LaRou v. Ridlon
| Decision Date | 31 July 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-1229,96-1229 |
| Citation | 98 F.3d 659 |
| Parties | Charles LAROU, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Wesley RIDLON, in his official and individual capacity as Sheriff of Cumberland County, Defendant, Appellee. . Heard |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Stuart Tisdale, Portland, ME, for appellant.
William R. Fisher, with whom Monaghan, Leahy, Hochadel & Libby was on brief, for appellee.
Before TORRUELLA, Chief Judge, CYR and LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
Appellant Charles LaRou challenges the district court's summary judgment rulings rejecting his political discrimination claims against Cumberland County (Maine) Sheriff Wesley Ridlon. We affirm the district court judgment.
Approximately two years after LaRou joined the Cumberland County Sheriff's Department ("Department") in April 1989, he was designated "Lieutenant, Programs Coordinator" by Sheriff Ridlon. Previously, Ridlon had told LaRou that one of his new responsibilities would be to gather adverse information that might enable Ridlon to fire Sergeant Christopher Muse, whom Ridlon considered a political rival. 2 LaRou responded that he would keep his eyes open, but would not participate in a witch hunt. Despite repeated requests from Ridlon, LaRou reported no adverse information about Muse. Ridlon nevertheless appointed LaRou to a captaincy and made him the Administrative Aide responsible for inmate programs and officer training (Administrative Aide/Programs) in October 1991.
In November 1993, however, all three captains in the Department, including LaRou, were reassigned to newly-created "shift commander" positions. The transfer memo stated that the shift commander assignments were to remain in effect until further notice. LaRou regarded his new night shift commander assignment as a temporary demotion, even though he had been relieved of all training program duties and a Ridlon political supporter had been appointed to succeed him as Administrative Aide/Programs. LaRou was never told that he would or would not be redesignated Administrative Aide/Programs.
In December 1993, Sergeant Muse first informed LaRou that he intended to run against Ridlon for the Democratic nomination for Sheriff. Although LaRou thereafter actively supported the Muse campaign, Ridlon ultimately won both the Democratic nomination and, on June 14, 1994, a second term as Sheriff.
In January 1995, while still serving as the night shift commander, LaRou saw a posting for the position of "Programs Manager," which he believed to be essentially identical to his previous position of Administrative Aide/Programs. LaRou promptly contacted the Cumberland County Personnel Manager, who advised that as far as Cumberland County was concerned LaRou was still the Administrative Aide/Programs. LaRou did not apply for the newly-posted position, however, because he felt that it remained his by right and that he was being forced out by Ridlon in retaliation for supporting Muse in the 1994 political campaign.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, Velez-Gomez, 8 F.3d at 874-75, and will affirm it if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). As a nonpolicymaking governmental employee, LaRou could only avert summary judgment on his political discrimination claim--
by pointing to evidence in the record which, if credited, would permit a rational fact finder to conclude that the challenged personnel action occurred and stemmed from a politically based discriminatory animus.... Without more, a nonmoving plaintiff-employee's unsupported and speculative assertions regarding political discrimination will not be enough to survive summary judgment.
Rivera-Cotto v. Rivera, 38 F.3d 611, 614 (1st Cir.1994) (citations omitted).
LaRou claims on appeal that Ridlon (i) knew Muse planned to oppose Ridlon in the 1994 primary, see supra note 2, (ii) Ridlon originally promoted LaRou with instructions to find grounds for dismissing Muse, and (iii) LaRou ultimately was "demoted" for failing to provide Ridlon with adverse information about Muse and for forming instead a successful working relationship with Muse. The 1993 retaliation claim fails, however, even assuming Ridlon caused LaRou to be "demoted" based on a retaliatory motive, since LaRou was engaged in no protected political activity at the time.
The First Amendment protects nonpolicymaking public employees from discrimination based on their political beliefs or affiliation. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980). See also Romero-Barcelo v. Hernandez-Agosto, 75 F.3d 23, 34 (1st Cir.1996). The plaintiff-employee in a political retaliation case "must bear the threshold burden of producing sufficient direct or circumstantial evidence from which a jury reasonably may infer that [his] constitutionally protected conduct ... was a 'substantial' or 'motivating' factor behind" the adverse employment action taken by the defendant official. Acevedo-Diaz v. Aponte, 1 F.3d 62, 66 (1st Cir.1993). The burden then shifts to the defendant official to articulate a nondiscriminatory basis for the adverse employment action, and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the adverse action would have been taken regardless of any discriminatory political motivation. Id. See also Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 576, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977).
Under the Mt. Healthy burden-shifting analysis, LaRou's retaliation claim falters at the outset. In similar circumstances, see Correa-Martinez v. Arrillaga-Belendez, 903 F.2d 49 (1st Cir.1990), we rejected a political discrimination claim that an administrator had been constructively discharged from the judicial branch of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico due to his prior association with a former judge who held political views at odds with the defendant officials. We explained that--
a politically charged atmosphere ..., without more, provide[s] no basis for a reasonable inference that defendants' employment decisions about plaintiff were tainted by their disregard of plaintiff's first amendment rights. Absent a constitutionally protected aspect, a "close relationship" with a third party is insufficient ... notwithstanding that consideration of the third party's political beliefs may have entered into the decisionmaking calculus.
Id. at 58 (citation omitted). As we stressed in Correa-Martinez, the plaintiff is required to show that "a causal connection exists linking defendants' conduct, as manifested in the adverse employment decision, to plaintiff's politics." Id. See also Aviles-Martinez v. Monroig, 963 F.2d 2, 5 (1st Cir.1992) ().
LaRou claims he was "demoted" to night shift commander because he did not abide by Ridlon's instructions to gather information which would enable Ridlon to fire Muse. LaRou does not claim, however, nor does the record indicate, that LaRou provided Muse with political support prior to his alleged "demotion" in November 1993. Although Ridlon and Muse had had political differences as early as 1990, as of November 1993 Ridlon and LaRou had not; and LaRou does not claim that he then knew Muse intended to oppose Ridlon. 4 Thus, for aught that appears in the record, LaRou's relationship with Muse in November 1993 was not political.
LaRou himself asserts that he chose not to provide Ridlon with adverse information about Muse because he and Muse had developed a successful professional relationship, which resulted in many noteworthy advances in officer-training procedures. Conspicuously absent is any suggestion that LaRou was motivated by Muse's political plans, affiliation, or beliefs. 5 Since the record does not disclose that LaRou was engaged in any protected political activity, the alleged "demotion" in November 1993 did not give rise to a cognizable political discrimination claim even assuming Ridlon's adverse employment action was based on his political differences with Muse, and he took those differences out on LaRou. See Correa-Martinez, 903 F.2d at 58.
LaRou attempts to assert a discrete retaliation claim in connection with the January 1995 posting of the "Programs Manager" position. Up until that time, LaRou says, he had believed that his November 1993 "demotion" to night shift commander was merely temporary, and that he would be returned to his former position some day. He adds that the position title was changed at the time of the posting in January 1995 to justify his final removal, and that his "permanent" loss of the position in 1995 was in retaliation for his support of Muse's 1994 bid for Sheriff. The 1995 retaliation claim nonetheless fails because LaRou was subjected to no cognizable adverse employment action as a result of the simple posting of the "Programs Manager" position in January 1995. See Connell v. Bank of Boston, 924 F.2d 1169, 1179 (1st...
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