question that required a separate analysis. See Lynch , 965 A.2d at 424 (holding that law of the case doctrine did not preclude consideration of a second motion for summary judgment that was based on new arguments and an expanded record). Because the record reveals that different, although closely connected, arguments were raised and considered on each summary-judgment motion, we are satisfied that the judgment in this case was not issued in contravention of the law of the case doctrine.⁴

Duty

The primary issue on appeal is narrow: whether Narragansett owed a legal duty to George, a pedestrian, to maintain the streetlight in question.

To properly assert a claim for negligence, "a plaintiff must establish a legally cognizable duty owed by a defendant to a plaintiff, a breach of that duty, proximate causation between the conduct and the resulting injury, and the actual loss or damage." Ouch v. Khea , 963 A.2d 630, 633 (R.I. 2009) (quoting Selwyn v. Ward , 879 A.2d 882, 886 (R.I. 2005) ). "Although complaints sounding in negligence generally are not amenable to summary judgment and should be resolved by fact finding at the trial court, the existence of a duty is a question of law." Berard v. HCP, Inc. , 64 A.3d 1215, 1218 (R.I. 2013) ; see Ouch , 963 A.2d at 633 (noting that whether a defendant owes a plaintiff a duty of care "is a question of law to be determined by the court"). To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she is owed a legal duty by the defendant before they are "entitled to a factual determination on each of the remaining elements: breach, causation, and damages." Ouch , 963 A.2d at 633. In the absence of a legal duty, "the trier of fact has nothing to consider" and the grant of summary judgment is proper. Berard , 64 A.3d at 1218 (quoting Holley v. Argonaut Holdings, Inc. , 968 A.2d 271, 274 (R.I. 2009) ).

The plaintiff argues that Narragansett's duty to repair and maintain streetlights extends to individual members of the public. The plaintiff first asserts that the PUC streetlight tariff and the city's ordinances establish this duty—particularly, the city's duty to report inoperable streetlights to Narragansett and Narragansett's duty to replace them. The plaintiff claims that there is a "concerted partnership" between the city and Narragansett to report and repair streetlights.

Once the PUC adopts a tariff, it becomes the standard for determining the duties and obligations between a regulated public utility and its customer.⁵ See G.L. 1956 §§ 39-1-3 and 39-3-10. Narragansett provided streetlight services to the city pursuant to the PUC streetlight tariff that governs the terms of service, installation, maintenance, and payment for streetlight services. See R.I.P.U.C. No. 2031-A. The tariff provides: "All inoperable lamps which are owned and maintained by [Narragansett]...