Laramie National Bank of Laramie City v. Steinhoff

• Decision Date: 31 March 1903
• Citation: 11 Wyo. 290,71 P. 992
• Parties: LARAMIE NATIONAL BANK OF LARAMIE CITY v. STEINHOFF
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

71 P. 992

11 Wyo. 290

LARAMIE NATIONAL BANK OF LARAMIE CITY v. STEINHOFF

Supreme Court of Wyoming

March 31, 1903

On rehearing, August 3, 1903.

Rehearing Denied 11 Wyo. 290 at 311.

ERROR to the District Court, Albany County, HON. CHARLES W. BRAMEL Judge.

Philip A. Steinhoff instituted the action to vacate a judgment previously rendered in an action brought against him by the Laramie National Bank of Laramie City. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiff the defendant prosecuted error. The material facts are stated in the opinion.

Judgment affirmed.

N. E Corthell, for plaintiff in error.

It is not contended that the rights of the parties could not have changed after the rendition of the judgment, or that no case could be made which would justify or require the court to set aside so much of it as was injunctive and prospective in its operation. We submit, however, that it is at least equally clear that the plaintiff can have relief against the judgment in but one of two ways: First, by showing that the judgment was, at the time, a nullity; or, second, by showing facts since the judgment by which (a) the bank's title has been divested and (b) a new title given to the plaintiff. We think it clear that the judgment was not a nullity.

The District Court is a superior court of general jurisdiction. Every presumption is in favor of its jurisdiction and none are against it. (Manier v. Trumbo, F. C. No. 18309; Butcher v. Bank, 2 Kan., 80; Suiter v Turner, 10 Ia. 526; Holmes v. Campbell, 12 Minn. 221; Welch v. Sykes, 3 Gilman, 197; Galpin v. Page, 85 U.S. 350; Sullivan v. Vail, 42 Conn. 90; Bridgman v. Wilcutt, 4 Greene, 563; Kenny v. Greer, 13 Ill. 432; Dodge v. Cole, 97 Ill. 338; Gramm v. Fisher, 4 Wyo. 1; Reynolds v. Manhattan Trust Co., 109 F. 97.)

The argument submitted by counsel for the plaintiff, when analyzed, will be found, not so much to question the jurisdiction of the court, as the rightfulness of its determination; in other words, it is insisted that the court's judgment is void, not because it had no right to render any judgment, but because it rendered an erroneous judgment. This argument would be pertinent upon appeal seasonably taken in the original case--a remedy which the plaintiff allowed to go by. It is not a valid argument for the vacation or even the modification of the judgment in another suit. (1 Black on Judgments, 329.) Nor can this argument be supported upon any ground which might have been pleaded in defense in the original action. The judgment is binding and conclusive, not only as to the defenses made, but upon all that existed and might have been made in the original suit. (1 Black on Judgments, 330; Seaman v. Ins Co., 86 F. 498; Foltz v. Ry. Co., 60 F. 316; Ry. Co. v. Homestead Co., 123 U.S. 552; Insley v. U.S. 150 U.S. 512.)

We should have no hesitation in upholding the original judgment as essentially a righteous and just determination of the rights of the parties as they stood at the time of that litigation; but it would be a waste of time to enter upon such an inquiry, as the question of the rightfulness or wrongfulness of the judgment cannot come before the court in this case.

If the District Court could in any case review its own judgments, and decide anew upon the subject matter, surely it could not and would not do so without having all the original facts and issues properly pleaded and set before it. To set aside a judgment without looking into the grounds upon which it rested would be contrary to the fundamental idea of judicial power, which hears before it condemns and examines before it decides. The court could not have reached the result it did in the present case unless it set out with the presumption that the judgment was wrong, and that the court's jurisdiction was a thing to be shown, rather than to be assumed until successfully attacked.

Stripped of all unnecessary and unessential adjuncts, the former suit was simply an action, by a private owner in possession, to quiet title to a tract of land within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Such an action is especially authorized by statute, as well as within the general equitable jurisdiction of the court. (R. S., Sec. 4104.) The requirements of pleadings in such an action are of the simplest character. (Durell v. Abbott, 6 Wyo., 265.)

