Larson v. GD Searle & Co.
| Decision Date | 28 March 1988 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 4-87-154. |
| Citation | 683 F. Supp. 1277 |
| Parties | Lisa Ann LARSON, Plaintiff, v. G.D. SEARLE & COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
Michael V. Ciresi, Roger P. Brosnahan, David L. Suggs, Roberta Walburn of Robins, Zelle, Larson & Kaplan, Minneapolis, Minn., for plaintiff.
Michael Berens, Madge S. Thorsen, Paula D. Osborn of Oppenheimer, Wolff & Donnelly, Minneapolis, Minn., for defendant.
Before the Court is defendant's motion, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2), to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction over defendant. In the alternative, defendant urges transfer of the case to the United States District Court in Iowa.
Plaintiff Larson is an Iowa citizen residing in Iowa. Defendant Searle is a corporation existing in, and incorporated under, Delaware law. Searle's principal place of business is in the state of Illinois. For purposes of this motion, Searle does not deny that it transacts business in Minnesota, has committed acts within the state, and has "minimum contacts" with Minnesota.
Plaintiff's Complaint and affidavit allege the following facts: On April 12, 1978, Larson was inserted with a Cu-7 at a medical clinic in Dubuque, Iowa. On July 25, 1980, clinic doctors removed the Cu-7 in response to Larson's complaints of severe cramping, heavy bleeding and intermenstrual spotting.
Subsequently, between March 6, 1985 and October 4, 1985, Larson was treated by various Iowa physicians for infertility. When she failed to become pregnant after those efforts, she was referred to the in vitro fertilization program at the University of Minnesota Hospital in Minneapolis.
Larson came to Minnesota for an initial examination at the University Hospital on January 13, 1986. She immediately returned to Iowa. She returned to the hospital on February 7, 1986 and stayed in Minnesota until February 25, 1986. During this time, Drs. Nagel and Tagatz performed a laproscopy for ovum retrieval. Four eggs were retrieved, fertilized and transferred back into Larson's uterus. Following the procedures, she again returned to Iowa.
These efforts at impregnation also failed. She has had no further medical treatment in Minnesota. On August 19, 1987 she placed her name on the waiting list for participation in a newly opened in vitro fertilization program at the University of Iowa.
The Complaint does not plead a specific nexus between Searle's acts in Minnesota and plaintiff's cause of action. Instead, the Complaint states only that Searle promoted and sold the Cu-7 and other pharmaceutical products in Minnesota.
Defendant contends that Larson's case in this forum must be dismissed because her claims do not arise from Searle's transaction of business or commission of acts occurring in Minnesota. According to defendant, such a nexus between defendant's forum state actions and plaintiff's cause of action is required by the Minnesota long-arm statute. Minn.Stat. § 543.19, subds. 1(b) and 3.
Upon careful review, the Court concludes that regardless of whether subdivision 3 indeed limits the extraterritorial reach of the Minnesota long-arm statute somewhere short of the full extent authorized by due process, there is a sufficient nexus between defendant's forum contacts and plaintiff's cause of action to justify assertion of jurisdiction consistent with Minn.Stat. § 543.19, subds. 1(b) and 3.
Moreover, although this case is in many ways more closely connected to Iowa than Minnesota, the balance of interests in favor of transfer is not so strong as to override plaintiff's choice of forum. Accordingly, this Court will deny defendant's motion to dismiss, as well as defendant's motion to transfer.
In order for this Court to exercise diversity jurisdiction, the Court must find not only that the exercise of personal jurisdiction, be it "specific" or "general," comports with due process, but also that service of process is authorized by the Minnesota long-arm statute. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980).
Minnesota's long-arm statute authorizes personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations which transact business within this state. Minn.Stat. § 543.19, subd. 1(b) provides:
Minn.Stat. § 543.19, subd. 3. A literal reading and application of this nexus requirement would clearly defeat personal jurisdiction unless plaintiff establishes that her claims arise out of G.D. Searle's business activities in Minnesota.
It is now well established that fundamental due process rights are not offended solely because a cause of action does not arise out of, or relate to, the foreign corporation's activities in the forum state. General jurisdiction is constitutionally appropriate provided that there are sufficient contacts between the state and the defendant corporation. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984). One issue before the Court is whether the explicit nexus requirement of Minn.Stat. § 543.19, subd. 3 limits the reach of the Minnesota long-arm statute somewhere short of the maximum permitted by current due process principles.
