Lau v. Bautista
| Decision Date | 23 July 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 6298,6298 |
| Citation | 598 P.2d 161,61 Haw. 144 |
| Parties | Thomas C. S. LAU and Henry Choy Lau, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Cayetano BAUTISTA, Rufino Tahanlangit, Aquino Arce, Hermogenes L. Rania, Mariano Laureno, Hilario Baisa, Martin Villar, Felix C. Soria, Edwardo Cagatin, Lee Chun, Adolph Von, Juan A. Lamar and Kam Shing Young, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | Hawaii Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Under H.R.C.P., Rule 56(c), a summary judgment will be sustained only if the record shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
2. Inferences to be drawn from the record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
3. For purposes of ruling on a summary judgment a fact is material if proof of that fact would have the effect of establishing or refuting one of the essential elements of a cause of action or defense asserted by the parties.
4. The sufficiency of a notice must be judged within its four corners.
5. Where a landlord brings an action for summary possession based on a tenant's failure to pay rent, the tenant may assert the landlord's breach of an implied warranty of habitability as an affirmative defense.
6. The tenant's obligation to pay rent and the landlord's duty to maintain the premises in habitable condition are mutually dependent.
7. In the factual context of this case (landlord is ordered to demolish the dwelling structure because of a determination by a governmental agency that the structures are in substandard condition) the tenants may assert the landlords' alleged breach of an implied warranty of habitability as an affirmative defense.
8. The State Assistance to Displaced Persons Act, HRS chapter 111, requires 9. Under H.R.C.P., Rule 19(a), if a "person to be joined if feasible" has not been joined, "the court shall order that he be made a party." Where joinder is feasible, the court need not proceed under Rule 19(b) to determine whether to proceed or dismiss for lack of an indispensable party.
that adequate relocation assistance be provided to displaced persons prior to eviction.
Wayson W. S. Chow, Honolulu (Leonor Tamoria, Honolulu, with him on briefs), for defendants-appellants.
Thomas M. Rosenberg, Honolulu (Kai, Dodge & Evensen, Honolulu, of counsel) for plaintiffs-appellees.
Before RICHARDSON, C. J., OGATA and MENOR, JJ., and MARUMOTO and KOBAYASHI, JJ., assigned by reason of vacancies.
This is an appeal from an order of the circuit court, granting partial summary judgment to plaintiff-appellees Thomas C. S. Lau and Henry Choy Lau (hereinafter appellees) against defendant-tenant-appellants Cayetano Bautista, Rufino Tahanlangit, Aquino Arce, Hermogenes L. Rania, Mariano Laureno, Hilario Baisa, Martin Villar, Felix C. Soria, Edwardo Cagatin, Lee Chun, Adolph Von, Juan A. Lamar, and Kam Shing Young (hereinafter appellants); from an order denying appellants' motion to dismiss; and from an order granting appellees' motion for issuance of writ of possession. We reverse.
In the court below, appellees brought an action for summary possession and damages against appellants.
Appellants filed an answer and counterclaim. Appellants' answer raised, among others, the following defenses: failure to join the City and County of Honolulu, Department of Housing and Community Development, as an indispensable party; violation of due process in appellees' "attempt to displace (appellants) without first following the procedures contained in Chapter 111, Hawaii Revised Statutes"; the doctrine of retaliatory eviction; appellees' breach of an implied warranty of habitability.
Appellants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to H.R.C.P., Rule 12(b)(7), contending that the City and County of Honolulu was an indispensable party under H.R.C.P., Rule 19. The trial court denied the motion.
Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court, without resolution of appellants' defenses and counterclaim, granted summary judgment as to the issue of possession. However, the court denied summary judgment with respect to all other issues, including appellants' counterclaim.
The trial court issued a writ of possession. However, the writ of possession was stayed pending appeal to this court.
I. Whether appellees complied with the notice requirements of HRS § 521-71(a) (1974 Supp.).
II. Whether appellants may assert breach of an implied warranty of habitability as an affirmative defense in the action for summary possession.
III. Whether adequate relocation assistance was offered to appellants.
IV. Whether the City and County of Honolulu is an indispensable party under H.R.C.P., Rule 19.
OPINIONUnder H.R.C.P., Rule 56(c), a summary judgment will be sustained only if the record shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hunt v. Chang, 60 Haw. 608, 618, 594 P.2d 118, 124 (1979); Gealon v. Keala, 60 Haw. 513, 518, 591 P.2d 621, 625 (1979). Inferences to be drawn from the record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Hunt v. Chang, supra, 60 Haw. at 618, 594 P.2d at 124; Hokama v. Relinc Corp., 57 Haw. 470, 472, 559 P.2d 279, 281 (1977).