The state of the title at the time of the original litigation does not appear in this action, and counsel would not be justified even in assuming that the United States had not then issued a patent. But, though this assumption were indulged, it would not alter the case. The question of the jurisdiction of courts to hear and determine controversies between private parties concerning the title to public land does not depend upon the issuance of patent. In a recent case, which is much relied upon by counsel for the plaintiff, neither party had a patent, and it was not even suggested that this fact affected the jurisdiction of the court. (Orchard v. Alexander, 157 U.S. 372.)

And this court itself has entertained at least three cases of this character, including the consideration, for another purpose, of the particular judgment sought to be vacated in this action. (Caldwell v. Bush, 6 Wyo., 342; Delles v. Second Nat. Bank, 7 Wyo., 66; Laramie Nat. Bank v. Steinhoff, 7 Wyo. 464.)

Assuming, then, that the first ground taken by the court below in its decision of the present case, viz., that the original judgment was without jurisdiction and a nullity, is not well taken, and that the judgment, at the time it was rendered, was within the jurisdiction of the court, it is submitted in the second place that the judgment was conclusive and binding upon the parties as to the question involved in that litigation. It settled, as between the parties, the title to the land as it stood at that time. Its decree that the bank was then the owner of the land, necessarily determined in its favor, every fact essential to its title and upon which its claim was founded. It specifically, among other things, established intact the final certificate under which the bank derived its title. Whatever proceedings might afterwards be taken to affect such title, Steinhoff could not afterwards insist upon any proceedings which had been taken before that time. If the decision of the case involved the consideration of the proceedings of the land office in a cancellation of the final certificate, attempted prior to that time, the court had unquestionable power to consider and determine such question. (Cornelius v. Kessel, 128 U.S. 456; Lindsey v. Hawes, 67 U.S. 554; Garland v. Wynn, 61 U.S. 6; Turner v. Sawyer, 150 U.S. 578; Johnson v. Towsley, 80 U.S. 72; Delles v. Sec. Nat. Bank, 7 Wyo., 66; Parsons v. Venzke, 164 U.S. 89; Carroll v. Safford, 3 How., 460; Shepley v. Cowan, 91 U.S. 343; Lytle v. Arkansas, 9 How., 333; Barnard v. Ashley, 59 U.S. 43.)

There remains to be considered but one other question, viz.: Do the facts alleged in the petition, and not denied or met by new matter in the answer, which have occurred subsequent to the rendition of the judgment in question, change the rights of the parties? That is, do they show, first, that the title of the bank then established has been destroyed, and, second, that a new and better title has been created in Steinhoff? Certainly nothing short of this showing could justify the court in setting aside that judgment.

The plaintiff relies for this purpose solely upon the acceptance of his final proof and the issuance of a patent to him. But the acceptance of such final proof and the issuance of such patent are, in themselves, of no force against a third party.

It is argued that the presumptions indulged in favor of the regularity of the acts of the land office are sufficient to conclude the bank. Speaking of such presumptions, in an analogous case, the Supreme Court of the United States says: "In no case have they been held sufficient where the fact in issue was, whether the Government had any title to convey, to establish the fact in dispute as against parties claiming a pre-existing, adverse and paramount title in themselves. All that can be reasonably or lawfully claimed as the effect of such documents of title is that they passed such estate, and such estate only, as the Government itself, in whose name and on whose behalf the official acts appear to have been done, had at the time, and not to conclude the fact that the estate conveyed was lawfully vested in the grantor at the time of the grant." (Sabariego v. Maverick, 124 U.S. 261, and see Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360.)

It is alleged in the answer that the plaintiff's final proof and patent were wholly based upon his homestead entry, made before the original litigation, and the validity of which was drawn in question, tried and determined in favor of the bank in that litigation. Of such right, it is said that "the holder of a legal title in bad faith must always yield to a superior equity. As against the United States, his title may be good, but not as against one who had acquired a prior right from the United States, in force when his purchase was made under which his patent issued." (Widdicomb v. Childers, 124 U.S. 405.)

Groesbeck & Carpenter, for defendant in error.

The action to set aside this judgment is a civil action under our code. It is akin to the action of Audita Querela under the common law, or under the ancient equity practice, which was the name of a writ constituting the initial process in an action brought by a judgment defendant to obtain relief against the consequences of the judgment on account of some matter of defense or discharge arising since its rendition, and which could not be taken advantage of otherwise. (1 Ency. Law (1st Ed.), 1003; 3 Ency. Pl. & Pr., 113, et seq.)

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