No Minnesota Supreme Court case has held the subdivision 3 nexus requirement an absolute bar to personal jurisdiction where a defendant has otherwise substantial enough forum contacts to satisfy due process. In contrast, at least five Minnesota Supreme Court decisions suggest that the "arising from" language of subdivision 3 does not preclude the assertion of jurisdiction where defendant's contacts with this state, although unrelated to a plaintiff's cause of action, are nonetheless so significant as to make it fair and reasonable that defendant appear in the forum.
In Franklin Mfg. Co. v. Union Pacific R. Co., 297 Minn. 181, 210 N.W.2d 227 (1973), a Minnesota corporation sued a foreign railroad company for damages resulting from the misrouting of a shipment of insulating materials which originated in Kansas. The defendant railroad had for an extended period of time maintained an office in Minnesota for the purpose of soliciting freight shipments for carriage on some part of its line. The defendant did not own transportation lines in the state, but did own railroad rolling stock which it authorized other companies to bring into Minnesota. The court stated:
That plaintiff's asserted cause of action did not arise out of defendant's contacts with Minnesota is not unimportant. Were it otherwise, the issue would probably not have been raised. This nevertheless does not prevent this state from taking jurisdiction, provided the other factors weigh sufficiently in favor of it.
Id. at 184, 210 N.W.2d at 230.
Similarly, in Northwestern National Bank of St. Paul v. Kratt, 303 Minn. 256, 226 N.W.2d 910 (1975), the court held that an Illinois guarantor who had guaranteed a loan made by a Minnesota bank on property in Minnesota had transacted business within the state sufficient to satisfy Minn Stat. § 543.19, subds. 1(b) and 3, notwithstanding that his Minnesota business transactions did not, in the strictest sense, give rise to the cause of action based on the signing of the guarantee itself. The guarantor had discussed a mortgage over the phone with bank officials and attended meetings concerning the transaction in Minnesota. The court stated that "defendant's contention that his activities must give rise to this particular cause of action, based upon the signing of the guaranty itself, construes the statute more strictly than was intended by the legislature." 303 Minn. at 261, 226 N.W.2d at 914.
In Hardrives, Inc. v. City of LaCrosse, 307 Minn. 290, 240 N.W.2d 814, (1976), the court held that "where contacts are substantial with respect both to quantity and quality, it is not essential to find that they are also related to the cause of action." Id. at 298, 240 N.W.2d at 819. The Court also concluded, however, that plaintiff's cause of action arose "at least in part out of defendant's contacts with the state." Id.
In Marquette National Bank v. Norris, 270 N.W.2d 290 (Minn.1978), the court went so far as to state that "where § 543.19, subd. 1(b) is concerned, the statutory and constitutional requirements for exercise of personal jurisdiction are coextensive." Id. at 291.
Most recently, in Rostad v. On-Deck, 372 N.W.2d 717 (Minn.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1006, 106 S.Ct. 528, 88 L.Ed.2d 460 (1985), the court held that Minnesota can exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation which sells products in Minnesota through distributors under a "stream of commerce" theory, even where the resident plaintiff could not show how the particular product arrived in the state. As in Hardrives, the Rostad court noted that the legislature intended the long arm statute to have the maximum extraterritorial effect allowed under due process. Id. at 719.
While these cases, collectively, counsel in favor of asserting jurisdiction, the Court is troubled that none declared the subdivision 3 nexus requirement superfluous or expressly endorsed the concept of general jurisdiction. The Texas Supreme Court did precisely this in the case u...
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Bielicki v. Empire Stevedoring Co., Ltd.
...Northwestern National Bank of St. Paul v. Kratt, 303 Minn. 256, 261 226 N.W.2d 910, 914 (1975); see also Larson v. G.D. Searle & Co., 683 F.Supp. 1277, 1279-80 (D.Minn. 1988) (discussing Rostad, Norris, Hardrives, and Kratt), the Minnesota Court of Appeals along with a number of Minnesota D......
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Bielicki v. Empire Stevedoring Co., Ltd.
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