For purposes of ruling on a summary judgment a fact is material if proof of that fact would have the effect of establishing or refuting one of the essential elements of a cause of action or defense asserted by the parties. Hunt v. Chang, supra, 60 Haw. at 618, 594 P.2d at 124. See Richards v. Midkiff, 48 Haw. 32, 39, 396 P.2d 49, 54 (1964).
HRS § 521-71(a) (1974 Supp.) 1 provides:
When the tenancy is month to month, the landlord or the tenant may terminate the rental agreement upon his notifying the other at least twenty-eight days in advance of the anticipated termination.
Appellants contend that appellees' letter of April 14, 1975, did not constitute sufficient notice.
It is undisputed that appellees sent appellants a letter, dated April 14, 1975, and entitled, "Notice to vacate and demolition of building." The letter stated:
We are in receipt of a letter from the City and County of Honolulu Director and Building Superintendent, notifying us that the premises you now occupy must be demolished. The structures have been found to be substandard and therefore continued occupancy on your part will be at your own risk.
You are hereby advised to move immediately if possible, but not later than thirty (30) days from the date of this letter.
We construe the letter to constitute sufficient notice. The sufficiency of a notice must be judged within its four corners. Carteret Properties v. Variety Donuts, Inc., 49 N.J. 116, 125, 228 A.2d 674, 679 (1967).
Appellants contend that certain appellants did not receive timely notice under HRS § 521-71(a) (1974 Supp.).
Under the provisions of HRS § 521-71(a) (1974 Supp.), appellees were required to notify appellants "at least twenty-eight days in advance of the anticipated termination." The "anticipated termination" was May 14, 1975, which was thirty days from the date of the letter. Twenty-eight days in advance of May 14, 1975, was April 16, 1975. Appellees were thus required to notify appellants on or before April 16, 1975.
There is a genuine dispute as to whether appellants Cagatin, Laureno, and Tahanlangit received timely notice. The trial court erred, therefore, in granting summary possession against these appellants.
It is undisputed that appellants Lamar and Villar did not receive timely notice. The complaint filed by the appellees should have been dismissed as to appellants Lamar and Villar.
There is no dispute that appellants Arce, Baisa, Bautista, Lee, Rania, Soria, Von, and Young received timely notice. However, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for summary possession against these appellants without first resolving the issues concerning the affirmative defense of breach of an implied warranty of habitability and the adequacy of relocation assistance.
Appellants' answer to complaint raised breach of an implied warranty of habitability as a defense.
Appellants contend that (t)he trial court's granting of possession where the defense of breach of warranty of habitability was raised was improper as a matter of law.
In Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 433, 462 P.2d 470, 474 (1969), we held that in the lease of a dwelling there is an implied warranty of habitability and fitness for the use intended. Having adopted the view that a lease is essentially a contractual relationship, we stated that upon breach of an implied warranty of habitability, a tenant would be entitled to the basic contract remedies of damages, reformation, and rescission. Id., 51 Haw. at 436, 462 P.2d at 475.
We extended the holding of Lemle v. Breeden, supra, in Lund v. MacArthur, 51 Haw. 473, 462 P.2d 482 (1969). In Lund, we held that an implied warranty of habitability exists in the lease of furnished, as well as unfurnished, dwellings. Id., 51 Haw. at 475, 462 P.2d at 483.
Whether a tenant may assert breach of an implied warranty of habitability as a defense in an action for summary possession is a question of first impression in this jurisdiction.
We hold that where a landlord brings an action for summary possession based on a tenant's failure to pay rent, 2 the tenant may assert the landlord's breach of an implied warranty of habitability as an affirmative defense. Green v. Superior Court of City and County of San Francisco, 10 Cal.3d 616, 637, 111 Cal.Rptr. 704, 718, 517 P.2d 1168, 1182 (1974); LeClair v. Woodward, 6 Conn.Cir. 727, 728, 316 A.2d 791, 792 (1970); Rome v. Walker, 38 Mich.App. 458, 464-65, 196 N.W.2d...
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