Lash v. City of Traverse City
| Citation | 479 Mich. 180,735 N.W.2d 628 |
| Decision Date | 18 July 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 131632 (Calendar No. 3).,131632 (Calendar No. 3). |
| Parties | Joseph LASH, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF TRAVERSE CITY, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
At issue in this case is the proper construction of MCL 15.602, a statute that limits the restrictions public employers may make regarding employee residency. While the statute does not allow an employer to require an employee to live in any specific geographic area, it does permit a public employer to require that an employee reside within a distance of 20 miles or more from the public employer's nearest boundary.
Plaintiff alleges that he was denied employment with defendant because the city imposed a residency requirement and measured the requirement in "road miles" rather than "radial miles."1 When measured in road miles, the distance between plaintiff's residence and defendant's nearest boundary was greater than that allowed by the city's residency requirement. Plaintiff contends that this residency requirement violates MCL 15.602(2), and seeks monetary damages for defendant's refusal to hire him.
We hold that the 20-mile distance permitted in MCL 15.602(2) is to be measured in a straight line between the employee's place of residence and the nearest boundary of the public employer. Because defendant's residency requirement demands that an employee reside within 15 radial miles of the nearest city limit, defendant's residency requirement contravenes MCL 15.602(2).
However, while defendant has violated the statute, nothing in the statute permits plaintiff to maintain a private cause of action for money damages. Moreover, no private right of action to recover money damages may be inferred because defendant is a governmental entity that is entitled to immunity unless the Legislature has explicitly authorized suits by citizens against the governmental entity.
We therefore hold that there is no private right of action for a violation of MCL 15.602(2). The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and we remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Plaintiff, a police sergeant with the city of Flint, responded to an advertisement seeking applicants for patrol officers with defendant's police department. The advertisement expressly outlined defendant's residency requirement: "A residency requirement of 15 miles radius, or 20 road miles, from the nearest City limit will be enforced for selected candidates."2
Plaintiff was interviewed in December 2002. Subsequently, he received a letter indicating that his interview was successful and that further action would be taken as vacancies arose. The following month, plaintiff purchased a 30-acre parcel of property in Thompsonville, Michigan. The property is located outside the 20-mile limit if measured in road miles, but is within the 20-mile limit if measured in radial miles.
In August 2003, after the candidate list expired, defendant again solicited applicants for patrol officers, outlining the same residency requirement. Plaintiff reapplied and was reinterviewed for the position. In March 2004, plaintiff was offered conditional employment, contingent on his passing a physical examination, a physical endurance test, and a psychological examination.3
As part of a routine preemployment background investigation, defendant discovered that plaintiff's property was 23 road miles from the nearest city limit. Plaintiff was advised that the hiring process would not continue unless he complied with defendant's residency requirement. Plaintiff refused to meet the residency requirement and suggested that the city renegotiate the collective bargaining agreement to relax the requirement. Plaintiff's suggestion was rejected. Because plaintiff refused to comply with defendant's residency requirement, defendant rescinded the conditional offer of employment and cancelled the scheduled testing.
In September 2004, plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit against defendant, seeking only monetary damages for defendant's "unlawful failure to hire" him. Plaintiff claimed that defendant's residency requirement violated MCL 15.602 because it required plaintiff to reside closer than 20 miles from defendant's nearest boundary as measured on a radial basis.
Defendant moved for summary disposition, claiming that its residency requirement was valid because the proper measurement under the statute was road miles, and that plaintiff's property did not fall within the requirement. Defendant further argued that plaintiff had failed to state a claim because the statute did not create a private cause of action. Lastly, defendant argued that plaintiff suffered no compensable damages because he continued to work as a Flint police officer, earning greater wages than he would have earned with defendant. In addition to suffering no wage loss, defendant noted that plaintiff's Thompsonville property had appreciated in value.
In response, plaintiff observed that MCL 15.602 did not specify road miles as the proper basis of measurement, and contended that a private cause of action was permissible because it provided the only effective redress for the statutory violation. While plaintiff did not claim wage loss damages, he insisted that he had incurred other monetary damages, including mileage expenses incurred during the two employment interviews, "continuing private school expenses" for his children in Flint, costs associated with the purchase and repair of the Thompsonville property, and damages related to his spouse's claimed lost job opportunity in Flint.
The trial court granted summary disposition to defendant, holding that the statutory distance was properly measured in road miles, because the "purpose of the statute" was to ensure that an employee could travel to work within a reasonable time. The trial court also held that a private cause of action could be maintained because there was "no other way to enforce" the statute.
In a published opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.4 Regarding the proper means of measurement, two members of the panel held that the distance provided in MCL 15.602(2) was to be measured in radial miles rather than road miles. A different configuration of panel members held that the statute permitted a private cause of action for money damages. This Court granted defendant's application for leave to appeal.5
Addressing the issues presented in this case requires that we interpret MCL 15.602. Issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law that this Court reviews de novo.6 Similarly, we review the trial court's decision to grant or deny summary disposition de novo.7
When interpreting a statute, our primary obligation is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature.8 To do so, we begin with the language of the statute, ascertaining the intent that may reasonably be inferred from its language.9 When the language of a statute is unambiguous, the Legislature's intent is clear and judicial construction is neither necessary nor permitted.10
MCL 15.602 states in relevant part as follows:
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a public employer shall not require, by collective bargaining agreement or otherwise, that a person reside within a specified geographic area or within a specified distance or travel time from his or her place of employment as a condition of employment or promotion by the public employer.
(2) Subsection (1) does not prohibit a public employer from requiring, by collective bargaining agreement or otherwise, that a person reside within a specified distance from the nearest boundary of the public employer. However, the specified distance shall be 20 miles or another specified distance greater than 20 miles.
* * *
(4) Subsection (1) does not apply if the person is a volunteer or paid on-call firefighter, an elected official, or an unpaid appointed official.
The plain language of § 1 describes the general prohibition against residency requirements — a public employer "shall not require" that a person reside within a specific geographic area or within a specific distance or travel time from the employee's workplace as a condition of employment.
While § 1 indicates what a public employer may not require, § 2 provides an exception and describes what residency limitations a public employer may require as a condition of employment. Under § 2, an employer may require that an employee reside within a specified distance from the nearest boundary of the public employer, without regard to the employee's place of employment, as long as that specified distance is 20 miles or greater.
Lastly, § 4 describes the categories of employees to whom the general prohibition against residency requirements described in § 1 is never applicable. A public employer may require on-call firefighters, elected officials, and unpaid appointed officials to reside in a specific geographic area or within a specified distance or travel time from the workplace as a condition of employment.
Defendant maintains that the Legislature's failure to define the method of measuring the 20-mile minimum distance in § 2 renders the statute ambiguous, because the term "20 miles" is susceptible to being measured in either radial miles or road miles. Moreover, defendant claims that this ambiguity is easily...
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