Lathrop v. Merrill

• Citation: 92 N.E. 1019,207 Mass. 6
• Parties: LATHROP v. MERRILL et al.
• Decision Date: 28 October 1910
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

207 Mass. 6

92 N.E. 1019

LATHROP v. MERRILL et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampden.

October 28, 1910

The following is a part of the will of Lucy A. Fuller, deceased:

'First I give to my nephew, Edward F. Merrill, three thousand dollars ($3,000) and to my nephew Henry C. Merrill two thousand dollars ($2,000) to be paid at the convenience of my executor.

'Second I give to my son Francis H. Fuller two thousand dollars. Also I give to my executor all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate to pay over the entire income thereof to my son Francis H. Fuller during his life.

'Third: After the death of my son I give to the Springfield Young Men's Christian Association five hundred dollars ($500); to the Woman's Board of Missions connected with the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions five hundred dollars; to the Hampden County Children's Aid Society five hundred dollars; and to the American Home Missionary Society five hundred dollars; to Edward F. Merrill three thousand dollars; and to Henry C. Merrill two thousand dollars.

'Should there be anything then remaining, I direct that it be divided equally among the six legatees mentioned in this clause.

'Fourth: I direct that all gifts, whether of principal or income made in this will, should not be alienable by the legatee, nor subject to interference by creditors, until paid to the legatee.'

COUNSEL

J. B. Carroll, W. H. McClintock, and J. F. Jennings, for respondent fuller.

C. H. Barrows, for respondent Merrill.

OPINION

LORING J.

The question upon which the rights of the defendants in this case depend is this: Were the interests which the legatees took under the third clause of the will legal or equitable interests?

A testator cannot qualify a devise of a legal estate in land or a bequest of an absolute legal interest in personal property by a provision that the devisee's estate or the legatee's interest shall not be alienated nor taken for his debts. Of that there never has been and is not now any doubt. Co. Lit. 223, a; Blackstone Bank v. Davis, 21 Pick. 42, 32 Am. Dec. 241; Gleason v. Fayerweather, 4 Gray, 348; Lane v. Lane, 8 Allen, 350; Broadway National Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170, 171, 43 Am. Rep. 504; Todd v. Sawyer, 147 Mass. 570, 17 N.E. 527; Winsor v. Mills, 157 Mass. 362, 363, 364, 32 N.E. 352; Butterfield v. Reed, 160 Mass. 361, 35 N.E. 1128; Cushing v. Spalding, 164 Mass. 287, 41 N.E. 297. See, also, Ide v. Ide, 5 Mass. 499; Bassett v. Nickerson, 184 Mass. 169, 68 N.E. 25; Galligan v. McDonald, 200 Mass. 299, 86 N.E. 304, 128 Am. St. Rep. 421.

On the other hand it must be taken now to be settled in this commonwealth that in case of the devise of an equitable fee in land or the bequest of an equitable interest in personal property the rule which originated in Broadway Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170, 43 Am. Rep. 504, obtains, and limitations against alienation and forbidding the property to be taken for the debts of the devisee or legatee are valid. Claflin v. Claflin, 149 Mass. 19, 20 N.E. 454, 3 L. R. A. 370, 14 Am. St. Rep. 393; Young v. Snow, 167 Mass. 287, 45 N.E. 686; Danahy v. Noonan, 176 Mass. 467, 57 N.E. 679; Hoffman v. New England Trust Co., 187 Mass. 205, 72 N.E. 952; Dunn v. Dobson, 198 Mass. 142, 84 N.E. 327.

Had the gift of the residue to the son of the testatrix been in terms a gift to him for life, the residue would have been held by the executor during the life of the son, the income of it would have been paid by him to the son during his life, and on his death the residue would have been paid over by the executor to the legatees to whom it was given on the son's death. Dorr v. Wainwright, 13 Pick. 338; Field v. Hitchcock, 17 Pick, 182, 183, 28 Am. Dec. 288; Homer v. Shelton, 2 Metc. 194, 206; Johnson v. Bridgewater Iron Manuf. Co., 14 Gray, 274; Lewis v. Shattuck, 173 Mass. 486, 53 N.E. 912. The gift over in that case would have been a bequest of a legal interest for which the legatee could have brought an action of contract. Rev. Laws, c. 141,§ 19. We do not think that the language of Field, J., in Hooper v. Bradbury, 133 Mass. 303, 307, should be taken to mean anything more than that the relation between the executor and the life tenant in such a case is a trust or in the nature of a trust.

We must assume on this record that the residue consisted entirely of personal property. The bill is brought by an administrator with the will annexed as such, for instructions as to the distribution of 'assets' in his hands.

All the personal property of a testator vests in his executor by the probate of the will. Hays v. Jackson, 6 Mass. 149, 152; Dawes v. Boylston, 9 Mass. 337, 352, 6 Am. Dec. 72; Clapp v. Stoughton, 10 Pick. 463, 468. It is sometimes said that an executor holds as trustee for the legatees. But all that is meant by that is that he holds title to his testator's goods in autre droit (Weeks v. Gibbs, 9 Mass. 74, 75, 76), and not in his own right. The right of those for whom he holds is a legal not an equitable right, and is enforced by an action at law. Rev. Laws, c. 141, § 19.

The bequest to the executor to pay the income to her son for life had no more effect than a devise to an heir. The result in the case at bar is the same as if there had been no bequest to the executor. This seems to have been assumed in the administration of the estate of the testatrix. The residue seems to have been administered by the administrator with the will annexed as such.

The result is that the gifts over after the son's life estate were gifts of an absolute legal, not of an absolute equitable, interest.

The remaining question is this: Since the fourth clause of her will shows...