Latta v. State
| Decision Date | 24 January 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 46A03-9811-PC-478.,46A03-9811-PC-478. |
| Citation | 722 N.E.2d 389 |
| Parties | Jacqueline LATTA, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Susan K. Capenter, Public Defender of Indiana, Hope Fey, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellant.
Jeffrey A. Modisett, Attorney General of Indiana, Thomas D. Perkins, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee.
Appellant-Petitioner, Jacqueline Latta ("Latta") appeals the post-conviction court's denial of her petition for relief from her conviction of murder.1
We reverse and remand for new trial.
Latta raises nine issues on appeal. However, we find one issue dispositive:2 whether Latta was denied effective assistance at trial due to an actual conflict of interest.
Latta and her husband, Roger Latta (Roger), lived with their two-year-old son, Brad, in Hanna, Indiana. During the evening of February 14 and the early morning hours of February 15, 1989, the house burned. Brad died in his bed because of the fire. Roger and Latta managed to escape from the burning house.
Investigators from the sheriff's department, fire department and a private insurance company concluded that the fire was set by the intentional pouring of a liquid accelerant on the floor of the kitchen, the living room, and Brad's bedroom.
Roger and Latta were charged with murder. They hired private counsel, Earl Studtman ("Studtman"), to represent them both to pursue the joint defense that the fire was the result of an electrical fire that originated in the attic. Studtman requested funds from the trial court to obtain expert witnesses to assist in preparing their defense. This motion was denied.
On June 26, 1989, defense counsel moved for separate trials of Latta and Roger. The trial court denied the Motion for Separate Trials, finding "that the defendant is not entitled to a separate trial as a matter of right merely because the issues of proof are substantially different, that a conspiracy or accessory have [sic] not been raised as issues in the information." (R. 60). A joint trial by jury began on March 6, 1990.
In preparation for trial, Studtman taped a visual sequence of the crime scene and provided oral narration. During the trial, the State moved for a mistrial due to a conflict of interest. In the State's motion for a mistrial, Prosecutor Duerring stated:
So, first two grounds for the Motion for Mistrial is, one, that he [Studtman] has become a necessary witness in this case which will require him to withdraw. Two, that his involvement in the video tape is interfering or apparently interfering with the independent professional judgment in the case foreclosing the course of action at one time they thought were necessary. The third grounds for my Motion for Mistrial is that, ...
The testimony yesterday of Sergeant Boyd, again, in my opinion, clearly implicates one of the Defendants much greater than the other Defendant. I don't know how at this stage of the development of the trial that Mr. Studtman can continue to represent the best interest of both clients when one begins to be more clearly implicated than the other...
(R. 1782-1784). The State expressed concern that defense counsel's ability to represent each defendant was adversely affected by his duty to both. The State's motion was in part based on testimony by Sergeant Boyd that Latta partially confessed to starting the fire.
The trial court interviewed both Latta and Roger regarding the potential conflict of interest resulting from the admission of the videotape. The following colloquy ensued:
(R. 1806). The trial court subsequently denied the State's motion for a mistrial.3
After a jury trial, Roger and Latta were each found guilty of murder and sentenced to the Indiana Department of Correction for fifty years.
Roger and Latta brought a joint direct appeal and hired Studtman to represent them. On direct appeal, we concluded that: (1) the motion to suppress the pre-trial statements was properly denied; (2) the search of the home to gather evidence of criminal activity after the fire had been put out was illegal, however the admission of the evidence obtained pursuant to an illegal search did not require reversal of a conviction because the admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) there was sufficient evidence of murder; (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit photos based on relevancy of the attic taken five months after the fire; (5) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defense's motion for a mistrial;4 (6) failure to object during trial to the trial court's treatment of jury questions waived any subsequent appeal of the trial court's treatment of the issue; and (7) the container of charcoal lighter fluid was properly admitted. We affirmed the conviction and sentencing.
On April 10, 1992, Latta filed a Petition for Post-Conviction relief. The petition for relief was amended on September 30, 1996, April 10, 1997, and May 19, 1997. The State filed answers on April 29, 1992, and February 26, 1997. On October 8, 1998, the petition was denied. On November 6, 1998, the Praecipe was filed, and this appeal followed.
Latta appeals from a negative judgment by the trial court on her motion for post-conviction relief. A post-conviction petition under Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1 is a quasi-civil remedy, and as such, the petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that she is entitled to relief. Mato v. State, 478 N.E.2d 57, 60 (Ind.1985); Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(5). Latta must now convince the court that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the post-conviction court. Harrison v. State, 707 N.E.2d 767, 773 (Ind.1999), reh'g denied. Specifically, in cases of alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, the proper standard to be applied by the post-conviction court is whether, considering the alleged deficiency, the ultimate result was fundamentally unfair or unreasonable. Games v. State, 690 N.E.2d 211, 214 (Ind. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 838, 119 S.Ct. 98, 142 L.Ed.2d 78. Moreover, when the petitioner has already been afforded the benefit of a direct appeal, post-conviction relief contemplates a rather small window for further review. Montano v. State, 649 N.E.2d 1053, 1056 (Ind.Ct.App.1995).
Latta alleges that she was denied effective assistance of counsel due to an actual conflict of interest resulting from her counsel's joint representation of both defendants.
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States guarantees the right of a defendant in a criminal case to the effective assistance of counsel. Williams v. State, 529 N.E.2d 1313, 1315 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). Included within the Sixth Amendment is the right to representation by an attorney who does not owe conflicting duties to other defendants. Id. (citing Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978)). However, joint representation of criminal defendants is not a per se violation of the right to effective assistance of counsel. Mullins v. State, 523 N.E.2d 419, 422 (Ind. 1988) (citing Carpenter v. State, 501 N.E.2d 1067 (Ind.1986)).
In order to obtain a new trial, Latta must show that her trial counsel had an actual conflict of interest and that the conflict adversely affected counsel's performance. Sada v. State, 706 N.E.2d 192, 199 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). Because Latta did not object to the joint representation at trial, she must show that the joint representation resulted in actual prejudice. Id. (citing Gray v. State, 579 N.E.2d 605, 607 (Ind.1991)). Thus, Latta must show that (1) an actual conflict of interest existed, (2) that it adversely affected her counsel's performance, and (3) that she was prejudiced by the affect of the conflict on her counsel's performance.
An actual conflict arises during joint representation when there is a divergence of interests between the defendants. Holleman v. State, 641 N.E.2d 638, 640 (Ind.Ct.App.1994); Tate v. State, 515 N.E.2d 1145, 1147 (Ind.Ct.App.1987); See also U.S. v. Lyons, 703 F.2d 815 (5th Cir.1983)
(); and Parker v. Parratt, 662 F.2d 479 (8th Cir.1981)(where there are markedly different degrees of relative culpability between co-defendants, there is a likelihood of a conflict of interest).
At trial, Latta and Roger presented a unified defense arguing that the fire was the result of an electrical short in the attic; however, there was a divergence of their interests throughout. At a taped interview of Roger taken before trial, Studtman objected to a question about Latta, because an answer to the question might tend to incriminate Roger. In ...
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Latta v. State
...assistance of counsel by reason of Studtmann's actual conflict of interest in representing both Latta and Roger. Latta v. State, 722 N.E.2d 389, 392 (Ind.Ct. App.2000). The court then concluded that Latta had demonstrated that an actual conflict of interest existed, that this conflict had a......
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