Lathe v. Lathe
| Decision Date | 21 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | NO. 01-18-00936-CV,01-18-00936-CV |
| Parties | JASON HENRY LATHE, Appellant v. RACHEL LATHE, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the County Court at Law Atascosa County, Texas1
Appellant, Jason Henry Lathe, challenges the trial court's property division in its final decree, entered after a bench trial, in his suit for divorce against appellee, Rachel Lathe. In two issues, Jason contends that the trial court erred in mischaracterizing certain community property as separate property wholly owned by Rachel and in awarding his separate estate only $8,695.90 in reimbursement.
We affirm.
In his original petition, Jason sought a divorce from Rachel, alleging that their marriage had "become insupportable because of discord or conflict of personalities." If he and Rachel did not reach an agreement for the division of the marital estate, Jason asked that he "be awarded a disproportionate share of the parties' estate" for, among other reasons, "fault in the breakup of the marriage." Jason also asked the trial court to reimburse his separate estate "for funds or assets expended by [his] separate estate for the benefit of the community."2
At trial, Jason testified that he and Rachel married on September 19, 2003 and they had three children. They separated in February 2017, and Jason filed for divorce.
As to ownership of the property on which Jason and Rachel lived, Jason testified that several months before he and Rachel married, in March 2003, Rachel'sparents, Raymond and Sheila Tschetter, gifted him and Rachel a lot located at 265 Sara Lane, Lytle, Texas 78052 (the "265 Sara Lane lot"). The trial court admitted into evidence Petitioner's Exhibit 6, a copy of a completed "Gift Certification" form that had been sent by facsimile delivery from Palm Harbor Homes, a manufactured home dealer. The completed form declared:
The trial court also admitted into evidence Respondent's Exhibit 1, a copy of a June 13, 2003 warranty deed with vendor's lien listing Rachel's parents as grantors and "Rachel Tschetter," with a mailing address of 265 Sara Lane, Lytle, Texas 78052, as the sole grantee of:
The warranty deed was recorded on July 3, 2003. Respondent's exhibit 2, a copy of a vendor's lien admitted into evidence, lists a principal amount of $100.00 and names Rachel Tschetter as the maker and Raymond Tschetter and Sheila R. Tschetter as payees. Also included in the exhibit is a Release of Lien acknowledging Rachel's payment of the $100.00 and releasing the property from the lien. Respondent's Exhibit 3, admitted into evidence, contains a copy of the Atascosa County Appraisal District's 2018 Property Details for the 265 Sara Lane lot, which shows Rachel as the 100 percent owner of the lot.
In July 2003, before their marriage, Rachel and Jason took out a loan to pay that debt and borrowed an additional $90,000 to buy a manufactured home for the lot. The lot served as collateral for the loan. Copies of mortgage documents admitted into evidence list Rachel and Jason as responsible parties. According to Jason, at the time of trial, the parties still owed about $60,000 on that loan.
Jason opined that the 265 Sara Lane lot was community property because the Gift Certification named both Rachel and Jason as recipients. And he believed that he was entitled to $30,000 for his share of the lot and home, which, he represented, was fifty percent of the equity in its appraised value.
Rachel's mother testified that her and her husband lived next door to the 265 Sara Lane lot; Rachel's brother and his wife lived on the property on the other side of the parents' home. Rachel's mother and her husband had purchased three adjacent lots on Sara Lane, one for each of their biological children, for each one to "have their own land." For this reason, Rachel's mother explained, she and her husband transferred the 265 Sara Lane lot to Rachel only and never intended to gift the land to both Rachel and Jason. As for preparing the Gift Certification, Rachel's mother recalled that "Palm Harbor wanted a document saying a gift with Jason's name on it . . . even though it would not override the deed." She and her husband signed the Gift Certification "[b]ecause that's what Palm Harbor asked us to do so they could get the house loan." When Rachel's parents signed the Gift Certification, about $17,000 in debt remained outstanding on the 265 Sara Lane lot.
The trial court found that the 265 Sara Lane lot was Rachel's separate property and the manufactured home on it was the separate property of both Jason and Rachel as co-tenants. It awarded fifty percent of the manufactured home's value to Jason and fifty percent to Rachel. Because part of the home loan was used to pay off the debt on the 265 Sara Lane lot, the trial court found that Rachel was solely responsible for that portion of the loan and that Jason was entitled to reimbursement in the amount of $8,695.90. The trial court ordered that Jason be given a lien on the lot to secure his right to that reimbursement. The trial court then awarded 100 percent ofthe lot value to Rachel, fifty percent of the structure value to Rachel and fifty percent of the structure value to Jason. The final divorce decree awards a 100 percent undivided interest in the 265 Sara Lane lot to Rachel "as her sole and separate property" and divests Jason "of all right, title, interest, and claim in and to that property."
In his first issue, Jason argues that the trial court erred in mischaracterizing the 265 Sara Lane lot as separate property instead of community property and in awarding Rachel a 100 percent undivided interest in the lot because the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's determination.
Most of the appealable issues in family-law cases, including property division incident to divorce, are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Reddick v. Reddick, 450 S.W.3d 182, 187 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.); Moroch v. Collins, 174 S.W.3d 849, 857 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably, or without any reference to guiding rules and principles. Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990). The trial court has broad discretion in dividing the community estate, and we must indulge every reasonable presumption in favor of the trial court's proper exercise of its discretion. Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1981); In re Marriage of C.A.S. & D.P.S., 405 S.W.3d 373, 384 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.). But onlycommunity property is subject to the trial court's division of the marital estate and in making its division the trial court may not divest one party of his separate property. Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210, 220 (Tex. 1982); Robles v. Robles, 965 S.W.2d 605, 614 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied). When a court mischaracterizes separate property as community property, the error requires reversal because the subsequent division divests a spouse of his or her separate property. McElwee v. McElwee, 911 S.W.2d 182, 189 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied).
In family-law cases, legal- and factual-sufficiency challenges do not constitute independent grounds for asserting error but are relevant factors in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. Moroch, 174 S.W.3d at 857. To determine whether a trial court abused its discretion because the evidence is legally or factually insufficient to support its decision, we consider whether the trial court (1) had sufficient evidence upon which to exercise its discretion and (2) erred in its application of that discretion. Id. We conduct the applicable sufficiency review when considering the first prong of the test. Id. We then determine whether, based on the evidence, the trial court made a reasonable decision. Id. Stated another way, the party challenging the trial court's characterization of property must establish error by challenging the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the property's characterization and then show that because ofthe mischaracterization, the trial court abused its discretion. See Viera v. Viera, 331 S.W.3d 195, 207 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, no pet.). A trial court does not abuse its discretion if there is some evidence of a substantive and probative character to support the decision. Moroch, 174 S.W.3d at 857.
"Community property consists of the property, other than separate property, acquired by either spouse during marriage." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.002. A spouse's separate property includes property owned or claimed by the spouse before the marriage. Id. § 3.001.
"Generally, whether property is separate...
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