Lataures L. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
| Decision Date | 27 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 4:18-cv-00067 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia |
| Parties | LATAURES L., Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. |
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Lataures L. asks the Court to review the Commissioner of Social Security's final decision denying her claims for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and supplemental security income ("SSI") under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act (the "Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434, 1381-1383f. The case is before me under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). ECF No. 11. Having considered the administrative record, the parties' briefs, and the applicable law, I cannot find that the Commissioner's final decision is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, I respectfully recommend that the decision be reversed and the case remanded under the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The Social Security Act authorizes this Court to review the Commissioner's final decision that a person is not entitled to disability benefits. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); see also Hines v. Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 2006). The Court's role, however, is limited—it may not "reweigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment" for that of agency officials. Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir.2012). Instead, a court reviewing the merits of the Commissioner's final decision asks only whether the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") applied the correct legal standards and whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's factual findings. Meyer v. Astrue, 662 F.3d 700, 704 (4th Cir. 2011); see Riley v. Apfel, 88 F. Supp. 2d 572, 576 (W.D. Va. 2000) (citing Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89 (1991)).
"Substantial evidence" means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). It is "more than a mere scintilla" of evidence, id., but not necessarily "a large or considerable amount of evidence." Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). Substantial evidence review considers the entire record, and not just the evidence cited by the ALJ. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487-89 (1951); Gordon v. Schweiker, 725 F.2d 231, 236 (4th Cir. 1984). Ultimately, this Court must affirm the ALJ's factual findings if "conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled." Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). However, "[a] factual finding by the ALJ is not binding if it was reached by means of an improper standard or misapplication of the law." Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987).
A person is "disabled" within the meaning of the Act if he or she is unable to engage in "any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). Social Security ALJs follow a five-step process to determine whether a claimant is disabled. The ALJ asks, in sequence, whether the claimant (1) is working; (2) has a severe impairment that satisfies the Act's duration requirement; (3) has an impairment that meets orequals an impairment listed in the Act's regulations; (4) can return to his or her past relevant work based on his or her residual functional capacity; and, if not (5) whether he or she can perform other work. See Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460-62 (1983); Lewis v. Berryhill, 858 F.3d 858, 861 (4th Cir. 2017); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 426.920(a)(4).2 The claimant bears the burden of proof through step four. Lewis, 858 F.3d at 861. At step five, the burden shifts to the agency to prove that the claimant is not disabled. See id.
Lataures filed for SSI and DIB alleging that she was disabled by an intellectual disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, severe asthma, and severe bronchitis. See Administrative Record ("R.") 75, 140, 313-19, 346-49, ECF No. 9. She was thirty years old, or a "younger person" under the regulations, when she allegedly became disabled on November 30, 2013. R. 140; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1563(c), 416.963(c). Disability Determination Services ("DDS"), the state agency, denied her SSI claim initially in October 2015, R. 139-53, and upon reconsideration in February 2016, R. 154-70.3 On August 10, 2017, Lataures appeared with counsel and testified at an administrative hearing before ALJ Mary Peltzer. R. 95-138. A vocational expert ("VE") also testified at this hearing. See id.
ALJ Peltzer issued an unfavorable decision on January 25, 2018. R. 75-89. Lataures's asthma, obesity, intellectual disorder, and major depressive disorder were "severe" medical impairments, R. 78, but they did not meet or equal the relevant Listings, see R. 78-82 . She had the residual functional capacity("RFC") to perform "medium work"4 with the following limitations:
no [climbing] ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; frequent balancing; occasional stooping and crouching; occasional exposure to extreme cold, extreme heat, humidity, wetness, respiratory irritants . . . and workplace hazards . . . , but no exposure to unprotected heights. She can perform unskilled work . . . involving simple, routine tasks in a static work environment where changes in tasks are infrequent and explained when they do occur, [there is] no independent goal setting, and where the pace of productivity is not dictated by an external source over which she has no control. She can have occasional contact with coworkers[, but] no tandem work assignments and no tasks involving contact with the general public.
R. 82. Based on this RFC and the VE's testimony ALJ Peltzer concluded at step five that Lataures was not disabled after November 2013 because she still could perform certain "light"5 to "medium" unskilled occupations (cleaner/sweeper, janitor, marker) that offered a significant number of jobs in the national economy. R. 88; see R. 129-32. The Appeals Council denied Lataures's request to review that decision, R. 1, and this appeal followed.
Lataures makes two arguments on appeal. See Pl.'s Br. 3-5, 5-8, ECF No. 13. First, she argues ALJ Peltzer erred by finding Lataures's intellectual disorder did not meet Listing 12.05B, noting in particular that the ALJ "ignored" Lataures's academic records showing she had "marked" limitations in her abilities to understand, remember, and apply information and to maintain concentration, persistence, and pace. See id. at 3-5. Second, she objects that ALJ Peltzer's RFC finding does not reflect Lataures's "limited ability to complete a normal workdayor workweek without interruption," her "need for very close supervision," or her reliance on supervisors to repeat even "simplified instructions." Id. at 5. While the Court cannot go so far as to make those findings, there's no question ALJ Peltzer failed at both steps to explain how she made certain findings, why the evidence she chose to cite (if any) supported her conclusions, and how she weighed other evidence in the record that either contradicted those findings or indicated Lataures had greater work-related functional limitations than ALJ Peltzer found. In short, ALJ Peltzer's "failure to build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to [her] conclusion constitutes reversible error," Lewis, 858 F.3d at 868, because the Court cannot "determine whether the . . . decision is supported as a matter of fact and law," Kenne v. Berryhill, 732 F. App'x 174, 177 (4th Cir. 2018).
The Listings are examples of medical conditions that "ordinarily prevent a person from working" in any capacity, "not just [in] substantial gainful activity." Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 532-33 (1990) (quotation marks omitted). If a claimant's severe impairment(s) "satisfies all of the criteria of [the corresponding] listing, including any relevant criteria in the introduction," 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1525(c)(3), 416.925(c)(3), then the claimant is "entitled to a conclusive presumption" that he or she is disabled, Radford v. Colvin, 734 F.3d 288, 291 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 471 (1986)). To make this determination, the ALJ must identify the relevant listed impairment(s) and "compare[] each of the listed criteria" to the relevant evidence in the record. Cook v. Heckler, 783 F.2d 1168, 1173 (4th Cir. 1986). The ALJ's step-three findings "are supposed to represent reasoned consideration of all the pertinent evidence, and are not simply an opportunity to give the claimant the benefit of the doubt at one step while taking it away at the next step." Claiborne v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., Civ. No.SAG-14-1918, 2015 WL 2061284, at *4 (D. Md. May 1, 2015). They also play an important role in the ALJ's "holistic and fact-specific [RFC] evaluation" before step four. Patterson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 846 F.3d 656, 659 (4th Cir. 2017).
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ALJ Peltzer considered whether Lataures's cognitive impairment met Listing 12.05, which "is based on the three elements that characterize intellectual disorder: Significantly subaverage general functioning; significant deficits in current adaptive functioning; and the disorder manifested before age 22." 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 § 12.00(H)(1); see id. § 12.05(A), (B). "Intellectual functioning refers to the general mental capacity to learn, reason, plan, solve problems, and perform other cognitive functions." Id. § 12.00(H)(2)(a). Listing 12.05(B)'s first prong requires a valid "full scale . . . IQ score of 70 or below" on a standardized test of general intelligence, id. § 12.05(B)(1)(a),...
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