LaRosa v. Johnston
Decision Date | 09 September 1997 |
Docket Number | No. 2735,2735 |
Citation | 328 S.C. 293,493 S.E.2d 100 |
Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
Parties | Linda LaROSA, Respondent, v. Debra JOHNSTON, Appellant. . Heard |
Thomas E. Lydon, of Simmons, Griffin & Lydon, L.L.P., Columbia, for appellant.
Frank S. Potts, of Lide, Montgomery, Potts & Medlock, P.C., Columbia, for respondent.
This is an action by Linda LaRosa to collect funds to satisfy a judgment against Debra Johnston. The master-in-equity ordered that the judgment be paid after the ten year statute of limitations on LaRosa's judgment expired. Johnston appeals the master's decision. We reverse.
LaRosa obtained a default judgment for $5,744.00 against Johnston which the Richland County Clerk of Court filed on March 11, 1986. Johnston did not have the funds to satisfy the judgment. In 1989, however, Johnston stood to inherit enough money from her mother's will to pay LaRosa's judgment. Before Johnston collected her inheritance, however, her mother's will became involved in protracted litigation which was unrelated to this case.
On April 15, 1991, LaRosa instituted supplemental proceedings to have the circuit court issue a rule to show cause and order of reference demanding that Johnston appear before a master in equity to explain why her inheritance should not be used to satisfy LaRosa's judgment. On July 18, 1991, the personal representative of Johnston's mother's estate was also added to the rule to show cause. On September 20, 1991, the personal representative from the estate agreed to a consent order which permanently enjoined any distribution to Johnston without a court order.
On February 26, 1996, LaRosa moved the court for an order to appoint a receiver to collect and appropriately distribute an amount from Johnston's inheritance to satisfy her judgment. During the hearing, Johnston, appearing pro se, indicated her consent to the payment of LaRosa's judgment from the distribution of her mother's estate. Specifically, Johnston stated that On March 15, 1996, the master signed a written order authorizing the personal representative of Johnston's mother's estate to pay LaRosa's judgment. The clerk filed the order on March 18, 1996.
Johnston subsequently filed a motion to alter, amend, and vacate the master's order. The master denied Johnston's motion. Johnston appealed the master's decision.
On appeal, Johnston argues that the master erred in denying her motion to alter, amend, and vacate his order, because LaRosa's judgment against Johnston expired on March 11, 1996--ten years after the judgment was filed. We agree.
"A judgment represents a judicial declaration that a judgment debtor is personally indebted to a judgment creditor for a sum of money." Wells v. Sutton, 299 S.C. 19, 22, 382 S.E.2d 14, 16 (Ct.App.1989) (citing Ducker v. Standard Supply Co., Inc., 280 S.C. 157, 311 S.E.2d 728 (1984)). South Carolina Code section 15-39-30, which governs the duration of judgments, states:
Executions may issue upon final judgments or decrees at any time within ten years from the date of the original entry thereof and shall have active energy during such period, without any renewal or renewals thereof, and this whether any return may or may not have been made during such period on such executions.
S.C.Code Ann. § 15-39-30 (1976) (emphasis added). South Carolina courts have consistently held that a judgment is utterly extinguished ten years from the date of entry. Hardee v. Lynch, 212 S.C. 6, 46 S.E.2d 179 (1948); TranSouth Fin. Corp. v. Cochran, 324 S.C. 290, 478 S.E.2d 63 (Ct.App.1996); Wells, 299 S.C. at 22, 382 S.E.2d at 16; cf. Garrison v. Owens, 258 S.C. 442, 189 S.E.2d 31 (1972) ( ).
LaRosa's judgment did not become effective until the clerk filed it on March 11, 1986. Rule 58(a), SCRCP () ; see also Bayne v. Bass, 302 S.C. 208, 394 S.E.2d 726 (Ct.App.1990) ( ). Starting on March 11, 1986, the judgment was good until March 11, 1996. S.C.Code Ann. § 15-39-30 (1976). The master's order compelling payment of LaRosa's judgment from Johnston's mother's estate was not final until it was filed on March 18, 1996. Rule 58(a), SCRCP. Because the judgment expired before the entry of the master's order, there was nothing upon which LaRosa could execute.
LaRosa argues that Johnston's consent to payment before the judgment expired should bar Johnston from challenging the master's order compelling payment after the judgment expired. We disagree.
Unquestionably, Johnston consented to the payment before the judgment expired. Johnston notes that when she conceded to payment, she "had no basis for challenging [LaRosa's] judgment." Moreover, Johnston's consent never mentioned extending the statutory limitation of LaRosa's judgment. When the judgment expired, Johnston acquired a statutory defense that had previously been unavailable. We are not going to penalize Johnston for failing to raise a defense which she could not have raised. See Wagner v. Wagner, 286 S.C. 489, 335 S.E.2d 246 (Ct.App.1985) ( ). Thus, Johnston's bare consent to payment before the expiration of the judgment did not affect her rights after the judgment expired.
We note, however, that under certain circumstances the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be a valid check against misleading statements intended to delay execution until after the statutory period.
The essential elements of an equitable estoppel as related to the party estopped are: (1) Conduct which amounts to a false representation or concealment of material facts, or, at least, which is calculated to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently attempts to assert; (2) intention, or at least expectation, that such conduct shall be acted upon by the other party; (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts. As related to the party claiming the estoppel, they are: (1) Lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question; (2) reliance upon the conduct of the party estopped; and (3) action based thereon of such a character as to change his position prejudicially.
South Carolina Nat'l Bank, Greenville v. Hammond, 260 S.C. 622, 630, 198 S.E.2d 123, 128 (1973). Nothing in the record establishes that Johnston's consent amounted to a false representation. As stated before, at the time of her consent, Johnston "had no basis for challenging [LaRosa's] judgment." Even assuming that Johnston's consent was a misleading statement coupled with intent and full knowledge, nothing in the record indicates that LaRosa relied on Johnston's statement. Therefore, equitable estoppel is inapplicable in this case.
LaRosa also argues that the 1991 permanent injunction effectively attached Johnston's inheritance. We disagree.
"[E]xecution is [the] only process to enforce the judgment." Cheraw & C.R. Co. v. Marshall, 40 S.C. 59, 63, 18 S.E. 247, 249 (1893). The funds on which LaRosa sought to execute constituted personal property. 1 South Carolina Code section 15-39-100 states, "Executions shall not bind the...
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